

The Faculty of Humanities
Institute of Asian and African Studies

MODERN ISLAM IN THE MAGHRIB

PESSAH SHINAR



2004

THE MAX SCHLOESSINGER MEMORIAL FOUNDATION
THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM

Elements sous droits d'auteur

Contents

Foreword

- I Ibādiyya and orthodox reformism in modern Algeria.
Scripta Hierosolymitana 9 (1961): 97–120.
- II The historical approach of the reformist ‘ulamā’ in the contemporary Maghrib.
Asian and African Studies 7 (1971): 181–210.
- III Some observations on the ethical teachings of orthodox reformism in Algeria.
Asian and African Studies 8 (1972): 263–289.
- IV Note on the socio-economic and cultural role of Sūfī brotherhoods and Marabutism in the modern Maghrib.
Proceedings of the International Congress of Africanists (Acre, 1982).
London: Longmans, Green, 1962, pp. 272–285.
- V Traditional and reformist Mawlid celebrations in the Maghrib.
Studies in Memory of Gaston Wiet, ed. M. Rosen-Ayalon. Jerusalem: Institute of Asian and African Studies, Hebrew University, 1977. pp. 371–413.
- VI ‘Abd al-Qādir and ‘Abd al-Krīm: religious influences on their thought and action.
Asian and African Studies 1 (1965): 139–174.
- VII ‘Ulamā’, Marabouts and government: an overview of their relationships in the French colonial Maghrib.
Israel Oriental Studies 10 (1980): 211–229.
- VIII A controversial exponent of the Algerian Salafiyya: the Kabyle ‘ālim, Imām and sharīf Abū Ya‘lā Sa‘īd b. Muḥammad al-Zawāwī.
Studies in Islamic History and Civilization in Honour of Prof. David Ayalon, ed. M. Sharon. Jerusalem: Cana and Leiden: Brill, 1986, pp. 267–290.
- IX Some remarks on the study of Hispano-Moroccan cultural relationships.
I Congreso Internacional “Encuentro de las Tres Culturas” (Toledo, October 1982), pp. 319–329 [in Spanish].
- X La recherche relative aux rapports Judeo-Musulmans dans le Maghreb contemporain.
Les Relations entre Juifs et Musulmans en Afrique du Nord, Abbaye de Sénanque, oct. 1978, Paris: CNRS, 1980, pp. 1–31.

- XI Réflexions sur la symbiose Judéo-Ibādite en Afrique du nord.
Communautés Juives des Marges Sahariennes du Maghreb, ed. M. Abitbol. Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1982, pp. 81–114.
- XII Magic and symbolism in North-African jewellery and personal adornment.
Jewellery and Goldsmithing in the Islamic World, Jerusalem: Israel Museum, 1987, pp. 131–146.
- XIII Vénus et l’Islam.
Communication présentée au Congress AFEMAM, Aix-en-Provence, juillet 1996 [inédit].
- XIV Some observations on the role of red in North-West Africa (the Maghrib).
Contacts between Cultures, vol. 1: West Asia and North Africa, ed. A. Harrak. Toronto: Mellen Press, 1993, pp. 383–390.
- XV Quelques observations sur le rôle de la couleur bleue dans le Maghrib traditionnel.
The Language of Color in the Mediterranean, ed. A. Borg. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1999, pp. 175–199.
- XVI Some remarks regarding the colours of male Jewish dress in North Africa and their Arab-Islamic context.
Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 24 (2000): 380–395.

Index

FOREWORD

The present volume contains a selection of sixteen articles, published in various journals over a period of forty years. Most of the articles are in English, and three of them in French. One article (IX) was delivered in English, but published in Spanish translation and appears in this volume for the first time in its original form. Most articles deal with aspects of Islam in the contemporary Maghrib.

This volume will be the first in the Max Schloessinger Memorial Series to deal exclusively with the Western part of North Africa. The Maghrib is considered a part of the Arab and Muslim world, characterized by the Berber component of the population, the imposition of French and Spanish colonial rule, and the indigenous reaction to both. To bring out these peculiarities of the Maghrib is a guiding principle underlying all these papers.

One point calls for special comment. The article “Vénus et l’Islam” (XIII) is part of a paper published in Hebrew in two parts: the first part addresses Saturn and the Jews, and the second part focuses on Venus and Islam. This paper was planned as a contrastive analysis and should be read together in order to understand its full dimension and significance. Regrettably, an English translation of the first part is still a desideratum.

It was originally planned to include my article “Salafiyya” which appeared in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edition. Because of technical reasons (differences of format) this was not feasible.

I would like to thank all those who took part in the production of this book, in particular the publishers of the journals for their kind permission to reprint these articles; Professor Yohanan Friedmann for including the book in the Max Schloessinger Memorial Series and for the editorial work involved; Professor Albert Arazi for checking the French style of the article “Vénus et l’Islam”; and Ms. Sivan Lerer for preparing the index. Special thanks are due to two eminent scholars in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem: Professor Myriam Rosen-Ayalon for supplying the picture appearing on the front cover—the *Kutubiyya* minaret, the famous Almohad structure erected at Marrakesh at the end of the 12th century; and to Professor Amnon Shiloah who contributed the Arabic background text appearing on the book’s cover, which consists of a Maghribī script written by the famous jurist al-Wansharīsī and preserved in the Royal Library at Rabat. To all of them I express my deep gratitude.

The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Jerusalem, November 2004

Pessah Shinar

IBĀḌIYYA AND ORTHODOX REFORMISM IN MODERN ALGERIA

by PESSAH SHINAR

In the light of the historical relationship between orthodoxy and sectarianism in Islam, special interest attaches to any attempt at reconciliation and mutual understanding. This is all the more true when one of the parties involved happens to be a group of the Khāridjite sect, the Ibāḍiyya.¹ This paper deals with the background and development of relations between Ibāḍīs and Sunnī reformists of the Salafiyya trend in Algeria.

As is well known, the Khāridjite heresy was characterized from its inception by extreme non-conformism and utter ruthlessness in dealing with dissenters. The doctrine of *isti'rāḍ*, the execution of all non-Khāridjite Muslims including their families, as preached and practised by the Azrakī subdivision of the sect, made the Khāridjites an object of intense and universal hatred and abhorrence. True, the backbone of activist Khāridjism was broken in the East as early as the middle of the eighth century, while in the Maghrib the Azāriḳa seem never to have gained any considerable foothold. Yet Berber Islam, opposed as it was to Arab superiority and dominance as well as to discriminatory taxation, proved singularly receptive to Khāridjite ideas. The relatively moderate groups of Ibāḍīs and Ṣufrites retained the ideal of an egalitarian theocracy, the fighting spirit of the sect and the principle of *takfīr*, but refrained from killing women and children. They were able to attract a large following among the Berbers, to such an extent that during much of the eighth and ninth centuries large parts of the Maghrib came under their political sway

1. Commonly spelt 'Abāḍīs' in the Maghrib. In this paper, the classical spelling 'Ibāḍīs' has been adhered to throughout. On the sect and its history see *Shorter EI*, s. v. 'Ibāḍiyya' (T. Lewicki); R. Strothmann, 'Berber und Ibaditen', *Der Islam*, XVII (1928), 258-79; T. Lewicki, 'Mélanges Berbères-Ibāḍites', *REI* (1936), 267-85. For the 16th century Ibāḍī chronicle *Kitāb al-Siyar* by Abū'l-Abbās al-Shammākhī see *REI* (1934), pp. 59 ff. — In addition to Algeria, Ibāḍīs are found also in Southern Tunisia, Tripolitania, Arabia and East Africa, for which countries the *Annuaire du Monde Musulman* (ed. L. Massignon), 1929, gives the following figures: Djerba, 20,000; Djebel Nafūsa, 34,000; Oman, 325,000; Zanzibar, 6,000. Figures for the Algerian Ibāḍiyya are given below, p. 99 and note 9.

or were involved in their struggles with the orthodox Caliphate and in the contest between the Khāridjite factions themselves.

