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Alexandre Papas

Khārijīs

Khārijīs (also Khārijites; Ar. *khawārij*, sing. *khārijī*, "those who went out") is the epithet given to groups of Muslim sectarians who held pious action to be the main criterion for accepting a person as a true Muslim, and who rejected the exclusive claims to the caliphate of the Quraysh, the tribe of the prophet Muḥammad, as well as the claims of the ʿAlids. Among Khārijīs, the term *khawārij* itself enjoyed only limited use among some militants (ʿAbbās, 105–6, 125; Gaiser, *Shurat legends*, 3), as the majority of early adherents preferred the term *shurāt* (sing. *shārī*), "exchangers," likely referring to Qurʾān 9:111, which mentions those who exchange their lives in the way of God for Paradise. The first Khārijīs, known as the Muḥakkima, seceded from the army of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (d. 40/661) in 37/657, at the Battle of Ṣiffīn, during the first *fitna* (civil war), after ʿAlī agreed to submit to arbitration his dispute with Muʿāwiya b. Abī Ṣufyān (d. 60/680) over caliphal succession. Later, in the Umayyad period (41–132/661–750), more belligerent Khārijīs considered any who would not join their group, as well as unrepentant sinners, to have left the community of Muslims and thereby to have become legitimate targets of violence. Other, less confrontational, Khārijīs migrated out from the cities of Basra and Kufa into other regions of the early Islamic world, where they practised dissimulation (*taqiyya*, the denial of religious beliefs and practices in the face of persecution) and lived among their fellow non-Khārijī Muslims. Most of the groups that were considered Khārijī disappeared in the Umayyad and early ʿAbbāsid (132–656/750–1258) eras; the only remaining subgroup to survive into the present time is the Ibāḍiyya, and they reject being associated with the Khārijīs, although they embrace the Muḥakkima and early *shurāt*.

1. Challenges to the study of the Khārijīs

The challenges facing the scholarly study of the Khārijīs remain numerous and weighty, and they bear directly on what can be profitably said about them. For these reasons, the source-critical and

theoretical issues surrounding the academic conceptualisation of the Khārijīs need to be addressed up front. First, the nature of the Muslim sources on those who were retroactively labelled Khārijīs makes obtaining an accurate portrait of these groups difficult (and in many cases impossible). With the exception of Ibāḍī sources, almost nothing from the Khārijīs themselves survives that has not been mediated through later (and mostly proto-Sunnī, Sunnī, and Shīʿī) non-Khārijī sources. And while these non-Khārijī Muslim sources clearly use earlier Khārijī works as the basis of their narratives, non-Khārijī Muslim author-editors remained hostile to the Khārijī groups about which they wrote. Disentangling what might have come from the Khārijīs themselves from what has been added by later editors is difficult at best and not always achievable (Lewinstein, Azāriqa, 251–2; Gaiser, Methodologies, 1377ff.).

Secondly, both Khārijī authors and the mediaeval Muslim author-editors who preserved their writings were not interested in "history" in the modern sense. Rather, these authors manipulated the stuff of history to present idealised images of their subjects, whether sympathetic or disparaging, and they did so by liberally employing recognised literary tropes and schemata. One literary genre in particular—Islamic heresiography (or heresiology)—deserves special mention, as it constitutes a problematic mainstay of studies on the Khārijīs: often drawing upon a quotation attributed to the prophet Muḥammad to the effect that the Islamic community would break up into seventy-three sects, only one of which would be the "saved sect" (*al-firqa al-nājiya*), many Muslim heresiographers sought to produce encyclopedic works that set the "saved" Muslim sect against a host of seventy-two unacceptable deviant groups (Watt, 2–6). Thus, and in addition to the textual issues of transmission, dating, anachronism, and polemical alteration, the heresiographical tendency to "fit" material into seventy-three sectarian moulds adds a further layer of distortion insofar as it hides the compressions (that is, placing unrelated groups or persons together under a single taxon) or expansions (breaking up a group into discrete taxa) inherent in this exercise. As an example, Lewinstein argues that the heresiographers invented or possibly inherited an already invented category—the "Ṣufriyya"—into which they could dump all problematic or otherwise uncategorisable Khārijī material, making the early "Ṣufriyya" (as they appear in heresiographical writings) something of a catch-all group (Lewinstein, Making, 75–96). The modern historian, then, must analyse what are essentially literary images of the Khārijīs, who have often been vilified and/or highly schematised by later Muslim author-editors.

The extent to which any given scholar engages with these source-critical issues tends to bear on his or her particular academic approach to the study of the Khārijīs. Works, for example, that treat the sources as if they present an impartial and "historical" portrait of the early Khārijī groups tend to view the more militant elements among them as the most representative and to take descriptions of their doctrines at face value (Wellhausen, 19–23; Dabashi, 124ff.). On the other hand, studies that stress the polemical and literary quality of the sources sometimes point to how these works promote polemical strategies aimed at delegitimising the Khārijīs as a whole and accordingly treat descriptions of historical events

or doctrine with more restraint (Gaiser, *Shurat legends*, 87ff.).

