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How and why does Oman maintain an independent foreign policy that is neither allied, neutral, nor dependent? Previous arguments have emphasized the importance of Oman’s location and culture or the personality of Sultan Qaboos (reigned 1970‐2020). However, relying on geographical factors overlooks the Sultanate’s dependence on the United Kingdom under Sultan Sa‘id (r. 1932‐70), while focusing on the personality of the late Qaboos underassesses continuities in policy under his successor, Haitham (r. 2020‐). In this article I argue that Qaboos’s promotion and preservation of international partnerships in suppressing the Dhofar Rebellion in the 1970s shaped – and have sustained – Oman’s statecraft.

بسبب دبلوماسيتها الناعمة و المحايدة، تم الاعتراف بعمان كوسيط رئيسي في الخليج والشرق الأوسط على نطاق أوسع، وعلى وجه الخصوص دورها في تقريب وجهات النظر بين ايران و الولايات المتحدة الامريكية، مما عزز سمعتها بقوة كصانع للسلام. لفهم ممارسات الوساطة العمانية في المنطقة بشكل كامل، يجب وضع وساطتها في سياق السياسة الخارجية الأوسع للسلطنة، ويجب تجميع جميع الوساطات المعروفة في مكان واحد من أجل تطوير تصنيف لفهم الأشكال والأنماط بشكل أفضل. وفي نهاية المطاف، فإن الوساطة تخدم وتمكن من خلال السياسة الخارجية للسلطنة. ولم تكن هذه نتيجة حتمية. على مدار عهد قابوس، تطورت عمان لتصبح "دولة محاورة"، حيث أصبحت ممارسة الوساطة أداة مهمة في تعزيز الأهداف المركزية المتمثلة في الحفاظ على سياسة عمان الخارجية المستقلة، وبالتالي في نهاية المطاف سيادة السلطنة وتقوية وأمنها .

Oman has developed under the rule of former Sultan Qaboos (1970-2020) a particular foreign strategy with its own basic lines, without neglecting the need to achieve a regional understanding with its neighbours and international superpowers, United States in the first place. Over the course of the last three years, his cousin and successor, Haitham bin Tariq Al Said, has aimed to undergo the “smooth” positive neutrality pursued by Qaboos albeit his efforts to introduce a number of innovations have been constrained under the pressure of an unexpected economic crisis. We try to analyse whether these budget grievances can oblige Muscat to establish a closer relationship with Saudi Arabia at the expense of its positive neutrality policies regarding a number of regional issues, e.g., Iran Nuclear Deal, Yemen´s war or the Peace process between Arab countries and Israel. We think that material conditions have already had a clear impact on Oman´s neutral diplomacy, mainly because Oman has relied on Saudis to help it overcome its dire financial straits. This does not mean, however, that the current Sultan is not making great efforts to maintain its traditional commitment to a type of strategy that could be termed specifically Omani; but the fact is that the decrease in oil and gas prices has had a remarkable effect on its government´s domestic and foreign policies. And as we intend to argue, the principles of positive neutral foreign policy of a small country like Oman cannot be disassociated from its economic situation and its increasing dependence on regional organizations like the Gulf Cooperation Council (which is highly influenced by Saudi´s priorities). This direction, we believe, leads to a renewed alignment with Riyadh which, after providing generous financial aid, is well placed to impose a “new regional view” on its south eastern neighbour. This new reality might change definitely the main trend line of Muscat´s traditional foreign policy as we knew it in the Gulf region.

This thesis aims to provide a nuanced explanation of the birth, evolution and consistency of Oman’s foreign policy of neutrality. Over the last five decades, neutrality has been a core feature of Omani foreign policy. Departing from its Arab Gulf Neighbours, Oman decided to adopt neutrality in various conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq War in 1980–88, the Syrian Civil War and the recent War in Yemen, 2015–2022. Even in conflicts where it could not be neutral, Omani leaders would express their preference to maintain a neutral stance. To guide my analysis, I developed a conceptual framework, which I denominate as the processual model of neutrality (PMN), that conceives neutrality as a process of three phases: ‘strategic’, where the country decides to adopt neutrality for strategic reasons; ‘passive’, when the country adopts neutrality but lacks the recognition of external powers; and ‘active’, when the country adopts neutrality and has wide recognition for this policy, enabling it to play active neutral roles such as hosting peace negotiations and supporting humanitarian efforts. On this basis, this dissertation explores Omani foreign policy towards two major conflicts, the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) and the War in Yemen (2015–2022), demonstrating that these cases are crucial to understanding the emergence of Omani neutrality and its consolidation and recognition. Furthermore, this thesis explores the period between 1988–2015 in order to scrutinise how the Omani position varied during other major conflicts, such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Syrian Civil War in 2011. Using data drawn from interviewing key Omani decision-makers and visiting several archives in the UK, US and Oman, this thesis concludes that Oman’s neutrality started as a strategic decision resulting from a complex interaction of different domestic and external factors during the Iran-Iraq War. This thesis also argues that Oman was not able to adopt neutrality in cases such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 due to various reasons, including the influence of its security guarantors and serious threats perceptions. Finally, factors such as the wide recognition of Omani neutrality and diplomatic reach enabled Oman to exercise active neutrality during the War in Yemen.

The foreign policy of Oman, since Sultan Qaboos bin Said’s accession to the throne in 1970 until his death in 2020, has been characterized by vigorous activities and broad outreach during a period marked by significant global challenges and shifts across political, economic, and security dimensions. This was especially pronounced in the Arabian Gulf region, which endured a destructive conflict that jeopardized its security and economic stability, resulting in substantial costs. This conflict, the Iran-Iraq War, also known as the First Gulf War (1980–1988), posed a considerable threat. This study examines Sultan Qaboos bin Said’s position on this war and Oman’s foreign policy approach to managing its implications.

بسبب دبلوماسيتها الناعمة و المحايدة، تم الاعتراف بعمان كوسيط رئيسي في الخليج والشرق الأوسط على نطاق أوسع، وعلى وجه الخصوص دورها في تقريب وجهات النظر بين ايران و الولايات المتحدة الامريكية، مما عزز سمعتها بقوة كصانع للسلام. لفهم ممارسات الوساطة العمانية في المنطقة بشكل كامل، يجب وضع وساطتها في سياق السياسة الخارجية الأوسع للسلطنة، ويجب تجميع جميع الوساطات المعروفة في مكان واحد من أجل تطوير تصنيف لفهم الأشكال والأنماط بشكل أفضل. وفي نهاية المطاف، فإن الوساطة تخدم وتمكن من خلال السياسة الخارجية للسلطنة. ولم تكن هذه نتيجة حتمية. على مدار عهد قابوس، تطورت عمان لتصبح "دولة محاورة"، حيث أصبحت ممارسة الوساطة أداة مهمة في تعزيز الأهداف المركزية المتمثلة في الحفاظ على سياسة عمان الخارجية المستقلة، وبالتالي في نهاية المطاف سيادة السلطنة وتقوية وأمنها .