The Ibādī Establishment in the Mzāb

The most interesting and significant political organization among these factions was undoubtedly the Ibādī Imāmate of Tāhert (Tiaret) in Western Algeria, founded by 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. Rustam in 776 A.D. It soon became a flourishing theocratic and puritanical, yet highly cultured and tolerant state, a focal point of Ibādism everywhere. Even its destruction by the Fāṭimids in 909 did not wipe the Ibādīs out of existence until the coming of the French and even thereafter. Scattered Ibādī communities continued to live in the Central Maghrib and Ifriqiya, virtually isolated in a hostile environment. The Tāhert commonwealth itself was resurrected in a different locality. Following an abortive attempt to settle at Ouargla (Wardjlan) and a magnificent but shortlived resurgence at Sadrāta, founded in 970 south of Ouargla, the Ibādī exiles from Tāhert selected as their final refuge a maze of desolate ravines north-west of Ouargla, cut by fluvial erosion in the calcareous plateau, and fittingly called the *shebka* (net). The exiles founded, from 1011 on, a series of remarkably constructed walled cities (*ḥṣūr*), each topped and dominated by a mosque with a combination of minaret and watchtower. Here there arose the 'confederation' of the Beni Mzāb (after their main valley, the Wādī Mzāb, or Mizāb — hence their appellation of 'Mozabites') with Ghardāya as their capital.²

By dint of intelligence, skill and hard work, including the labour of the serflike *ḥarrāṭīn*, the Mzābīs gradually triumphed over the tremendous odds of their environment and created an economy based in the main on

2. The 'Confederation' consists of a close group of five towns — the Pentapole — and the settlements of Berrian and Guerrara, at a distance of 45 and 100 km. from Ghardāya, respectively. The chronological order of their establishment is as follows: Al-'Atf (El Atteuf), 1011; Bū-Nūra (Bounoura), 1045; Ghardāya (Ghardāia), 1084; Baryān (Berrian), 1101; Malika (Melika),?; Banī Yaṣkan (Beni Isgen), 1347; Karāra (Guerrara), 1631 (*Documents Algériens*, No. 16, août 1955). On the Mzāb and its people see A. Motylinski, 'Bibliographie du Mzab', *Bull. de Corr. Africaine*, Alger, III (1885), 37-38; E. Masqueray, *La formation des cités chez les populations sédentaires de l'Algérie (Kabyles du Djurdjura, Chaouias de l'Aurès, Beni Mzab)*, Paris, 1886; M. & F. Gouvion, *Le Kharédjisme, Monographie du Mzab*, Casablanca, 1926; A. Chevillon, *Les Puritains du désert*, Paris, 1927; A. M. Goichon, *La vie féminine au Mzab*, Paris, 1927; id. in *REI*, 1930, pp. 231 ff.; L. Milliot, avec collab. A. Giacobetti, 'Recueil de délibérations des djemāas du Mzāb', *REI*, 1930, pp. 171-230; *Documents Algériens*, 'Mzab', Nos. 16 (Août 1955) and 23 (Nov. 1958).

their famed date groves³ and trade. The cities attracted Arab elements, sedentary or nomadic, and Jews, but these were not allowed to settle within the Ibādī quarters.

The political regime in the Mzāb can be described as a theocracy. Each city was guided by a Council of Twelve, called the 'Circle of Recluses' (*ḥalqat al-‘azzāba*)⁴, headed by a shaykh and chosen from among persons excelling in piety and learning. Some of the 'azzāba had specific functions, such as calling to prayer, leading the prayers and administration of waqfs. As a body they watched over the observance of the Law and public morality and exacted obedience under threat of excommunication (*tabri'a*).⁵ The womenfolk lived in a world apart, filled with strange beliefs and old Berber practices. They were guided and supervised by a council of their own, composed of the washers of the dead and subject only to the control of the shaykh.⁶ Men and women alike believed themselves to be in the constant grip of a power that emanated from the ever-expanding cemeteries. Here the living betook themselves from time to time, singly or in groups, to enter into communion with their dead and seek their guidance or comfort.⁷

While the domain of the dead kept steadily growing, the precincts of the living remained stationary and their numbers seem to have been kept down by frequent internecine strife, enemy raids and possibly also the exceedingly hard conditions of life. In 1906 the total number of Mzābīs in Algeria was estimated at 40,000,⁸ and this figure has remained practically unchanged over the last fifty years.⁹ About one-fourth of this number were temporary emigrants in the cities of Northern Algeria, the Tell, emigration having begun in Turkish times. Here their literacy, versatility and business flair, no less than their frugal ways and purposeful

3. *Documents Algériens*, No. 16, gives a total of some 200,000 palm trees for the entire Mzāb, including Metlili-des Chaamba.

4. About the derivation and meaning of the term 'azzāba see *al-Minhādj*, Cairo, I, 159.

5. On the government of the Mzāb see *ibid.*, I, 156-60, 329-33.

6. On the women in the Mzāb see especially Goichon, *op. cit.*

7. On the cemeteries of the Mzāb and their significance see Chevrillon, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-66.

8. Ismaël Hamet, *Les Musulmans Français du Nord de l'Afrique*, Paris, 1906, p. 289.

9. In 1952 the total population of the Mzāb was officially estimated at 53,000; of these 30,000 were Ibādīs, 20,000 Chaamba Arab Mālikīs, 2000 other Arab Mālikīs, 1627 Jews, about 100 Europeans. According to *Documents Algériens*, No. 16, the population in 1955 totalled 42,000, of whom, 32,097 were Ibādīs. About 10,000 Ibādī emigrants in the Tell should be added to this figure to obtain the total number of Ibādīs in Algeria.

saving, enabled them to accumulate considerable funds which they invested in the Mzāb, largely to maintain or expand their plantations. Hence came their reputation for wealth and the various epithets describing them as the 'bankers of North Africa'; their country as the 'banksafe of the Sahara'; and their religion as 'une théologie bancaire' (E. F. Gautier), while malicious tongues accused them of 'building a bridge of gold to Paris', i.e. of using their financial power to influence the Government's policy.¹⁰ It should be noted that the Mzābī enterprises in the Tell tended to become family ventures and as a rule barred partnership with non-Ibādīs.¹¹

It was clear that while the temporary emigrants in the Tell made possible the relative prosperity of the *shebka*, permanent emigration would spell the decline of the Mzāb and perhaps of the entire Algerian Ibādiyya. To obviate this danger, the Mzābī legislators did not rely solely on Ibādī clannishness and attachment to the Mzāb, but imposed an absolute ban on the emigration of women¹² and made it incumbent on every emigrant to revisit the Mzāb at regular intervals and thus renew his bond with home.¹³

The popularity of the Mzābīs in the Tell, however, seems often to have stood in inverse ratio to their commercial success. Their heterodoxy, exclusiveness, reputed avarice and distinct physique, and probably also their lack of sympathy and contact with the extremely popular and powerful Ṣūfī orders, singled them out as a target for Mālikī fanaticism. When the marabout, Ḥādjdj Mūsā of the Darḳāwa order, invested al-Mīdya (Médéa) in 1835, he demanded that all Jews and Mzābīs be delivered up to him, in order to put them to the sword.¹⁴ Significantly also, when the French troops entered al-Mu'askar (Mascara), the capital of Amīr 'Abd al-Ḳādir, in 1841, they found there only Jews, Mzābīs and a few *ḥaḍar*; the rest of the inhabitants had fled.¹⁵

10. *Al-Nadǧāḥ*, 2.11.1923; P. Fontaine, *Alger-Tunis-Rabat, Les dessous du drame nord-africain*, Paris, 1953, pp. 195 f.

11. A similar attitude was adopted by the Ibādī grocers from Djerba in Tunis in 1906. It took three years to persuade them to form a cooperative, and when they finally agreed they stubbornly refused to admit any non-Djerban member (Chedly (Shādhilī) Khairallah, *Le Mouvement Jeune Tunisien*, Tunis, n. d., p. 58).

12. In 1928 the population of Berrian was reported to have unitedly resisted the departure of a woman for Algiers (*Documents Algériens*, No. 23, 20.11.1958).

13. According to *al-Nadǧāḥ*, 5.6.1925, the average Mzābī emigrant revisits his home after 5-6 years of absence and stays there for several months.

14. Col. P. Azan, *L'Emir Abd el-Kader*, Paris, 1935, p. 39.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

An Attempt at Sunnī-Ibādī Reconciliation

This traditional attitude of mutual aloofness, distrust and hostility between Mālikī orthodoxy and Ibādism continued until the early twenties of the present century, when an attempt was made on both sides to reach mutual understanding and co-operation. On the part of the Sunnis, the group involved were some reformist 'ulamā' of the Salafī-'Neo-Wahhābī' trend. Like their parent movement in the East, though in more thoroughgoing fashion,¹⁶ these 'ulamā' strove to regenerate their people by means of an Islam restored to its original purity and simplicity and a classical Arabic education; to foster pride in Islamic religion and history, and confidence in the future; to awaken Algerian national consciousness and solidarity with the rest of the Arab and Muslim peoples; and to counteract the lures and inroads of French and Western civilization, as well as Christian proselytism.¹⁷

The movement towards rapprochement seems to have begun in 1923: a moderate organ of orthodox reformism in Constantine, *al-Nadjāh*, provides evidence of friendly contact and mutual respect and sympathy between the two groups at that time.¹⁸ The paper strongly supported the Mzābīs' case in their dispute with the French Government over the question of military service (see below) and incidentally refuted current allegations and misconceptions about the Mzābīs in general.¹⁹ It sharply

16. On the Eastern Salafiyya and orthodox reform movement see C. C. Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt*, O.U.P., 1933; H. Laoust, 'Le réformisme orthodoxe des "Salafiya"', *REI*, 1932, pp. 223-34; H. A. R. Gibb, *Whither Islam*, London, 1932, pp. 102-54 (the Y.M.M.A.), 267 ff.; id., *Modern Trends in Islam*, Chicago, 1947, pp. 34-36, 133.