The issue of whether or not to conceptualise the Khārijīs as a sectarian group (as this entry does for simplicity's sake) presents another critical scholarly issue. It is not clear that "sectarianism" is, in fact, the best theoretical framework for their study (Cook, Weber, 276), nor that those retroactively labelled the "Khārijīs" constituted a reified group. Employing the moniker "Khārijīs" implies a separate and semi-coherent movement with at least a minimum of common features to distinguish it from others of its kind. However, groups identified as "Khārijī" diverged radically from one another, and the broad ideas that could be said to characterise them in their earliest periods were not markedly different from some basic Qurʾānic notions or from certain caricatures of early Muslims that appear in later sources. For example, before the advent of the second *fitna* (60/680) those groups later described as "Khārijīs" seem connected by a hazily defined conviction that true Muslims demonstrated their submission to God through their actions, and that among the outward signs of submission was resisting unjust, sinful, and/or tyrannical rulers (be they ʿUthmān, ʿAlī, or later caliphs or governors). The first idea—that faith is demonstrated through action—is thoroughly grounded in Qurʾānic discussions of sin and unbelief (*kufr*), which strongly imply in several places that faith or its opposite can be intuited from a person's actions (Waldman, 452–3). Thus, the Khārijī linking of faith and deeds can be considered thoroughly Islamic, insofar as it reflects this Qurʾānic basis.

The second conviction—that piety requires, among other things, resisting unfit leaders—can likewise be attested as an Islamic ideal (that is, not exclusive to the Khārijīs), and one that purports to characterise the convictions of certain early Muslims. For example, Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh al-Azdī's (d. c. 164/781) *Futūḥ al-Shām* ("Conquest of Greater Syria") contains a description of the Muslim warriors (*ghāziyūn*) during the Islamic conquests: in al-Azdī's account, a Christian monk who has been sent to scout the advancing Muslim army returns to the Roman commander and describes the Muslim soldiers as "a people staying up through the night praying and remaining abstinent during the day, commanding right and forbidding wrong, monks by night, warriors by day. Should their king steal, they cut off his hand, and if he commits adultery they stone him" (al-Azdī, 115–6). While this description must not be confused with history per se, what it reflects is a literary concern with portraying the first Muslim soldiers as particularly pious, and that a marker of their piety included an eagerness to extend the Qurʾānic punishments even to their leaders (their "kings" in this quotation). In such light, descriptions of the early Khārijīs' willingness to label their opponents as unbelievers or to stand up to caliphs and governors whom they considered tyrannical appear as variations on this literary theme of early Islamic piety. In other words, it is difficult to see how the literary images of the Khārijīs that survive in the sources actually distinguish them from those of early Muslims as they are depicted in other narratives.

In their initial periods, then (insofar as these can be reconstructed from the sources), it is not altogether clear to what extent the first Khārijīs constituted a recognisable or entirely discrete Muslim group. And while it seems certain that the process of forming distinct Khārijī subgroups

with identifiable features likely began as early as the 60s/680s, the nature of the sources renders identifying the early stages of this development highly problematic. At best, the first Khārijīs might be considered a loosely defined politico-religious movement, unified only by their conviction that the caliph ʿUthmān (r. 23–35/644–56) had been killed justly, and that his successor ʿAlī had erred by agreeing to arbitrate his dispute with Muʿāwiya over who was rightful heir to the caliphate. Yet these disparate groups were unable to fully agree on what should be the consequences of these positions they held.

For the most part, then, history has left hybrid portraits of the Khārijīs that were fashioned by non-Khārijīs working in later periods and for their own purposes. These sources remain problematic for the reasons indicated above, and their interpretation has resulted in a wide range of scholarly attitudes toward the history, doctrine, and even the very concept of the Khārijīs. In the end, what can be said with any certainty about the groups later identified as Khārijīs remains very little and needs to be stated with considerable caution. It is hoped that such caveats will be borne in mind, especially with respect to the remainder of this entry: although it treats the Khārijīs as a sectarian group with at least semi-coherent doctrines and a history that can be narrated, it does so only because the alternative—continually qualifying and problematising every aspect of their history, doctrine, and presentation—remains equally untenable.

