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This chapter sheds light on the engagement of Islamists in Oman before, during, and after the Arab and Omani uprising, addressing the under-researched nature of

The seventh in the CAIW series, this title draws on the 50 years of experience of Cambridge based World of Information. During most of the period covered, Oman was ruled by Sultan Qaboos bin Said, overcoming several handicaps, including modest hydrocarbon revenues, and during the first years of Qaboos’ reign, a rebellion in the southern province of Dhofar. The latter was often described as a full-blown war with the neighbouring People’s Democratic Republic of the Yemen (PDRY) and its Soviet supporters. Nevertheless, this strategically located, mostly Ibadhi sect Sultanate, has developed from a medieval, into a modern state.

Britain's military presence in the Middle East underwent a significant transformation by the 1960s, characterized by contractions to establish smaller bases in Aden and the Gulf; however, the British military marked a significant change in contrast to its former stronghold at the Suez base. These bases protected vital oil interests and fulfilled Britain's obligations to local rulers. However, political developments within the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula increasingly challenged Britain's strategic position. These evolving dynamics necessitated a re-evaluation of both diplomatic and military strategies leading to the most far-reaching anti-British revolution, the Dhofar Revolution in Oman.   The scholarly discourses concerning the end of the revolution have highlighted the reintegration of the Dhofar society that was actively engaged in the revolutionary struggles of broader Omni society. Nevertheless, the mechanisms employed for their success/failures have not been covered in the existing literature. Consequently, this paper aims to fill this existing gap in the literature by contextually analysing the present literature and archival documents on the Dhofar war. For this purpose, the authors extensively utilized archival documents available within the Arabian Gulf Digital Archive (AGDA) in Abu Dhabi. Moreover, the Dhofari rebel literature derived from The Gulf Bulletin fervently promoted the communist revolutionary ideology. On the other hand, the Omani government's viewpoint was extensively disseminated through its military propaganda branch, aiming to counter the rebels' influence. This paper posits that, despite the strong support from the Communist bloc, the Dhofari Revolution ultimately failed because the rebels made hastened attempts to replace the region's traditional cultural values and Islamic beliefs with their novel ideological vision. This alienated the Dhofari population, causing the rebels to lose the support of the people they aspired to lead.

This book offers a comprehensive and insightful exploration of Oman’s discourses on foreign policy and national identity in the context of the Middle East. The Sultanate of Oman is often hailed as a peaceful exception in the region, but this work goes beyond surface-level observations to reveal the intricate complexities of Oman’s foreign policy and identity construction. With a keen focus on deconstructing essentialist understandings, the chapters delve into how discursive alignments and identity contents have shaped the government’s quest for legitimacy, recognition, and status. Employing a pioneering discourse historical approach to compare the National Day speeches and UN General Assembly speeches throughout Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Bu Saidi’s reign (1970–2020), the author reveals how discourse evolved based on time, issues, and audiences. Notably, the book situates Oman within the context of the Gulf Cooperation Council states, examining how the Omani government’s interlinked discourses on identity and foreign policy contributed to differentiate the Sultanate from other Gulf countries. With chapters exploring Oman’s foreign policy principles, its material and ideological response to the ideas linked to the Dhofar Revolution, and its interactions with the Arab world and the international community, readers of this book will gain a comprehensive understanding of Oman’s evolving national and supranational identifications and the dynamic nature of its foreign policy. Challenging prevailing narratives while providing a fresh perspective on the relations between Oman’s foreign policy and identity construction, this book marks an important text for scholars as well as policymakers and anyone interested in understanding the intricate dynamics of Oman’s role in the global stage.

At a time of rapid international change and marked regional dynamism, the Sultanate of Oman is emerging as a nation of surprising significance. Oman is a unique case of a Gulf state strategically and culturally located at a crossroads between the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. From this position, the Sultanate has developed its own political identity and pursued a unique foreign policy in the turbulent Middle East region, enabling the country to survive and overcome the challenges of the region. Over the years, the Sultanate has earned the title "Switzerland of the Middle East" due to its political neutrality and its prominent role as a regional mediator and peacekeeper. Renowned local and international authors as well as promising younger scholars present studies on the history, politics, economy and culture of Oman.