17. No exhaustive study of the orthodox reform movement in Algeria has appeared in print so far, though its general character and development have been described in various publications. Of these the following may be mentioned: articles in *L'Afrique Française* by I. Desparmet (1933, pp. 149 ff., 265 ff., 780 ff.; 1935, pp. 104 ff., 229 ff.; 1938 (Rens. Col.), pp. 195 ff.); A.-G. Bouvreuil (1936, pp. 582 ff.) and J. Noël (1938) (Rens. Col.), pp. 32 ff.); *Oriente Moderno*, XII (1932), 195, 489; XIII, 180-82; XV, 445 f.; XVII, 224 f., 438, 537 f.; XVIII, 421; in *Politique Etrangère* by R. Montagne (Avril 1937, pp. 131 ff.); in *Revue de la Méditerranée* by Aug. Berque (Juillet-Août 1951, pp. 417-29); Hassan, *Comment Périra l'Algérie Française*, Constantine, 1938; Ch.-A. Julien, *L'Afrique du Nord en marche*, Paris, 1952, pp. 112-17; G. Busson de Janssens, *L'indépendance du culte musulman en Algérie*, Paris, 1951.

18. See, for instance, the news item on the visit of the paper's envoy with the Mzābī merchants of Miliana and the Ibādī judge of Ghardāya in *al-Nadjāh*, 19.10.1923.

19. *Ibid.*, 2.11.1923, 21 and 28.12.1923, 4.11.1924, 6.6.1925.

denounced an attack by Mālikī rowdies on Ibādī shopkeepers in Miliana as unbecoming Muslim brotherhood, and appealed to the local authorities and religious leaders to restore communal peace and harmony.²⁰ It took an active interest in Mzābī progress and welfare,²¹ and warmly greeted the appearance of a new Ibādī weekly in Cairo, *al-Minhādj*.²² Its publisher also distributed some legal writings of the great Ibādī mudjtahid and reformer, Muḥammad b. Yūsuf Aṭṭāfiyyash.²³ The editor, Māmi Ismā'il, accompanied by a group of literati, paid a formal visit to the Ibādī village of Guerrara, an event which was celebrated in a *ḡaṣīda*²⁴ by the Ibādī divine of Relizane, Ibrāhīm al-Bayūd. On the other side, an Ibādī judge of Constantine had no qualms about sending his son to an orthodox reformist school and about attending, together with the Ibādī religious council, the final examinations presided over by the foremost leader of the Algerian reformist 'ulamā', Shāykh 'Abd al-Ḥamīd Ben Bādīs.²⁵

When in the spring of 1931, in conjunction with some progressive elements among the Ṣūfī orders,²⁶ a group of reformist 'ulamā' decided to establish in Algeria an association for the propagation of their doctrines,²⁷ Ben Bādīs insisted that the new organization be open to members

20. Ibid., 6.6.1924.

21. See the editorial of *al-Nadjāh*, 25.12.1925 ('The Mzābis and Reform'), which commends the former for their attachment to tradition but urges them to train administrators and professionals who would be able to look after the interests of the community. In its issue of 20.2.1925 the paper welcomes 'an intellectual movement' among the Ibādīs in Guerrara.

22. Ibid., 4.8.1925.

23. Ibid., 23.10.1925. The spelling of the name in *El* (new edition), s.v. 'Aṭṭāfiyyash' (J. Schacht) is at variance with that given throughout in *al-Nadjāh* and *al-Minhādj*. Khayr al-Dīn al-Ziriklī, *al-A'lām*, Cairo, 1929, p. 1008, gives the spelling 'Aṭṭāfiyyish and explains it, not very convincingly, as a contraction of three Berber words. Aṭṭāfiyyash carries the double *nisba*, al-Ḥafṣī al-'Adawī, implying descent from 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, a caliph held in particular veneration by the Khāridjites.

24. The *ḡaṣīda* is printed in *al-Nadjāh*, 11.4.1924.

25. Ibid., 6.6.1924. On Ben Bādīs see *L'Afrique Française*, 1933, pp. 149-56 (J. Desparmet, 'Un réformateur contemporain en Algérie') et passim (years 1931-1940); 'Allāl al-Fāsi, *Ta'rikh al-Ḥarakāt al-Istiqlāliyya ji'l-Maghrīb al-'Arabī*, Cairo, 1948, pp. 16-17.

26. More especially the 'Aliwiyya order, on which see A. Berque, 'Un mystique moderniste, le cheikh Benalioua', *Revue Africaine d'Alger*, 1936, p. 87 ff.; M. Carret, *Le Shaikh el-Alaoui (Souvenirs)*, Mostaganem, 1947; F. S. Vidal, 'Religious Brotherhoods in Moroccan Politics', *Middle East Journal*, IV (Oct. 1950), pp. 439-42.

27. Its official name is Association of Algerian Muslim 'Ulamā' (*djam'iyyat al-'ulamā' al-muslimīn al-djāz'iriyyīn*).

of all Islamic rites and groups. Following his election as president of the Association, he included in the governing body — beside kabyles, graduates of *zāwiya*s and 'official' *medersas* — also two representatives of the Algerian *Ibādīyya*, the poet, Abu'l-Yaqẓān of Guerrara,²⁸ and the above-mentioned shaykh al-Bayūḍ.²⁹

Whilst the admission of the *Sunnī* representatives went unopposed, the *Ṣūfī* members took exception to their *Ibādī* colleagues. As they also objected to the 'Neo-Wahhābī' tendencies of the reformists in the educational field, they soon seceded and set up an association of their own (September 1932).³⁰ To their original name they added the adjective 'Sunnī', thereby implying that, their opponents having become contaminated by heresy, they alone could rightfully claim to represent pure Algerian orthodoxy. The 'Alīwī organ *al-Balāgh* even went so far as to accuse Ben Bādīs' organization of being 'Ibādī'.^{30a}

The seal of *Ibādī*-*Salafī* friendship was set when Ben Bādīs, in the course of a propaganda tour in the summer of 1932, visited the city of Relizane. The entire *Ibādī* colony, headed by al-Bayūḍ and the *Ibādī* members of the town council, assembled in the local *Ibādī* school to greet the visitor. In his welcoming speech al-Bayūḍ pledged all those present to bury their quarrels, while Ben Bādīs extolled the brotherhood of the Maghrib people, founded upon their common origin. *Al-Nadjāh*, which covered Ben Bādīs' tour, reported that the event had left a profound impression in the country.³¹

Doctrinal Similarities

Viewed in the light of the past history of the sect, the alliance of *Ibādī* leaders with orthodox reformism in Algeria stands out as a puzzling and remarkable, albeit circumscribed, development in modern Islam and calls for an explanation.

As regards the Reformists, there was nothing in their doctrine or practice that precluded or discouraged a desire to associate with the *Ibādīyya*. On the contrary, in striving to join hands with heterodox or

28. His full name is given as Abu'l-Yaqẓān Ibrāhīm b. al-Ḥādjdj 'Isā al-Karārī. It should be noted that the names Abu'l-Yaqẓān and Yaqẓān were borne by two imāms of the Rustamid dynasty.

29. *Al-Balāgh* (Algiers), 25.11.1932, quoted by Desparmet, op. cit., p. 149.

30. *Al-Shihāb* of August 1932, quoted by Desparmet, op. cit. According to *al-Nabḍa* (Tunis), 27.9.1932, quoted by *Oriente Moderno*, XII, 489, the leader of the marabutic party, 'Umar Ismā'il, was expelled from the Association for attempting to exploit it in the interests of the 'Alīwiyya order.

30a. Thus *al-Nabḍa*, ibid.

31. *Al-Nadjāh*, 8. and 10.8.1932.

divergent groups in Algeria, the reformist 'ulamā' in fact practised what their Mashrikī prototypes, the apostles of Islamic revival, had been preaching from the very beginning. As early as 1884 Djamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī had diagnosed as a prime factor of disintegration in Islam the process whereby legal and religious authority and capacity of *idjtihād* had become divorced from the Caliphate, thus degrading the latter to mere kingship and opening the door to a tremendous growth of sects and rites and the division of the Empire along sectarian lines.³² On a practical plane, Djamāl al-Dīn addressed impassioned pleas to the rulers of Persia and Afghanistan, urging them to merge their sectarian differences in a united effort in order to stem the Russian advance into the remaining areas of Muslim independence.³³ Fifteen years later, 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī voiced his conviction that the double division of Islam into sects and rites was — contrary to a famous Ḥadīth — an act of divine vengeance (*naḳma*), not an act of grace (*raḥma*).³⁴ He made his imaginary Islamic Congress at Mecca decide on the setting up of a non-political and non-sectarian society, based on the moderate Salafī trend (*al-mashrab al-salafī al-mu'tadil*).³⁵

Subsequently, the unification of rites within Islam became a plank in the programme of the Manār group in Cairo.³⁶ Also, a special body, the 'Dār al-Takrīb bayn al-Madhāhib al-Islāmiyya', with an organ, *Risālat al-Islām*, was set up in Cairo to find a common language between 'al-Azhar and al-Nadjaf'.³⁷

However, it took more than a mere *nihil obstat* on the part of the Salafī 'ulamā' of Algeria to effect an understanding with the Mzābis. First, there was much common ground in the field of religious doctrine and attitudes; and secondly, they shared certain political antipathies and short-range objectives and thus stood to gain by cooperating for their attainment.