2. The origins and history of the Khārijī movement

Muslim and non-Muslim scholars alike trace the emergence of the Khārijīs to the events and aftermath of the Battle of Ṣiffīn in 37/657. Initially, those who became the first Khārijīs—also known as the Muḥakkima—supported ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib against the army of Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufyān, a cousin of the murdered caliph ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān (d. 35/656) and governor of Damascus. Muʿāwiya challenged ʿAlī's right to rule as caliph with the contention that ʿAlī had not done enough to punish the killers of ʿUthmān. For their part, ʿAlī and his supporters regarded Muʿāwiya as an opportunist, and many among them considered ʿUthmān to have been killed justly. The two armies met outside present-day Raqqa, in north-eastern Syria, on the plain of Ṣiffīn. When the tide of battle turned against Muʿāwiya, his general, ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ (d. 43/664), suggested that they escape total defeat by suing for arbitration. According to the traditional rendering of the story, Muʿāwiya's army allegedly made their plea for arbitration by placing pages of the Qurʾān (*maṣāḥif*) on lances and hoisting them up between the battle lines (suggesting that the Qurʾān should judge between them). The proposal split ʿAlī's army. Many, reportedly including ʿAlī himself, wanted to continue fighting (Madelung, *Succession*, 239ff.). Others, including some who subsequently joined the Muḥakkima, pressed ʿAlī to accept arbitration, to which ʿAlī grudgingly agreed. But as the details of the arbitration emerged, discontent grew among the ranks of ʿAlī's army, and a group among them came to believe that there could be no agreement with Muʿāwiya. Possibly citing Qurʾān 49:9 as the proof for their line of reasoning, this group argued that God had made His intentions clear regarding the likes of Muʿāwiya: he should be fought, using the terminology of Q 49:9, until he "returned to the ordinance (*amr*)

of God." The Qurʾānic verse in question reads in full: "And if two factions among the believers should fight, then make a settlement between the two. But if one of them oppresses the other, then fight against the one that oppresses until it returns to the ordinance of God. And if it returns, then make settlement between them in justice and act justly. Indeed, God loves those who act justly" (al-Qalhātī, 2:234, 249; al-Barrādī, 122; Gaiser, *Shurat legends*, 126–7). Arbitration (*taḥkīm*, *ḥukm al-ḥukūma*) therefore directly contradicted a clear Qurʾānic command to fight rebellious and oppressive factions until they returned to obedience, and only after returning to obedience could peaceable relations (*ṣulḥ*) be restored between them. In what became the slogan of the Khārijīs and a play on the term for arbitration, there was "no judgment but God's" (*lā ḥukm illā li-llāh*), and ʿAlī therefore was required to resume the fight. It was from the *lā ḥukm* slogan that the Muḥakkima, the first Khārijīs ("those who say the *lā ḥukm* slogan"), came to be known. When ʿAlī refused to renew hostilities, claiming that he would not break his agreement, several of the dissatisfied elements in his army seceded from him (in Arabic, *kharaja ʿanhu*), decamping initially to a place outside Kufa called Ḥarūrāʾ (and thus, one of the names by which the Khārijīs came to be known was the Ḥarūriyya), where they were said to have elected provisional leaders. According to many accounts, ʿAlī was able to coax some of these secessionists back to his camp by debating them and possibly making certain promises regarding his willingness to disregard the arbitration, which he certainly did not fully support (Gaiser, Ibāḍī accounts, 67–9). But when ʿAlī did not wholly abandon the arbitration, the Khārijīs broke with him again. They reportedly elected their own leader—ʿAbdallāh b. Wahb al-Rāsibī (d. 38/658)—and then escaped in small groups to a place further up the Euphrates River, near a canal called Nahrawān (al-Qalhātī, 2:239; al-Barrādī, 128–9; al-Ṭabarī, 1:3363–6; al-Mubarrad, 3:117).

Along the way to Nahrawān, the Muḥakkima were said to have killed a son of a Companion of the Prophet named ʿAbdallāh b. Khabbāb b. al-Arat (d. 38/658) and possibly his family, too. Numerous versions of this story exist in the sources, although few of them narrate the event in the same way, and, notably, this story does not appear in early Ibāḍī narratives of the Muḥakkima (Gaiser, *Shurat legends*, 95–6; al-Sābiʿī, 127–8). Accordingly, and because the sources point to this incident as justification for ʿAlī's destruction of the Muḥakkima at Nahrawān, the historicity of Ibn Khabbāb's murder should be regarded with extra caution. In any case, ʿAlī and his army marched to Nahrawān, where, after ʿAlī convinced some of the Khārijīs to leave the field, the two groups engaged in battle, and ʿAlī's forces virtually annihilated the Muḥakkima remaining there. Although apparently decimated, remnants of the early Khārijīs survived to propagate their ideas, as the later history of Khārijism shows. Moreover, unexpected results from the battle of Nahrawān materialised shortly thereafter, in 40/661, when ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muljam (d. 40/661), a relative of some of the Muḥakkima killed at Nahrawān, assassinated ʿAlī in the mosque of Kufa. ʿAlī's eldest son, al-Ḥasan b. ʿAlī (d. 50/670), strategically decided not to challenge Muʿāwiya, instead agreeing to cede to Muʿāwiya the leadership of the Muslim community. In this way, the Khārijīs' original enemy at Ṣiffīn, Muʿāwiya b. Abī

Sufyān, became the first Umayyad caliph, in 41/661, initiating what would become the first dynasty of the early Islamic period and eliciting significant Khārijī resistance.