For a long time, analysts of the Middle East have justifiably focused their attention on Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, three Gulf states holding massive hydrocarbon deposits and financial resources. Their leaders are the main “movers and shakers” of regional affairs and enjoy tremendous influence on the international scene. Still, other Gulf states play significant roles in shaping the Middle East's economic and strategic landscape. Such is the case with Oman, which has been a major US ally in most regional crises and has played a crucial role in mediating Gulf conflicts. This article, based on several visits to the sultanate and interviews with senior officials, analyzes the domestic, regional, and international dynamics being navigated by Sultan Haitham bin Tarik, who succeeded Sultan Qaboos bin Said in January 2020. The argument is that the new Omani leader is likely to follow the domestic and foreign policies of his predecessor, with minor adjustments. Oman may witness major changes when Crown Prince Theyazin succeeds his father. For now, given the crucial role Muscat plays in mediating regional conflicts, the sultanate expects more attention from its counterparts in Washington.

Mobile peoples in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world have faced enormous pressure throughout the twentieth and twentieth-first centuries to change their way of life, to settle down and remain in one place. The notion that a settled existence is more modern than a mobile one continues to dominate expert thinking as a continuation of late nineteenth-century social evolutionist theories of the progress of civilisation. Most of the modern nation-states of the Middle East have approached their mobile pastoral peoples with a determined view to making them stay put in one place and give up their pastoral subsistence livelihoods. Settlement schemes, it was assumed, would assure political and economic control over these difficult-to-emplace-and-control peoples. The development aid efforts, both bi-lateral and international, throughout the twentieth century followed these same biases and were designed to make mobile or nomadic peoples ‘modern’, using principles developed during the colonial era such as terra nullius, which declared all land not held privately as empty, and thus belonging to the state so that it could be disposed of or developed as the state wished. By the end of the twentieth century, most pastoral peoples’ grazing lands had been expropriated and sed-entarisation schemes of one sort or another were the mechanisms of choice. Pastoral peoples in Oman, however, had some success in challenging the notion of terra nullius in the deserts of the country. A younger generation of ‘citizen’ herders have been able to parlay further multinational oil industry intervention to support their continued mobility in the deserts of Oman and subsistence pastoral livelihoods.I begin the chapter with a brief examination of the ways in which mobile pastoral communities in the Middle East have faced and then navigated around government land expropriation and sedentarisation efforts to create multi-resource livelihood successes without always being forced to settle. I then examine the situation in Oman, where a more ‘enlightened’ state policy regarding settlement was enacted and where oil concerns have been paramount. Determined to provide social benefits to its mobile pastoral communities without forcing them to settle, the government of Oman extended basic services to these communities late into the twentieth century.

This study seeks to analyze the implications of Oman’s participation in the Maritime Silk Road, which is the maritime component of the Belt and Road Initiative, announced in 2013 by the President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping. Sultan Qaboos has transformed Oman from an isolated and backward country to an active political mediator in the region. Oman’s neutral stance and diplomatic connections with every political actor in the region differentiate Oman from the rest of the Gulf countries. Geographically, Oman is situated in the intersection of the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. Historically, Oman ruled South Asian and East African coasts, extending its influence. The geographical position and historical legacy make Oman as a key country for the Maritime Silk Road. Thus, participation of Oman in the Belt and Road Initiative is invaluable in the eyes of the Chinese policymakers. Omani policymakers, who want to diversify Oman’s economy, welcome Chinese investments. However, increasing Chinese involvement in Oman’s economy might harm Oman’s sovereignty because of Chinese practice of using debts as exerting pressure on the lending states’ sovereignty. Moreover, the intensified competition between the USA and China in the Indian Ocean could compromise Oman’s neutral stance. Yet, Sultan Qaboos’ legacy is followed by Omani policymakers. While benefiting Chinese economic investments, Oman performs balancing acts against China.

In contrast to other states in the Gulf Cooperation Council, Oman has declined to participate in the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen and has opted to facilitate dialogue between the conflict's warring parties. Oman has embraced a strategy of diplomatic deterrence in Yemen, facilitating dialogue to counter the perceived threats that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates pose to its foreign policy independence. The article explores how the Sultanate's diplomatic deterrence strategy manifests at the local, regional, and international levels, building on English- and Arabic-language source material and interviews.