32. *Al-'Urwa al-Wuthqā*, Cairo, 1927, p. 78.

33. *Ibid.*, 189–95, 215–18.

34. *Umm al-Ḳurā*, Cairo, 1931, p. 130; cf. *ibid.*, p. 12.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 134.

36. Cf. Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

37. Other societies of similar inspiration and aims are the 'Khuddām al-Dīn' of Lahore, 'Djam'iyat al-Wā'izīn al-Dja'fariyya' (active in Malaya, Africa and Europe), 'Djam'iyat al-Ismā'iliyya' of Bombay, 'Djam'iyat Karāchī al-Islāmiyya', and various groups in Indonesia which sprang from the Muḥammadiyya movement. On these societies and their emphasis on reconciliation between Sunna and Shī'a, see Hāshim al-Daftardār al-Madanī and Muḥammad 'Alī al-Zu'bi, *Al-Islām bayn al-Sunna wa'l-Shī'a*, Beirut, 1950, p. 58 ff. Evidence of Shī'i response can also be found in the Matāwila monthly, *Al-'Irfān* of Ṣaydā (ed. 'Ārif al-Zayn), II (1910), 100–4, V (1913), 154–58, 240.

Perhaps the most important points of resemblance between the orthodox reformists and the Ibādīyya lie in their ideal of a restoration of Islam to its original purity and in certain fundamentals of Islamic theology, law and ethics. Even a cursory comparison of Ibādī doctrine with that of Muḥammad ‘Abduh³⁸ and the Maghribī Salafīyya will show quite an impressive number of such points.

In dogmatics, all these trends are basically rationalistic and deny any conflict between religion and reason and science. They are strictly unitarian and hold the Qur’ān to have been created in time. They are against determinism and incline to a large measure of free-will, with, as a corollary, the belief in the moral responsibility of man.³⁹ Hence they stress the importance of action (‘amal) and strength of will (irāda), of individual effort, vitality and improvement, of mutual help and cooperation (ta‘āwun), of solidarity (taḍāmun) and unity (waḥda, ittihād)⁴⁰ and condemn in the strongest terms passivity and stagnation (djumūd wa-rukūd). In canon law they reject the principle of taklīd, the blind acceptance of juridical authority, and affirm the right of idjtibād, the individual exercise of legal judgment based on a direct study of the Qur’ān and genuine Tradition. Accordingly, they are against the prevailing system of legal schools, the madhāhib.⁴¹

In the realm of piety, they are out of sympathy with Šūfism (apart from its ethical import); they have no use for saints and miracle-mongering, and abhor all popular manifestations of saint-worship as heretical innovations (bida‘) and rank idolatry (shirk).⁴²

38. For an excellent summary of ‘Abduh’s views, see the relevant article in *El* by J. Schacht.

39. In these their views they are quite close to the Mu‘tazila, which may not be co-incidental. See *Shorter El*, s.v. ‘Ibādīya’ by T. Lewicki; C. A. Nallino, ‘Rapporti fra la dogmatica mu‘tazilita e quella degli Ibaditi’, *RSO*, VII (1916), 455–60. It should be noted that both Ibādīs and orthodox reformists affirm the belief in destiny (al-kaḍā’ wa’l-ḥadar) and the reliance on God as a mainspring of human will, courage and action, but deny *djābr*, i.e. the belief that men act under compulsion, like automata. See *al-‘Urwa al-Wuthqā*, pp. 102–17; *al-Minhādj*, I, 298.

40. See, for instance, articles in *al-Minhādj*, I, 297 (on Will); *ibid.*, 55–58 (on Cooperation, Solidarity and Unity); *al-Nadjāḥ*, 2.11.1923, 29.8.1924 (on Unity), 9.11.1923 (on Action), 22.6.23, 4.1.1924 (on Cooperation); cf. *‘Urwa*, pp. 151–62 (on Hope and Quest of Glory), 314 f., 387 f.

41. Cf. *al-Nadjāḥ*, 2.11.1923, where a writer criticizes a reference to Mzābis as the ‘Fifth of the Shebka’ (*khawāmis al-shabaka*), which appellation implies their being beyond the pale of the four orthodox schools.

42. Cf. *al-Minhādj*, I, 417 ff. The peculiar attitude of the Algerian Ibādīyya to their dead falls in a category apart and cannot be equated with what the

The Prophet and his book enjoy exceptional veneration with all of them: the book, as the source of ultimate wisdom and a guide to happiness in this world and the next; the Prophet, as an embodiment of human virtues and as an example to emulate. His heirs, the 'ulamā', have a role of overriding importance in the community. They are the teachers of righteousness and correct conduct (*murshidūn*) in things temporal and spiritual (the two cannot be separated), in keeping with the Qur'ānic injunction, 'Command that which is proper, forbid that which is improper' (III, 110; XXX, 17).⁴³ Correct conduct is that which conforms to the standards of simplicity, austerity and puritanism believed to have obtained in the days of the Prophet and the two subsequent generations.

Finally, as concerns the body politic and government, both Salafis and Ibādīs are basically democratic and egalitarian and reject the traditional pattern of oriental despotism. Furthermore, the Mzābis, as we have seen, are deeply attached to their home (like other sedentary Berber groups, such as the Sūsīs and the Kabyles); while Muḥammad 'Abduh and his group and the Maghribī reformists have awakened to the notions of a fatherland and patriotism related to a definite territory without relinquishing their vision of a world-embracing commonwealth of Islam.⁴⁴

It should be noted that, apart from differences in extent and emphasis, most of the similarities listed above were, for the Ibādīs, inherent in their original system and part of their historical experience, while for the Orthodox Reformists they represented a break of continuity, a renovation, an aspiration and a programme rather than an established reality. Yet it would seem that the rank and file of the Ibādīs themselves, at least in

Salafis understand by *ḥubūriyyūn*, or *maḥābirīyyūn* (Al-Kawākibī, op. cit., p. 77). The position of the Algerian orthodox reformists on the entire question is stated authoritatively by Mubārak al-Milī in his *Risālat al-Shirk wa-Maḥābirīkī*, Algiers, 1937, (pp. 232-51), a work provided with the imprimatur of the Association of Algerian 'Ulamā'.

43. See the article in *al-Minhādj*, III (1929), 3, entitled 'Al-amr bi'l-ma'rūf wa'l-nahy 'an al-munkar'. This principle, too, is a basic tenet of the early Mu'tazila (see above, n. 39).

44. For the Ibādī attitude to patriotism, see the article in *al-Minhādj*, I, 405 ff., entitled 'Al-Waṭan wa'l-Waṭaniyya', and Abu'l-Yaḥzān's farewell *ḥaṣīda* to the Mzāb (ibid., p. 214). The new patriotism of the Algerian reformist 'ulamā' is most pithily expressed in Ben Bādīs' famous rejoinder (*al-Shihāb*, April 1936) to Farḥāt 'Abbās' article, 'La France c'est moi', and is reflected in Aḥmad Tawfiḳ al-Madani, *Kitāb al-Djazā'ir*, Algiers, 1932; Mubārak al-Milī, *Ta'riḥ al-Djazā'ir*, Constantine, 1932; Mohammed-Cherif Sahli, *Le message de Yougourtba*, Algiers, 1947; and the poems of Muḥammad al-'Id. About the latter see S. Bensheneb, 'Mohammad al-Id Hammou Ali', *Documents Algériens*, No. 7, 15.7.1946.

Algeria, had over the centuries become oblivious of their heritage and remiss in the observance of the do's and don't's of integral Ibādism. It took a definite and determined effort of reform to bring the Mzābīs back to their origins, and the beginnings of this movement are placed by local tradition in the eighties of the last century.⁴⁵ Curiously enough, this would coincide with the annexation of the Mzāb by France (1882) and al-Afghānī's and 'Abduh's publicistic activities in Paris (*al-'Urwa al-Wuthkā*, 1884). What strengthens the impression that this was no mere coincidence is the fact that the Mzābī reform appears, as far as it goes, closely akin in spirit and details to the programme launched by the Islamic revivalists. This similarity further widened the area of agreement between the Orthodox Reformists and what has been aptly called 'Neo-Ibādism'.