In fact, "Khārijī" (*shurāt*) opposition had commenced even before the murder of ʿAlī: after Nahrawān, the sources document ten further engagements with ʿAlī and Muʿāwiya and, over the following two decades, record four additional Khārijī-inspired rebellions against Muʿāwiya and his son and successor, Yazīd (r. 60–4/680–3; al-Baghdādī, 61–2). Muʿāwiya himself faced an uprising at Nukhayla, outside Kufa, in 41/661 of Khārijīs who had deserted the battlefield of Nahrawān and sought to redeem themselves. Muʿāwiya elicited the help of the Kufans, and the Nukhaylīs were slaughtered. Other rebels and small rebellions followed in their wake, emanating in large part from the garrison cities of Kufa and Basra: from Kufa, Shabīb b. Bajra al-Ashjaʿī (d. 41/661), Muʿayn b. ʿAbdallāh al-Muḥāribī (d. 41/661), Abū Maryam (d. 41/661), Abū Laylā (d. 42/662), Ḥayyān b. Ẓabyān al-Sulamī (d. 58/678), al-Mustawrid b. ʿUllafa (d. 43/663), Ziyād b. Kharrāsh al-ʿIjlī (d. 52/672), and Muʿādh al-Ṭāʾī (d. 52/672); from Basra, Sahm b. Ghālib al-Ḥujaymī (d. 49/669) and Yazīd b. Mālik al-Bāhilī (known as al-Khaṭīm, "broken nose") (d. 49/669), ʿAbbād b. Ḥuṣayn (d. 47/668), Ḥāritha b. Ṣakhr al-Qaynī (d. 63/683), Qarīb b. Murra al-Azdī (d. 53/672–3) and Zuḥḥāf b. Zuḥr al-Ṭāʾī (d. 53/672–3), Ṭawwāf b. ʿAllāq (d. 58/677), and Abū Bilāl Mirdās b. Udayya (d. 60/680). What these early uprisings tend to have in common is how they are presented in the sources, which emphasise the Khārijīs' eagerness to perish fighting tyranny and injustice, that is, for martyrdom (expressed as *shirāʾ*, exchange of one's life for Paradise), as well as the attendant attitude of asceticism that was said to have permeated their groups (Higgins, 7–8). It is in part these same idealised images of martyrs and ascetics that make reconstructing the history of the early *shurāt* problematic.

What can be surmised of the early stances of the Khārijīs proves equally difficult to reconstruct with any reliability. The events of Ṣiffīn and then of the Umayyad period threw into relief the question of sinful and erring *imāms*. In the broadest sense, the Khārijī "answer" was that the *imām* needed to demonstrate piety, and so long as that requirement was met, he could theoretically be any Muslim. This position stood in contradistinction to what later became the standard Sunnī and Shīʿī stances on the issue: Sunnīs held that the *imām* should be from Muḥammad's tribe, the Quraysh, and that his transgressions could be tolerated (to a point); the Shīʿīs looked to the family of the Prophet (*ahl al-bayt*) as providing the sole legitimate leaders of the Islamic community, and, moreover, Ithnāʿasharī (Twelver) and Ismāʿīlī Shīʿīs held their *imām*s to be *maʿṣūm*, that is, protected from error. The Khārijī stance meant that sinning *imām*s, along with their supporters, needed to be resisted in some fashion, and they could not be regarded as full Muslims. Yet these positions left considerable leeway for interpretation. Were all unjust *imām*s to be fought, along with their supporters, at all times? Was the true Muslim community to separate itself physically from these sinners (and to vigorously exclude sinners from their own ranks), or might it be better to practise *taqiyya* (dissimulation) until the moment was right for revolution? What did it mean to deem non-Khārijīs less-than-full Muslims? This last question

generated numerous interpretations in later years, and became, in part, a means by which Muslim scholars made sense of the various subgroups of Khārijīs. The Muḥakkima reportedly accused ʿAlī of all manner of transgressions, including *kufr* (unbelief) (Gaiser, *Shurat legends*, 90–9). But what did the earliest Khārijīs mean when they employed the term "infidels" (*kuffār*) to describe their opponents? Did they intend, as most Muslim heresiographers and later historians would have it, that the Khārijīs held non-Khārijīs to be absolutely beyond the pale of belief (al-Ashʿarī, 1:167; al-Baghdādī, 55–6; al-Isfarāyīnī, 38)? Or did the earliest Khārijīs employ this term as polemic, implying (in a way strikingly similar to how Christians and Jews used accusations of unbelief in their polemical writings) that non-Khārijīs had fallen short in a manner resembling (but not actually becoming) infidels (Hawting, 49, 74)? The ambiguities surrounding Qurʾānic discussions of sin and unfaithfulness admit many interpretations, including a range of interpretations that were possibly held by the earliest Khārijīs.

