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يهتم البحث بدراسة العلاقات بين بريطانيا وعمان للفترة الواقعة ما بين 1913م وعام 1939م. وإن سبب اختيار عام 1913م منطلقا للبحث يعود لاندلاع ثورة الإمامة في هذه السنة والتي أدت إلى إنشطار عمان إلى نظامين للحكم أحدهما في الساحل حيث العاصمة مسقط بقيادة السلطان وبدعم وتأييد من لدن الإنجليز والآخر في الداخل...

This file relates to relations between the UK and Oman. It contains correspondence, briefs, and records of conversations concerning: The visit of the Sultan of Oman Qaboos Bin...

This file relates to relations between the UK and Oman, and in particular the replacement of D G Crawford as the Consul General in Muscat by D F Hawley. It includes...

f° 62-63: Sur Yahya Omar Baruni conseiller du Sultan introduit par Omar Baruni

The file is concerned with an agreement between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and Petroleum Development (Oman and Dhofar) Limited, which relates to the oil concession agreed between the company and the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, Sa‘īd ibn Taymūr Āl Bū Sa‘īd, in respect of the district of Dhofar. The agreement outlines the terms and conditions, laid down by the British Government, regulating the operation of the company in Dhofar. The agreement is signed by Leonard Day Wakely, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for India, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, in the presence of Sir Alexander Colin Burlington Symon, the Assistant Principal for the Political Department in the India Office. It is also sealed by the petroleum company.

The file consists of a memorandum in two parts. The first part provides information about the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman in eight sections, entitled, 'Territory', 'Historical', 'Physical Features', 'Climate', 'Population', 'Products and Trade', 'Religion' and 'Government'. The second part describes and gives a brief biography of His Highness Sultan Saiyid Said bin Taimur, and outlines the extent of British influence upon him.

This printed India Office report was written by John Gilbert Laithwaite and published in November 1934. It aims 'to examine, with particular reference to the proposal which has been put forward to establish a station at Khor Quwai [Khawr Quway] in the Musandim Peninsula, the history of the Declaration of 1862 by which France and Great Britain undertook to respect the independence of Muscat, and its effect, and that other existing treaty provisions, on the right of H.M. Government (subject to the consent of the Sultan of Muscat) to establish a naval station in Muscat territory.' The documents include a short note on the status of the Musandam Peninsula. It lists key treaty engagements between the Sultan of Muscat and His Majesty's Government with relevant extracts including: British Treaty of Commerce of 1839 with Muscat, Article 2; Treaty of Commerce between France and Muscat, 1844, Article 3; Anglo-French Declaration of 10th March 1862; British Treaty of Commerce of 1891 with Muscat, Article 4; Exclusive Agreement of the Sultan of Muscat with H.M. Government, 1891. Further sections are: Muscat and France, 1770-1934; British Connection with Muscat, 1770 to 1934; The Anglo-French Declaration of 1862: its importance in Muscat Policy, and the interpretations which have been placed on it.

This file contains letters relating to the sale and shipment of arms and ammunition to Muscat in Oman. The majority of the correspondence is between the British firm of C H Laubenburg and British Political Agent in Muscat. The letters discuss changes to particular shipments of arms and ammunition as well as disputes and claims on payments due to the arms supplier. Other firms included in the correspondence are that of a W Darlow of Bedford, and Kynoch Limited. French correspondence in the file is issued from the French Consul in Muscat, Antoine Goguyer or Algerian Merchant Abraham Elbaz.

This dissertdtion examines British Foreign Policy toward the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, 1954-1959. The theoretical framework is clientelism. The patron-client relationship develops over a lengthy period. The Anglo-Omani relationship was uninterrupted from the 1600s through the subject period. and British efforts to later in Kuwait achieve included their the interests in establishment India and maintenance of the Al Bu Said family as Oman's hereditary monarchs. Britain signed anti-slave trade treaties with Oman in the nineteenth century to eliminate it as a regional economic threat; and separated the wealthy Zanzibar dominions from the control of Muscat's leadership. This "divide-and-rule" policy resulted in both Oman and Zanzibar becoming dependent on Britain. The 1913-1920 disturbance between the Sultan and shaikhs from the country's interior led to the British mediated Agreement of ai-Sib. The record shows that the events were different than what had been portrayed in various memoirs. Said ibn Taimur. the British educated Sultan, wanted political reunification of the interior with the coastal plains under his leadership. This was accomplished by the Sultan's forces with minimal opposition when the Imam died in 1954. The rebel leadership returned in 1956 with Saudi Arabian trained and armed troops. The rebels were defeated but the Sultan needed British military support. Britain's disproportionate response to the limited and localized opposition necessitated the rapid cover-up of damage to the interior's vii lages. The patron-client relationship strained almost to the breaking point. The British wanted to "cover-up" the damage they had wrought; the Sultan wanted to enhance his military capacity and to withdraw from the protective but overbearing relationship with Great Britain. The official records for the period are used extensively. For the first time, an academic work that discusses the events of the last half of the 1950's does not rely on personal interviews.

This thesis has concentrated on one period of the historical relations which began over three centuries ago. Great Britain, or rather Englan~ during the 1620s when the Portuguese were still the lords of Muscat, was trying to explore the eastern coast of Oman. They made friends in the Masseera Island, but their relationship with the Portuguese was not a friendly one. They were welcome, indeed, by the local powers as rivals to the Portuguese in India and in Persia as well as in Oman. But despite the generosity of their help, they tried to strike a balance between the ambitions of the local powers and those of the Europeans. The English, for example, were reluctant to assist the Persian projects in Muscat against the Portuguese. In fact, if the Portuguese were expelled from there by the Persians, then it would be too difficult for the Omanis to occupy it. At the same time they offered evacuation for the wounded and the surrendered Portuguese garrison with their women and children. The English observed that, after all the people of South Persia and of Hunnuz, Arabs or Persians alike, revolted. against Shah Abbas and wanted. the Portuguese back, having discovered. them to be the lesser evil. English interest in Oman and the Persian Gulf during the seventeenth century seems to have been purely commercial. For example, during the sixteen thirties and forties stable relations with the Portuguese were maintained, partly no doubt a reflection of the marriage between their two royal families, but also because the English saw commercial value in establishing good relations with both the Omanis and the Portuguese. After the expulsion of the Portuguese, the English witnessed the establishment of the first known Omani sovereign in the modem world, and the establishment of an Omani Afro-Asian Empire. They established good relations with the Ya,aarribeh family; but for some reason they were reluctant to establish themselves in Muscat. Probably the Dutch were seen to be in a better position while the English were ~stracted. by civil war. But during the first half of the eighteenth century English policy seems to have changed, probably due to the struggle between various local and European powers which took the form of piratical activities on the seas, in which the Omani Yaaribeh took part. By the second half of the eighteenth century the English had witnessed the downfall of the Ya,aaribeh and Greater Oman, and the establishment of another dynasty in the interior of Oman under Albu Sa,eed with the Omani Coast in the Gulf ruled by EI-Qawaasem, highlighting the division of Oman. The English found it in their interest to support Ahmed bin Sa,eed in East Africa, against El-Mazaree,a, and to keep East Africa under the Yal-bu-Sa,eed rule. They found a mutual interest in challenging the Qawaasem of Rasel-khaymeh in the Gulf, and their allies the EI-Wahabyeen in Arabia., during the first half of the nineteenth century.