The Mzābī Reform Movement

The Mzābī reform movement is said to have originated with the great Ibādī mudjtahid and polygraph, Shaykh Muḥammad b. Yūsuf b. 'Īsā Aṭfiyyash of Beni Isgen (1820-1914), reverently called the 'Pole of the Imāms' (*kuṭb al-a'imma*).⁴⁶ It was the result of his study of original Khāridjism and developed under the slogan 'Back to the source!'

The reform falls into several categories: revivification of ḳur'ānic duties; eradication of heretical practices of Berber origin; improvement of morals; imposition of a regime of austerity; reform of the educational system with increased emphasis on the study and use of classical Arabic. Thus the formula of intention which must precede any valid devotional act (*niyya*) and which used to be recited in the Mzābī Berber vernacular, was henceforth to be pronounced in Arabic. The observance of all Pillars of Islam, not just prayer and fasting, was insisted upon. The Berber *bid'a* of shaving the beard and hair of armpit and genitals was banned. The use of spoken Arabic was discouraged and the Berber dialect retained for profane use only,^{46a} while for all liturgical purposes classical Arabic was to be used exclusively. To achieve the latter, the study of classical

45. A.-M. Goichon, 'La vie féminine au Mzab', *REI*, 1930, p. 233.

46. Of a total of over 300 writings ascribed to Aṭfiyyash, al-Ziriklī (op. cit., pp. 1008-9) lists 29 works, many of them voluminous, 17 of which have appeared in print. Most of them deal with questions of canon law, ḳur'ānic exegesis, biography of the prophet, history, theology, logic, rhetoric and *adab*. His most celebrated work is a commentary on a seventeenth century codification of Ibādī law, entitled *Sharḥ al-Nīl*. See also *EI*, (new ed.), s.v. 'Aṭfiyyāsh' (J. Schacht).

46a. For the Berber dialects of the Mzāb see H. Basset, *Essai sur la littérature des Berbères*, Alger, 1920, pp. 35 n., 37. The vernacular of Beni Isgen has been studied by A. Moulières, *Etude sur le dialecte des Beni Isguen*, Oran, 1897.

Arabic was introduced into the school curriculum for both boys and girls.⁴⁷

The Mzābī community seems to have been most spectacularly affected by the code of behaviour imposed on them, which banned all kinds of extravagance, luxury and frivolity, drastically curtailed expenditure on wedding festivities and their duration — which, again, closely parallels a characteristic trend among Maghribī Salafīs⁴⁸ — and strictly enforced the wearing of the veil by women.⁴⁹ It would seem that by the beginning of this century the revolution of manners among the Mzābīs was practically completed. Ismaël Hamet, writing in 1906, observes that the discipline of the Mzābīs was so strict that all of them, including those who were long-established in the cities of the Tell, rigorously abstained from singing, dancing, music, smoking and frequenting Moorish or European coffee-houses.⁵⁰ Twenty years later, Chevrillon still finds holy Beni Isgen a citadel of Ibādī clericalism, where sacred studies and monastic silence reigned supreme.⁵¹

The Mzābīs and the French

No less apt to endear the Mzābīs to the Orthodox Reformists was their zealous attachment to their Islamic heritage, their total rejection of Western ways and civilization and their intense resentment of foreign intrusion. When the French formally annexed the Mzāb in 1882, the Mzābī community, in accordance with Ibādī tradition, entered the 'State of Concealment' (*kitmān*), and the chief of the 'azzāba became 'Imām of Defence'

47. A detailed list of reforms is given by Goichon, op. cit., pp. 233–58.

48. See especially an article in *al-Nadjāh*, 4.3.1925, where excessive marriage expenditure is flayed as one of the worst and most injurious *bid'as*. For condemnation of luxury in general, see *ibid.*, 2.5.1924. For the austerity campaign of the Salafīs in Tunisia see G. Zawadowski, 'La situation de l'Islam en Tunisie d'entre deux guerres', *En Terre d'Islam*, 1943, pp. 77–100. The campaign against extravagant weddings in Morocco was first noted by E. Dermenghem in 1927 (see *L'Afrique Française*, 1928, pp. 99–100). On the excessive expenditure involved in Fāsī weddings, see the colourful account of J. & J. Tharaud, *Fez ou les bourgeois de l'Islam*, Paris, 1930, pp. 130–85; on its *bid'as*, E. Westermarck, *Marriage Ceremonies in Morocco*, London, 1914. That these customs are still common in Morocco can be inferred from *al-Ra'y al-'Āmm* (organ of the Moroccan Democratic Independence Party), 29.10.1949.

49. It should be noted that the Berber woman in the Sahara, especially among the Tuareg, does not wear the veil and generally enjoys a far greater degree of freedom than her urban and Arab counterpart (cf. H. Lhote, *Les Touaregs du Hoggar*, Paris, 1944, pp. 288–97).

50. Op. cit., p. 289.

51. Op. cit., pp. 199–209.

(*imām al-dīfā'*).⁵² The military authorities, governing the Shebka through Mzābī officers (*kuwwād*) and elected secular assemblies (*djamā'āt*), became engaged in a silent, but perpetual, tug-of-war with the invisible *hakka* of the 'azzāba. All *bid'as* introduced by the infidel power, such as government offices, modern schools and hospitals, were countered by the Mosque with an order for passive resistance and non-co-operation.⁵³ Even among the emigrants in the Tell the order was complied with. 'There is only one Muslim group in Algeria that is totally impervious to European penetration', states Hamet, '... these are the Mozabites. . . they have not changed one detail of their dress, they do not attend French schools, and not one of them has been seen soliciting a government position or collaborating with Europeans in any branch of commerce, industry or agriculture'.⁵⁴

As long as the French *présence* in the Mzāb merely entailed an offer of Western facilities and services, the Mzābīs were free to accept or reject them, even though they resented the French refusal to leave them alone. Even taxation, which in the Maghrib, as elsewhere, has often been a prime motive of tribal rebellion, does not seem to have caused undue friction,⁵⁵ though this does not necessarily mean that some Mzābīs did not consider it oppressive.⁵⁶ Some of them might admit the benefits that the coming of the French had brought to the Mzāb in terms of internal peace, security and increased commercial opportunities, but for the puritan and intransigent, these advantages obviously could not neutralize the irritations of the present.

52. On this institution see again *EI*, s.v. 'Ibādīya'.

53. Even the proposals to install electricity and a telephone system — amenities which the Mzābī merchants in the North made free use of — seems to have aroused serious apprehensions and opposition in the Mzāb (see *al-Minhādj*, III (1928), 65, 67). However, the objections to the electrification scheme, which may have been mainly economic, were overcome by 1930 (M. Violette, *L'Algérie vivra-t-elle?*, Paris, 1931, p. 381).

54. *Ibid.* This, as well as the natural secretiveness of the Berber towards the foreigner, may also account for the reluctance of the Mzābīs to teach Europeans anything of their native idiom (Basset, *op. cit.*, p. 37 and note).

55. Thus the village of Wādī Metlīlī, which adjoins the Mzāb but is not Ibādī, refused to pay a certain tax (*itāwa*), while the Mzābī *ḡā'id*s agreed to levy it (*al-Minhādj*, III, 81).

56. In an article entitled 'A Policy of Spoliation', *al-Minhādj* complains bitterly of administrative exactions in the Mzāb: a tax rise from 45,000 francs in 1853 to 300,000 francs in 1928, plus various taxes to cover expenditure on road improvement, administration and the local garrison, a contribution for artesian wells, etc. (*ibid.*, pp. 65–68).

A crisis in French-Mzābī relations begins, however, when compulsory military service, introduced into Algeria in 1912, was made applicable to the Mzāb by the *décret* of August 1917. In the spring of 1919 serious incidents took place in the Mzāb, followed by opposition and tension, as a result of which a new ordinance was issued by the Governor General in March 1921, which required the Mzābīs to supply annually 150 recruits for a two-year period of service. This demand was rejected by the latter on historical, legal, religious and economic grounds.

As far as the historical reasons were concerned, they claimed that throughout the period of Arab domination the Mzāb had enjoyed complete independence. Under the Turks they had purchased official protection against an annual tribute consisting of twelve male and twelve female negro slaves, while retaining their previous status unimpaired, including exemption from military service.

From the legal point of view, they asserted that the Mzāb, unlike the rest of Algeria, was not French territory and its inhabitants not French subjects; hence French legislation could not apply to them. To substantiate this claim, they proffered the following main arguments:

a) The peace-terms of Governor General Randon, as stated in his letter of January 25, 1853 and accepted by the Mzābī notables, offered them protection, non-interference in their internal affairs and recognition of their previous status, in return for their submission to the French authority and the annual payment of 40,000 francs. In other words, the Randon Agreement conferred on the Mzāb the status of a protectorate, not that of an annexed territory. This interpretation was confirmed by a decision handed down by the Court of Appeal of Constantine to the effect that the decree of October 24, 1870 (the famous *Décret Crémieux*), which granted French citizenship to the native Jews of the Algerian *départements*, was not applicable to the Jews of the Mzāb.

b) The occupation of the Mzāb in November 1882 did not constitute an annexation. True, the presidential *décret* of December 21, 1882 used the term 'annexation', but it only confirmed a report submitted by the Minister of War and Interior justifying the annexation and the creation of the military *cercle* of Ghardāya. Furthermore, in accordance with the constitutional law of July 16, 1875 no transfer, exchange, or annexation of territory was valid unless it was done by law, and no such law had been passed by Parliament concerning the Mzāb.