Beyond the apparent unity of the early *shurāt* movement, then, significant differences must have been developing among various Khārijī groups. These disagreements manifested themselves in the fragmentation of the movement in 64/683. Later Muslim sources refer to this event as the *tafrīq* (splintering), and trace its origin to a specific incident involving the varieties of negative Khārijī reactions to ʿAbdallāh b. al-Zubayr's (d. 73/692) refusal to denounce ʿUthmān (al-Ṭabarī, 2:516–20). Although the Khārijīs initially fought alongside Ibn al-Zubayr against the Umayyads, his embrace of ʿUthmān made him a sinner in their eyes. Nāfiʿ b. al-Azraq (d. 65/685, the eponym of the Azāriqa) was said to have taken the most extreme stance when he held the sinner (meaning here, Ibn al-Zubayr himself) to be unfaithful in the same fashion as a polytheist (*mushrik*). ʿAbdallāh b. Ibāḍ (d. second/eighth century, the alleged eponym of the Ibāḍiyya) condemned Ibn al-Azraq for taking this position, considering it too extreme. In contrast, ʿAbdallāh b. Ṣaffār condemned them both—Ibn al-Azraq for going too far, Ibn Ibāḍ for not going far enough. (Ibn Ṣaffār was likely a fictitious character, but if real, then d. late first/seventh or early second/eighth century; his name differs, depending on the version of the story, but he is taken to be the eponym of the Ṣufriyya. It should, however, be noted that Ibn Khayyāṭ's version of the *tafrīq* narrative names only the Azāriqa and Najdāt, who are described below; Ibn Khayyāṭ, 157.) And in this way, according to the *tafrīq* narrative, the main divisions of the Khārijīs into the Azraqīs, the Ibāḍiyya, and the Ṣufriyya were established.

Although the *tafrīq* narrative remains a popular anecdote, it is not likely based on historical fact. First, the distinctions between the groups are too neatly drawn, while the basic details (such as names of the supposed founders) remain muddled and contradictory; notably, they contradict what can be more reliably surmised about the founding of the Ibāḍiyya (Cook, *Dogma*, 64). Second, a strong colour symbolism undergirds the story, whereby the most extreme stance is associated with blue (in Arabic, *azraq*), the most moderate with white (*abyaḍ*), and the middle position with yellow (*aṣfar*). Such colour symbolism could be imagined to function in a number of ways: for example, it could be a conceptual tool that simplified the differences between the three main Khārijī subsects.

Fierro argues that the term *al-asfar* may have been connected to physical yellowness produced by dying, and likewise may have been connected to southern Arabian tribal practices and symbols that became associated, in part, with groups later identified as Ṣufrī Khārijīs (Fierro, al-Aṣfar, 181–97; Fierro, al-Aṣfar again, 209–12).

Beyond the *tafrīq* narrative, however, it does seem as if the events of the second *fitna* split the *shurāt* movement into what might be broadly classed as militants and moderates/quietists, and that the militants seem to have achieved self-definition as recognisable Khārijī subsects around this time. In general, the militants advocated fighting unrighteous rulers and their supporters, even passive ones, as the only means to establish a legitimate Islamic social order. They held those Muslims who would not join them to be absolute *kuffār* (infidels), possibly even *mushrikūn* (polytheists)—a position that ruled out any interaction with them beyond fighting. Positioning themselves in this way, the militants advocated (in theory) separatism from non-Khārijī Muslims, when not engaged in open hostilities.

In fact, the specific responses to these three questions—how unjust, sinful *imām*s should be resisted, what the status of those who accommodated unjust *imām*s was, and what level of interaction with non-Khārijīs was permissible—distinguished the various emerging Khārijī subsects from one another. Thus, the most militant (and most infamous) of the Khārijīs, the Azāriqa (Azraqīs), chose to fight non-Khārijīs—whom they considered to be the equivalent of polytheists (*mushrikūn*)—wherever and whenever they encountered them, and when not fighting, to separate themselves from the rest of Islamic (in their thinking, non-Islamic) society. They were said to have dissociated from (*bariʾū min*) their fellow Khārijīs who did not fight—that is, the "sit-outers" (*al-qaʿada*) who refrained from battle—as well as from those who practised *taqiyya* in either word or deed (al-Mubarrad, 3:200; Ibn Ḥazm, 3:125; Ibn Dhakwān, 100–5). The Islamic heresiographer al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935) states that the Azraqīs anathematised as unbelievers (*kuffār*) all Muslims who did not emigrate (make the *hijra*) to their camp; that they administered an examination (*miḥna*) of those who came to them; and when fighting they allowed the killing of the women and children of their enemies, holding that these were also destined for hell (1:168–74). Likewise, the Azraqīs were said to practise *istiʿrāḍ* (indiscriminate killing), and although these accusations bear a strong trace of polemic, it is also true that the practice of *istiʿrāḍ* sits easily alongside the belief that all who were not with the Azraqīs were enemies.