As to the religious aspects, the Mzābīs insisted that military service in the French army would violate fundamental principles of Islam and, in particular, interfere with the obligation of the five daily prayers.

Finally, the Mzābīs pointed out that military service, by diverting

sorely needed manpower from their agricultural and commercial enterprises, would spell ruin to the economy of the Mzāb.⁵⁷

The French authorities did not admit the validity of these claims, nor did they see their way clear to exempting the Mzābīs from a legal obligation applying to the rest of the Algerians. Some of them held that the Randon letter, by demanding of the Mzābīs 'submission to France' in return for which they were to be considered 'our subjects', was in fact an act of annexation, while the *décret* of December 28, 1882 had sanctioned the military occupation of the Mzāb and introduced a new administrative regime after the previous order proved unsatisfactory.⁵⁸ The Mzāb had become a depot of forbidden goods and a supplier of arms to the rebels led by Bū 'Amāma, chief of the 'marabutic' tribe, Awlād Sīdī Shaykh; they were torn by internal dissensions and exposed to nomad raids. The new order had put an end to this anomalous situation and placed the Mzābīs on an equal footing with the rest of the population.⁵⁹

The Mzābīs did not let the matter rest there but carried their case before the Council of State in Paris, which rejected their appeal on May 15, 1925. The decision aroused intense feelings in the Mzāb which erupted in a protest demonstration when the new Governor General, Maurice Viollette, visited Ghardāya on November 20, 1925.⁶⁰ Viollette, a socialist and a liberal, recognized the strength of the economic reasons adduced by the Mzābīs, though he considered their legal case untenable. To meet them halfway, he reduced their yearly quota to twenty men, in which number he included also those enlisted from among the Mzābī emigrants in the Tell or elsewhere in Algeria. This decision rendered superfluous the operation of the recruiting commissions in the Mzāb — some of whose sessions had been quite stormy — and soothed passions.⁶¹

57. The official Mzābī point of view is contained in a refutation of a report dated May 14, 1923 by Governor General Steeg to the Council of State in Paris. A 'somewhat abridged' version of the Mzābī statement is given in *al-Minhādj*, I, 186-202. For more details see *ibid.*, I, 47-52, 101-25, 334-40; cf. also *al-Nadjāh*, 2.11.1923, 5.6.1925.

58. This view is expressed by Governor General Steeg in his report (see preceding note).

59. An exposé of the French (and Mzābī) position is given in an article entitled 'Les Indigènes du Mzab et le service militaire', *L'Afrique Française* (Rens. Col.), 1925, pp. 236-38.

60. This demonstration was celebrated by the poet Abu'l-Yaḳẓān in a *ḡaṣīda* published in *al-Minhādj*, I, 362-66.

61. Viollette, *op. cit.*, p. 380. After the last war the Mzābīs were completely exempted from military service by Governor General Yves Châtaigneau.

The feelings engendered in the Mzāb by the issue of military service and the fundamental position of the Mzābīs towards French policy in the Shebka in general are forcefully expressed in an anonymous and undated letter sent to the French Bureau of Ghardāya. The letter is a reply to a French reprimand administered to the local *kā'id* for having neglected to report a case of typhus during an epidemic and ordering a medical inspection. The document, which has been published by Chevillon, deserves to be reproduced in full:

'Mr. Commandant:

Let it be known to you that the doctor must see neither dead nor sick Mzābīs; you have done here an evil thing. And you must not take the Mzābīs as soldiers. You must not change the law of our ancestors. You cannot oblige our children to attend your school. You must not say: I want a hundred, a thousand, twenty, or ten of them. Our children will never study under compulsion. You have established a Bureau: whoever wants to complain can go there; a hospital: whoever wants can go there; a house of pleasure: whoever wants to go to Hell may go there. Nothing of all this is obligatory.

You say, O French, that your ancestors are dead, that you communicate with them no more. We Muslims say that our ancestors are alive and watch over their children even though their flesh and bone have crumbled to dust in the earth. Our ancestors are like lions in the thicket who watch over themselves and their realm. They devour whoever wants to make them perish. God sees and is just. Our ancestors say to you: The government that takes a single Mzābī as a soldier will perish. Such a Mzābī will only submit to force, or else be a renegade. He who sells his religion and brothers cannot profit by it.

This letter does not come from the learned, the chiefs, the rich or the salaried. It is the work of the weak, the sick and the dead whose dust reposes underground. You believe them dead: they are alive beside God.

No enquiry should be made concerning this letter. He who wrote it fears neither enquiry nor jail nor death. He fears only God who created him and commanded him to write it.'⁶²

The Ibādiyya and Arab Nationalism

It would seem that the feelings aroused by the struggle over the question of military service were not confined to the Shebka, but created something akin to the stirrings of a national movement amongst the Mzābīs in general. The intensely patriotic songs of the poet Abu'l-Yaḳẓān have already been referred to. In an article in *al-Nadjaḥ* entitled 'The Patriotic Resurgence' (*al-Nabḍa al-Waṭaniyya*), an Ibāḍī correspondent hails the beginnings of a 'Saharan patriotic movement' and quotes the following passage from an anonymous Mzābī tract: 'The present catastrophes and successive disasters that have befallen the Muslims have promp-

62. Op. cit., pp. 186-88.

ted every liberal person (*ḥurr*) to ponder the means of deliverance (*kbalās*) and to wish that the Muslims may close their ranks and unite their force'.⁶³

The author of this pamphlet seems to strike a new and important note. He goes beyond the narrow confines of the traditional attachment of the Berber to his native soil and pins his hopes on Islamic solidarity and unity. In 1926 there appeared in Algiers a new Ibādī weekly, *Wādī Mizāb*, which, too, advocated an Islamic union, to be achieved by means of a congress.⁶⁴ The paper served mainly as a mouthpiece of Mzābī grievances and aspirations and denounced the administration in a tone that led to its being barred from entry into Morocco in 1927 and suspended a year later. *Al-Shihāb*, the leading reformist organ of Algeria, eulogized in moving terms the disappearance of its *confrère*,⁶⁵ reciprocating, as it were, the feelings expressed by *al-Minhādīj* over the suspension of the Algerian reformist organs, *al-Muntaḳid* and *al-Djazā'ir*, three years earlier.^{65a} Its line was continued by the Mzābī organs, *al-Nūr* and, later, *al-Umma*, both of them published in Algiers. The latter in particular made itself a champion of Arab causes everywhere and urged the Algerian 'ulamā' to raise the new generation in a spirit of *djihād* and martyrdom against imperialism.⁶⁶

Even less inhibited in its espousal of Muslim nationalism is the Neo-Ibādī weekly *al-Minhādīj*, published by the Salafiyya Press in Cairo since 1926. Its editor, Abū Ishāḳ Ibrāhīm Aṭfiyyash, a nephew of the great Mzābī Imām and reformer and himself steeped in Ibādī lore, combines a deep attachment to his native Mzāb with the ideology of modern Ibādism, Salafiyya and Islamic Renaissance (*nabḍa*).

Naturally, his paper gives pride of place to matters of Ibādī interest, such as Mzābī institutions and grievances against the French, the affairs of Oman and Zanzibar, thus serving in fact as a link between the widely scattered communities of the Ibādī sect. It strongly supports and publicizes the Ibādī scholar, Berber leader and mudjāhid of Tripolitania, Sulaymān Pāshā al-Bārūnī. A disciple of Shaykh Aṭfiyyash in his Algerian period,⁶⁷

63. *Al-Nad̄jāh*, 13.3.1925. The title of the pamphlet is given as 'The Exalted Critique of the Gentle Rebuke' (*al-Nakd al-Djalil li'l-'Atb al-Djamil*).

64. H. A. R. Gibb (ed.), *Whither Islam?*, London, 1932, p. 93.

65. *Al-Shihāb*, Feb. 1929, p. 33.

65a. *Al-Minhādīj*, I, 237.