As might be expected, these extreme positions resulted in limited popular support among the wider Muslim community and elicited massive counter-responses from the Umayyads, resulting in the virtual extinction of these militants within a relatively short period of time. Thus, the Azāriqa did not last long—only about fourteen or fifteen years. Their eponym, Nāfiʿ b. al-Azraq, was killed in their first battle (at Dūlāb, in 65/685), and he was succeeded by several others who had led the group into the mountainous regions of Fārs and Kirmān, east of Basra. Their last effective leader, Qaṭarī b. al-Fujāʾa (d. 78–9/698–9), had coins minted in his name. As minting coins implies economic activity that would involve non-Azraqīs, this act is an indicator that the Azraqīs were perhaps not as militantly separatist as the sources would lead scholars to

believe. In the end, the Umayyad general al-Muhallab b. Abī Ṣufra (d. 83/702) relentlessly hunted them down, sowed dissension in their ranks by splitting the Arabs from the non-Arabs, and virtually eliminated them.

A related group, known as the Najdāt or Najdiyya, after their founder, Najda b. ʿĀmir (d. 72/691–2; several variations can be found on his name), came into existence when Najda and his followers broke with Nāfiʿ over the status of those who "sat out" the fight (the *qaʿada/quʿūd*) and other questions (al-Ṭabarī, 2:515–7). For example, the Najdiyya reportedly allowed the practice of *taqiyya* and tolerated those who refused combat, although their leader preferred those who fought (al-Shahrastānī, 123–4; al-Baghdādī, 67–70). They also reportedly considered it lawful to marry non-Khārijīs and eat the meat slaughtered by them, even though they considered them akin to idol worshippers (*ʿabadat al-awthān*; Ibn Dhakwān, 104–11). On the question of sinners, Najda was said to have held that those who persist in minor sins become unbelievers qua polytheists (*mushrikūn*), but that a Muslim (meaning a Khārijī Muslim) who commits a major sin but then repents remains a Muslim. Those who did not join the Najdī camp were considered "hypocrites" (*munāfiqūn*), a usage that suggests that they were not absolutely anathematised (al-Ashʿarī, 1:174–5; Ibn Ḥazm, 3:125; van Ess, 2:228). Indeed, Ibn Dhakwān, an early Ibāḍī scholar (fl. late first/seventh or second/eighth century), claimed that the Najdīs made those among them who refused to fight admit to hypocrisy, which granted them safety, but that they would declare as infidels those who would not admit to it (Ibn Dhakwān, 110–1). Moreover, Najda was said to have excused sins committed in ignorance, although this view was not universally held by all Najdīs and led to some friction in the group. Thus, while the Najdīs are counted among the militant Khārijīs because of their belief that those who did not join them from the greater Muslim community became unbelievers (with a status equivalent to the polytheists), Najda apparently moderated some of the more stringent stances of the Azāriqa.

It is possible that his moderated stances led to the limited successes of the Najdīs in the Arabian Peninsula during the second *fitna*: as Najda was a member of Ḥanīfa tribe, he led his band into the Arabian Peninsula, where he rallied the Banū Ḥanīfa to his cause and enjoyed moderately widespread success during the course of the second *fitna*. In essence, the Najdīs controlled the countryside while Ibn al-Zubayr controlled the cities (especially Mecca and Medina). Toward the end of the second *fitna*, however, fatal divisions developed within the group: two prominent Najdīs, ʿAṭiyya b. al-Aswad (d. 78–9/698–9) and Abū Fudayk (d. 73/693), broke from Najda, and Abū Fudayk later killed Najda. Abū Fudayk's group was said to have stayed in the Arabian Peninsula, while those who followed ʿAṭiyya went east, into the Iranian highlands, where they broke into several small subgroups, notably the ʿAṭawiyya, from whom split the ʿAjārida with its many purported subsects (van Ess, 2:574–6). According to al-Ashʿarī these subsects were the Maymūniyya, Khalafiyya, Ḥamziyya, Shuʿaybiyya, Ṣaltiyya, Khāzimiyya, and Thaʿāliba (1:177–83); al-Shahrastānī (d. 548/1153) adds the Aṭrāfiyya (al-Shahrastānī, 130–1). What distinguishes many of these subgroups is their stance toward the status of children:

the ʿAjārida reportedly excluded them from Islam until they reached maturity and could formally accept it (al-Ashʿarī, 1:128; Ibn Ḥazm, 3:126–7; van Ess, 1:132); the subsects of the ʿAjārida tended to accord them a more neutral stance until puberty (al-Ashʿarī, 1:129ff.; van Ess, 2:576ff.). There is great confusion regarding these subsects as well as their purported offshoots (Madelung, *Trends*, 58–9), most of which were defeated in the same series of campaigns that rid Fārs and Kirmān of the Azāriqa. However, the Ḥamziyya led a revolt in southern Khurāsān against the ʿAbbāsids (r. 132–656/750–1258) from 179/795 until 195/810 (van Ess, 2:584–8). So, too, remnants of the original Najdīs in the Arabian Peninsula were said to have persisted up to the fifth/eleventh century (reportedly in al-Baḥrayn), and to have adopted the position that the imāmate was optional because every person has equal capacity to reach the relevant conclusions in religious matters, that is, to practise *ijtihād* (Crone, 67). Beyond the sixth/twelfth century, nothing is recorded of the militant Khārijīs, none of whom survived.