66. A description of this paper with excerpts is given in *L'Afrique Française*, Jan. 1937, p. 30.

67. *Al-Minhādīj*, I, 460.

al-Bārūnī headed a self-proclaimed Government of Tripolitania in 1912,⁶⁸ fought the Italians during the First Italo-Sanūsī War and served as senator in the Ottoman Parliament in Constantinople.⁶⁹ Barred from European-controlled Muslim countries after the First World War, he finally found his way from France to Mecca and from there to the co-religionist Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, where he was favourably received by Sultan Taymūr b. Fayṣal, and the Ibādī Imām Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Khalīlī. For two years he tried to infuse a new spirit into the Ibādī tribal chiefs, mediated between Imām and Sultan and was entrusted by the latter with a mission of conciliation between King Ḥusayn of Ḥidjāz and ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Ibn Sa‘ūd, Sultan of Najd.⁷⁰ In 1927 he was appointed Prime Minister of Oman and embarked on a programme of modernization of army and finance which, however, was branded in conservative Ibādī circles as a ‘Christian *bid‘a*’.⁷¹

In his articles in *al-Minhādj*, al-Bārūnī reveals himself as a staunch Muslim nationalist and an enemy of imperialism. With him, as with Aṭṭīyash, the mingling of Ibādī with anti-imperialist and general Islamic sentiment stems from the contemporary involvement of Ibādism with the colonial Powers: the French in the Mzāb, the Italians in Tripolitania, and the British in Oman.⁷² As this triple experience paralleled that of the Sunnī world, it naturally attuned the Ibādīs to the rallying voices in modern Islam. The European Powers, Aṭṭīyash argued, had shown the way. They had created an instrument of concerted action, the League of Nations, which served their interests, but held out no hopes for the subject peoples of the East.⁷³ Hence the Muslims, and in fact all Eastern peoples, regardless of sect and rite, must forge their own unity, in order to withstand Western imperialism, now threatening the heart of Arabia

68. The text of the proclamation and the story of this government are given in Amīn Sa‘īd, *Al-Dawla al-‘Arabiyya al-Muttaḥida*, Cairo, n.d., II, 500.

69. His involvement in the war is related by Dr. Muḥammad Fu‘ād Shukrī, *Al-Sanūsiyya Dīn wa-Dawla*, Cairo, 1948, pp. 147–50, 227–54. According to E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica*, O.U.P., 1954, p. 126, he was among those who plotted to entangle the Sanūsī in a war with the British.

70. The text of the Sultan’s letters to King Ḥusayn and Ibn Sa‘ūd concerning al-Bārūnī’s mission is given in *al-Minhādj*, I, 169–71. At the same time al-Bārūnī was delegated by the Ibādī Imām to represent him at the Caliphate Congress in Cairo (*ibid.*, p. 71). He was, however, refused an entry visa to Egypt (*ibid.*, I, 421).

71. *Al-Minhādj*, II, 69–72.

72. See his articles on British politics in Arabia (*al-Minhādj*, I, 161–65) and the drawbacks of the Anglo-Sa‘ūdī Treaty (*ibid.*, IV (1929–30), 2–22).

73. *Ibid.*, I, 123–34.

after Britain's occupation of Ma'ān and 'Aḳaba. They must resist imperialism's handmaid, the Christian missionary societies, against whose activities *al-Minhādj* repeatedly sounds the alarm.⁷⁴ Pointing to Japan, which had taken the lead in the formation of a movement of Asian solidarity as a reaction to Western 'enmity, conceit and scorn',⁷⁵ Aṭfiyyash advocates the creation of a united front of Eastern nations⁷⁶ and claims that he had been directing his efforts towards this goal for a long time.⁷⁷ The East, he asserts, will never enjoy life. . . unless it forms a purely Eastern League of Nations that will work for its deliverance. . . and fight the oppression of imperialist Europe,⁷⁸ whose codes do not permit (*lā yadjūzu fī shari'atihim*) the Easterner to be treated as an equal.⁷⁹ For a Muslim, such a union is enjoined by the Ḳur'ān (III, 103): 'And hold ye fast to Allah's rope jointly and do not part asunder, but remember the benefit Allah has bestowed upon you when you were enemies and he composed your hearts and you became brethren by his grace', and (V, 3): 'Help each other in good works and fear of Allah, do not help each other in works of sin and enmity'.⁸⁰

Besides working for a comprehensive unification scheme, Aṭfiyyash also launched an appeal for North African unity, based on a community of religion, language and race,⁸¹ while al-Bārūnī tried to restore unity in the Arabian peninsula.

The Enemy from Within

However, external danger is not the only one that threatens Islam. It is doubled and countenanced by danger from within, which Aṭfiyyash identifies — in typical Salafī fashion — as assimilation to, and blind imitation of, Western civilization on the one hand, and rigid traditionalism and unconcern with the condition of Islam, on the other.⁸² A most glaring example of the former is Turkey. *Al-Minhādj* bitterly deplores the Kemālist Revolution which had begun so well but had

74. *Ibid.*, III, 49–51 (evangelistic congress in Jerusalem); cf. also *ibid.*, pp. 29–35, 73, 88.

75. *Ibid.*, III, 23–28.

76. *Ibid.*, I, 40–42, 43–46; III, 23–28.

77. *Ibid.*, I, 45.

78. *Ibid.*, I, 466.

79. *Ibid.*, III, 23.

80. *Ibid.*, I, 55.

81. *Ibid.*, I, 55–58 (lecture to Maghribī residents in Cairo).

82. See his programmatic introduction (*ibid.*, I, 2–3); cf. S. Arslān, *Limādhā Ta'akhhkbara al-Muslimūn wa-Taḳāddama Ghayruhūm*, Cairo, 1931, pp. 54 ff. (chapter entitled *Dayā' al-Islām bayn al-Djāmidin wa'l-Djāhidin*).

turned sour and had brought glad tidings to all enemies of Islam. While the French Revolution did not strip the French of their Frenchness and Christianity, the Kemālists had brought Turkey into the European bloc, deserted the Islamic Community (*djāmi'a*) and were now striving to divest the Turkish people, so deeply attached to its religion, of its Islamic character.⁸³ Particular significance is attributed to the adoption of the European hat (*burnayta, kubba'a*) and the discarding of the turban and fez. *Al-Minbādj* goes so far as to qualify this as *shirk*, as an act of 'secession from the Islamic nation and the fold of the faith' and a 'complete casting-off of Islamic status (*wad'iyya*)', since Islam commands the believers to preserve its characteristics and distinct personality and discourages them from adopting any trait, no matter how trifling, that is peculiar to the infidels.⁸⁴

To immunize the rising generation against the temptations of the West, Atfiyyash strives to foster its self-respect and pride by extolling the virtues and achievements of Islam and the benefits it bestowed on the West. Here again he follows the course traced by modern Islamic apologists and especially Muḥammad 'Abduh, Rashīd Riḍā and the Algerian Reformists. 'Our journal', he states, 'is eager to catch and ferret out every title of pride of Islam in order to revivē the glory of old and stimulate the modern and liberal mind'.⁸⁵ Thus he carries a long article on borrowings from Arabic in European languages,⁸⁶ and another one on Gustave Lebon's indictment of European imperialism in Islamic lands.⁸⁷ Were it not for Islam, he asserts, Europe would have had no notion of happiness, progress and civilization.⁸⁸ The Islamic faith, he says in a rebuttal of charges made by Louis Bertrand,⁸⁹

83. *Ibid.*, I, 177-84.

84. *Ibid.*, I, 426-28. Cf. also *ibid.*, III, 95, where he hails the appearance in Europe of the Egyptian King in his Eastern garb as a blow to the hat and a slap to its propagandists. The Algerian Salafis have a similar affection for the traditional headgear. Thus *al-Nadjāh*, 25.9.1925, commends the inhabitants of Djidjelli for continuing to wear the dress of their forbears (*aslāf*) and refrain from affectation (*taṣannu'*) and the wearing of the fez and other finery (*zarkashāt*). For Tunisia see Zawadowski, *op. cit.*, p. 97. For a satire on the Europeanized Muslim woman, see S. Bensheneb, 'Chansons satiriques d'Alger', *Revue Africaine*, 74e année, 1-2 trim. 1933, pp. 79-80.

85. *Al-Minbādj*, II, 50.

86. *Ibid.*, I, 50-68.

87. *Ibid.*, I, 473-88.

88. *Ibid.*, I, 242.

89. The rebuttal refers to Bertrand's book, *Devant l'Islam* (Paris, 1926). For the author's background, views and works see O. C. Cabeen, *The African Novels of Louis Bertrand*, Philadelphia, 1922; cf. also *Documents Algériens*, 1949, pp. 201-4.

is a logical and natural (*fiṭrī*) religion, free from myths and superstitions, a religion of perfection, tolerance, majesty and beauty, whose culture amazed the ancestors of its present detractors.⁹⁰ The story of its propagation by the sword is a fable. The fact that even today, despite the weakness of Muslim governments, it attracts more followers than any other religion is proof that its force is a moral, not a material one.⁹¹ The criticism levelled against it by Europeans is prompted by envy, fear of its present resurgence, and the rancour of the Catholic Church.⁹²

Just as he lashes out at the imitators of the West, Aṭfiyyash holds up to scorn another *bête noire* of the Salafis: the partisans of 'stagnation' (*al-djāmidūn*), under which term are lumped together all those who cling to the *bida'* of popular Islam, especially to the veneration of saints and tombs; those unconcerned with the Islamic polity, its past greatness and challenging present; those devoid of a sense of civic duties and responsibilities; those who negate the temporal and worldly side of Islam as a derogation of the spiritual; the indifferent, the indolent, the fatalistic, the submissive, the particularist.⁹³ Thus he sees eye to eye with the Wahnābīs when they demolish structures erected over tombs, ban all sorts of *bida'* and *shirk* perpetrated there, such as circumambulations, kissing of stones, praying, asking for intercession, use of incense and intoxicants.⁹⁴ He agrees with Muḥammad 'Abduh that the popular superstitions (*ḵburāfāt*) were among the factors responsible for the eclipse of Islam and warmly recommends the assiduous study of 'Abduh's writings.⁹⁵

This is not to say that Aṭfiyyash is a sceptic. He implicitly believes the miracles performed by the prophets (*mu'djizāt*) and things supernatural insofar as they are attested by the Ḳur'ān and the 'genuine' Tradition, and takes issue with the materialists (*al-māddiyyūn*) who deny all that cannot be traced back to natural causes.⁹⁶ But he gives no credence to the

90. *Al-Minhādj*, I, 459, 462.

91. *Ibid.*, I, 460-61.

92. *Ibid.*, I, 243, 458-59.

93. *Ibid.*, I, 186; II, 2; IV, 32. Discussing the Azhar reform the paper remarks: 'Some of the *djāmidūn* have grown pessimistic, but the pessimism of the people of *djumūd* or their outcry is a sign that things are going well... There is nothing more serious than the malady of *djumūd*; it is a pernicious disease in the body of the Islamic nation' (*ibid.*, I, 186). Cf. also I, 45-53, where the Ḥadīth *law i'ta-ḵada aḥadukum 'alā ḥadjar la-nafa'abu* is branded as *shirk* and as a cause of tomb-worship.

94. *Ibid.*, p. 418. 'Undoubted influence' of the Ibādīs on the Wahnābīs has been seen by A. Guillaume, *Islam*, Edinborough, 1954, p. 114.

95. *Al-Minhādj*, II, 105.

96. *Ibid.*, II, 91-93.

miracle-mongers and quacks whose occasional successes he admits but explains in terms of faith-healing.⁹⁷ He flays them as impostors (*dadj-djalūn*) who exploit the credulity of the vulgar in order to increase their following, enhance their stature and line their pockets; he holds them responsible for the introduction of saint-worship into Islam.⁹⁸ The popular observance of the Nativity of the Prophet (*mawlid*), which already aroused the opposition of Ibn Taymiyya, the Wahhābis and 'Abduh, comes in for criticism, too.⁹⁹ Some *mawlid* celebrations were accompanied by improprieties (*manākīr*), the sight of which 'give the creeps, split the liver, make eye and heart weep', and discredit Islam in the eyes of its ill-wishers.¹⁰⁰ This Aṭfiyyash deplores the more as the Nativity of the Prophet, with its recitation of the *sīra*, could be an excellent means of renewal of Islamic life and a check on the spread of 'foreign poisons'.¹⁰¹

With equal vehemence Aṭfiyyash turns against the apostles of other-worldliness who 'whisper' into the ears of the gullible that the concern for mundane affairs leads to damnation. In Islam, he states categorically, religion cannot function properly without attending to the temporal (*dunyā*). This has always been so, but is especially true, he says, now that Islam is overwhelmed with disasters, internal rifts, hateful innovations, oppression, corruption, sin and lust which are dissipating its pristine beauty and virtue and dissolving its established social order. The Prophet himself gave an example: by sending missions to instruct the nations, by wielding the sword and administering the state, and by consulting the experienced in worldly affairs he showed that he was dedicated to the temporal and spiritual alike.¹⁰²

Small wonder, then, that Aṭfiyyash thinks highly of Rashīd Riḍā's conception of the Caliphate, as expressed in his book 'The Caliphate or Supreme Imāmate',¹⁰³ and emphatically rejects the thesis propounded by the former *kāḍī* and faculty member of al-Azhar, Shaykh 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāzīk. In his famous book, *Islām and the Foundations of the State*¹⁰⁴,

97. *Ibid.*, I, 463.

98. *Ibid.*, II, 107.

99. See *El*, s.v. 'Mawlid' (H. Fuchs).

100. *Al-Minhādj*, II, 85.

101. *Ibid.*, II, 88.

102. *Ibid.*, III, 3-4.

103. *Al-Khilāfa aw al-Imāma al-'Uzmā*, Cairo, 1922. An annotated translation was published by H. Laoust: *Le Califat dans la doctrine de Raḥīd Riḍā*, Beirut, 1938. See *al-Minhādj*, I, 4.

104. *Al-Islām wa-Uṣūl al-Ḥukm*, Cairo, 1925. An analysis of this work is given in *Revue du Monde Musulman*, LIX, 302-305. For its impact on the Egyptian scene see *Oriente Moderno*, IX, 492-96; XII, 680-81.

'Abd al-Rāziq averred that Muhammad's politics and wars were secular affairs, separate from his religion and aimed merely at promoting Qurayshite power; that he never envisaged the Caliphate; that this institution, therefore, was not required by Muslim religion and could be dispensed with. The imperative need for the Caliphate, Aṭfiyyash retorts, is postulated by the Qur'ānic obligations 'to command the good and forbid the evil', to dispense justice, to uphold the 'limits' set by God (*ḥudūd*) and to propagate Islām (*nashr al-da'wa*). True, these obligations involve mundane affairs, such as administration, business transactions and conduct of war; but they are part of religion, as they must be decided on the basis of Qur'ān, Sunna, Consensus (*idjmā'*) and — supplementarily — the *idjtibād* of the Caliph, who, by doing so, becomes a politico-religious Imām. The indispensability of the Caliphate is further demonstrated by the fact that Abū Bakr and 'Umar were unanimously — hence infallibly — elected to the Caliphate, the former even before the body of the Prophet was committed to earth.¹⁰⁵

This is, of course, also the position of the Sunna, both conservative and reformist. On two points, however, Aṭfiyyash takes an opposite view, in conformity with Ibādī doctrine. First, he speaks out against a single, universal Imāmate, as both unwarranted by scripture and proven impossible in practice, and insists that a plurality of Imāms does not preclude unity of the Umma. And secondly, he denies as equally unwarranted the requirement of Qurayshite descent for a caliphal candidate and adduces as proof the well-known Ḥadīth about the eligibility of an Abyssinian slave; while Abū Bakr's dictum, 'The Imāms are from Quraysh', is interpreted as having preferential, not exclusive, force and reflecting the pre-eminent position of that tribe in those days.¹⁰⁶

The closeness of Ibādīs and Salafis in their basic religio-political philosophy, which has been attributed to the influence of the latter on the former¹⁰⁷ and is most clearly reflected in the Cairene exponent of the Algerian Ibādīyya, Ibrāhīm Aṭfiyyash, is further underlined by regular or sporadic contributions to *al-Minhādj* by noted orthodox reformists, such as Shaykh 'Alī Surūr al-Zankalūnī, a faculty member of al-Azhar and a friend of 'Abduh;¹⁰⁸ Shaykh Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb, owner of the pan-Islamic organ *al-Fatḥ*; and Shaykh 'Abd al-Ḳādir al-Maghribī.¹⁰⁹

105. *Al-Minhādj*, I, 6–9.

106. *Ibid.*, I, 11–12.

107. L. Massignon, 'Les vraies origines dogmatiques du Wahhabisme', *Revue du Monde Musulman*, XXXVI (1918–19), 325.

108. Adams, *op. cit.*, 210.

109. Attention was called to al-Maghribī by P. Hitti in 1927 (see Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 247).

* * *

In Algeria, the alliance between the Mzābīs and the Reformist 'ulamā', and Mzābī sympathies for Sunnī nationalism in general, appear to have cooled off over the years. In 1936 the Muslims of Constantine launched a boycott against Mzābī shops, following the refusal of the Mzābīs to contribute substantially to 'ulamā' funds.¹¹⁰ There was also Mzābī dissatisfaction with a resolution passed by the Islamic Congress of Algiers (June 1936) — in which the Reformists had taken a leading part — demanding the grant of French citizenship to Algerian Muslims without loss of their personal status.¹¹¹ The estrangement between the parties became evident by 1950, when the Association of 'Ulamā' refrained from including any Mzābī representative in the list of candidates, from which the Algerian Assembly was to form a Provisional Islamic Council of Algeria.¹¹²

Thus the period of Ibāḍī-Salafī friendship in Algeria may well turn out to have been a brief and unusual episode in the history of inter-sectarian relations in Islam.

110. *L'Afrique Française*, Août-Sept. 1936, p. 460.

111. *Al-Umma*, 9.6.1936, quoted in *L'Afrique Française*, Août-Sept. 1937, p. 424.

112. Busson de Janssens, *op. cit.*, p. 17. The complete list of candidates is given in an annex to the memorandum on the Separation of Church and State, submitted by the Association of 'Ulamā' to the Algerian Assembly in May 1950, pp. 21-26.