Less militant Khārijīs fared better in the long term, but they do not appear to have achieved doctrinal or practical coherence until decades after their militant counterparts. Like the militants, the moderates also disapproved of tyrannical and sinful *imām*s and looked to any competent, pious co-religionist as theoretically qualified to replace them. However, whereas the militants advocated separatism and warfare as the primary (if not the only) means to resist sinning *imām*s and their followers, rejecting in the process all non-militant Khārijīs as non-Muslims, the moderates proved more practical on these counts. In general, the moderates seem to have accepted (even advocated) dissimulation (*taqiyya*) over physical separatism; to have rejected (on the whole, but with some notable exceptions) the reckless pursuit of martyrdom in favour of inconspicuously building the institutions and support necessary for successful resistance, which, in turn, allowed the moderates to mount more traditional military campaigns, such as those pursued against the Umayyads in North Africa in the 120s/740s, and those of ʿAbdallāh b. Yaḥyā l-Kindī (d. 130/748) and al-Julandā b. Masʿūd (d. 133/751) in the Arabian Peninsula; and to have treated non-Khārijīs as less-than-full-Muslims, yet not outright polytheists (*mushrikūn*). This last point meant that moderates were more willing to interact with non-Khārijīs than were their militant counterparts—a fact that undoubtedly contributed (especially in the case of the Ibāḍiyya) to their long-term survival as Khārijī subgroups. Thus, the Ibāḍiyya, for example, accepted the practice of *taqiyya*, allowed their followers to live amongst non-Ibāḍīs, and considered non-Ibāḍī Muslims to be akin to "hypocrites" (*munāfiqūn*)—a status that allowed Ibāḍīs to intermarry with them, inherit from them, eat the meat that they slaughtered, and honour contracts with them. During times of peace, non-Ibāḍī Muslims enjoyed the protection of the Ibāḍīs, but during a time of war it was required that they first be summoned to accept the truth before they could be fought: at no time could their property be taken, nor could their wives and offspring be killed or treated as spoils; nor could non-Ibāḍīs be assassinated or killed in secret (Ibn Dhakwān, 132–41; on the term *kufr al-niʿma*, "ingratitude for the blessings of God," see Crone and Zimmermann, in Part 2, Ibn

Dhakwān, 200). The specifics of these positions required in some cases several decades to be articulated, and only in the case of the Ibāḍiyya do scholars possess a more or less reliable record of that process (Gaiser, *Shurat legends*, 166–7).

The terms "quietist" (which is the term found in the sources: *al-qaʿada/al-quʿūd*) and "moderate" remain somewhat problematic when applied to the early Khārijīs for at least two reasons: first, the term "quietist" tends to imply pacifism, whereas these Khārijīs were perfectly willing to engage in military and revolutionary activity. It could be argued, in fact, that the moderate forms of militancy, as it were, proved far more successful over the long term than the more "militant" tactics of other Khārijīs. Yet another difficulty with the terms "quietist" and "moderate" arises with respect to how they render some Khārijī groups difficult to place. For example, reports on the Khārijī subgroup known as the Bayhasiyya indicate that although they held non-Khārijī Muslims to be infidels (*kuffār*) and also encouraged their followers to live only among fellow Bayhasīs (both of which are positions that would push them toward the "militant" camp), they also were said to have considered it permissible to live among non-Khārijī Muslims, intermarry with them, and inherit from them, a position that would locate them in the "moderate" camp (al-Shahrastānī, 126–7; Crone and Zimmermann, in Part 2, Ibn Dhakwān, 214; van Ess, 2:594–600). Where, then, to place the Bayhasiyya? They seem to occupy the middle of the spectrum.

There are some advantages, however, to the ambiguities of the terms "quietist" and "moderate," insofar as these non-specific monikers seem to reflect the murky origins of these groups. Initially there seems to have been significant overlap between those moderate Khārijīs later identified as Ṣufriyya and Ibāḍiyya; both, for example, were associated with Abū Bilāl Mirdās b. Udayya and the poet ʿImrān b. Ḥaṭṭān (d. late first/seventh or early second/eighth century), and some Ibāḍīs were said to have supported the "Ṣufrī" Ṣāliḥ b. Musarriḥ al-Tamīmī's (d. 76/695) rebellion in Iraq in 76/695, which was taken up after Ṣāliḥ's death by Shabīb b. Yazīd al-Shaybānī (d. 77/697). The real difference between the Ibāḍī and Ṣufrī Khārijīs may have been their tribal affiliations and geographical locales: in Iraq the Ibāḍīs, operating from Kufa and especially Basra, recruited more and more from the southern Arabian tribes of Kinda and Azd, while those labelled Ṣufrī had been associated with the northern Arabian tribes of Rabīʿa in northern Iraq and Azerbaijan (Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 157–60).

Tribal connections to southern Arab tribal groupings paid off in several ways for the later Ibāḍiyya. Although Basra remained the centre for early Ibāḍism well into the mid-to-late 180s/early 800s, by the late third/ninth century Basran Ibāḍism had died off there and the prominent Basran Ibāḍīs had moved to Oman (the home of the Azd tribal grouping). Moreover, tribal affiliations with Kinda and Azd led to two important uprisings in the late Umayyad/early ʿAbbāsid revolutionary period in the ancestral homelands of these peoples (Wilkinson, *Ibāḍism*, 157–60). In Yemen (home of the Kinda), the Ibāḍī-inspired uprising of ʿAbdallāh b. Yaḥyā l-Kindī (known as Ṭālib al-Ḥaqq) spread northward, controlling the holy cities of Mecca and Medina for a time, before falling to the invading ʿAbbāsid army. In Oman, the failed uprising of

al-Julandā b. Masʿūd paved the way for Ibāḍīs to continue to agitate there, and in 176/793 to establish an imāmate that survived for roughly one hundred years. This period, sometimes called the Second Ibāḍī Imāmate in Oman, with its capital at Nizwā, witnessed the consolidation of Ibāḍism, especially in the interior regions. Since that time, Ibāḍism has survived as a vibrant force in Oman, and indeed continues to survive up to the present day. Ibāḍīs in Oman have periodically re-established the imāmate, as they did in 407/1016, when the third Imāmate period commenced under al-Khalīl b. Shādhān al-Kharūṣī (r. 407–20/1016–29). In the eleventh/seventeenth century, Ibāḍī rule emerged again in Oman under the Yaʿrubid dynasty, which was replaced in 1162/1749 by Imām Aḥmad b. Saʿīd Āl-Bū Saʿīdī (r. 1162–97/1749–83), founder of the present-day ruling family of Oman, the Āl-Bū Saʿīdīs. The Āl-Bū Saʿīdīs also (re-)extended the influence of Ibāḍism down the East African coast (there is evidence of Ibāḍism in East Africa as early as the sixth/twelfth century; Wilkinson, *Arabs*, 16–20): Bū Saʿīdī sultans ruled Zanzibar from 1832 until 1964, when it became part of Tanzania.

The process of initial sectarian overlap giving way to a gradual solidification of identity based on geography and tribal groupings can also be seen among the moderate Khārijīs in North Africa. Moderates began to proselytise there in the 100s/720s, paving the way for the North African Khārijī revolts of the 120s/740s. It is not until after these revolts, however, that distinct groups of Ibāḍī and Ṣufrī Khārijīs can be reliably distinguished from one another. This distinction was the basis on which Berber tribal confederations affiliated with them: the Ibāḍiyya became more and more associated with the Hawwāra, the Nafūsa, and some elements of the Zanāta tribal groupings; Ṣufrī Khārijīs of North Africa aligned themselves with the Miknāsa primarily, but also the Barghawāṭa, Maṭghara, Maghīla, and Yafran (also spelt Yifran; Gaiser, *Shurat legends*, 118). During the North African Khārijī uprisings of the 120s/740s (that is, the "Berber Revolt"), Ibāḍīs established footholds in Tunis (in the Djerid, Ar. al-Jarīd, and the Fezzān, Ar. Fizzān) and in Libya (Jabal Nafūsa), while the nascent Ṣufriyya established the Midrārid dynasty in Sijilmāsa (Love, 177–86). In 161/778, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Rustum (r. 161–71/778–88) moved part of the Ibāḍī community to Tāhart, in Algeria, and established the Rustumid dynasty, which endured until the Fāṭimids destroyed it in 296/909. The Rustumids consolidated the gold and slave trades in West Africa, and they enjoyed excellent trade relations with the Iberian Umayyads, the Ṣufrī Midrārids, and even the Muhallabid governors of al-Qayrawān (Gaiser, Slaves and silver, 51–70). After the Fāṭimids destroyed the Midrārid and Rustumid dynasties, the Ibāḍiyya of North Africa made no further attempts to re-establish the imāmate, with the exception of the spectacular revolt of Abū Yazīd Makhlad al-Nukkārī (d. 336/947) against the Fāṭimids in 332/944. Unlike their Midrārid counterparts, however, the North African Ibāḍiyya survive to the present day in Algeria, the island of Djerba, in Tunisia, and Libya, governing themselves by local councils (*ʿazzāba*) in the absence of an *imām*.

In recent decades, some Muslims have applied the term *khawārij* to militant Sunnī groups and opposition movements, in an effort to tar them as overly pious zealots and illegitimate Muslims (Kenney, 55ff.). However, there are no historical

connections between the mediaeval Khārijīs and modern radicals. Likewise, attempts at establishing a conceptual connection—between, for example, mediaeval Khārijīs and the modern employment of anathematisation (*takfīr*) or the use of association/dissociation (*walāya/barāʾa*)—too often rely on simplistic understandings of these doctrines in their early mediaeval context.

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