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The relationship between the Sultanate of Oman and Iran is distinct from that of other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in terms of historical political relations. What distinguished this relationship was the geographical factor and the nature of the Sultanate of Oman s foreign policy, especially when Sultan Qaboos bin Said took over the Sultanate of Oman and made its foreign policy a starting point for a prudent policy, making its relationship whith Iran a focus of regional and international that it expressed since the advent of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 . the location of the Sultanate of Oman in the Arabian Gulf made it between the two major poles of conflict in the Gulf and the region Iran and Sauadi Arabia despite this it was able to maintain a balanced policy towards Iran as the Sultanate of Oman was able to adopt a balanced position in its foreign policy, unlike the rest of the countries in the region, at a time when the middle East witnessed many events and experiences that made some countries seek to find a space for alliances and join them . the Sultanate of Oman is considered among all the Gulf cooperation Council countries to be the most comfortable country towards Iran this is a result of the balanced behavior that the Sultanate of oman follows in its foreign policy towards Iran as a way to maintain its security because it does not see, in light of its capabilities to deter military threats rather, by managing the threads of balance through calming external threats in the Arabian Gulf it seeks as much as possible to be a source of regional and international trust in order to maintain a balance between the conflicting interests of its neighbors and its supreme national interest represented by its security within a foreign policy that places national intersts and avoiding conflicts as a fundamental goal in its orientations, even after the invasion of Iraq by the United states of America in 2003, to the liberation of the British sailors hostages in 2007 and the effective role the Sultanate of Oman in resolving these crises. أن علاقة سلطنة عُمان مع إيران علاقة تتميز عن غيرها من دول مجلس التعاون الخليج العربية من حيث العلاقات السياسية التاريخية ، والذي ميز هذه العلاقة العامل الجغرافي وطبيعة سياسة سلطنة عُمان الخارجية وخاصة عندما تولى السلطان قابوس بن سعيد سلطنة عُمان وجعل من سياستها الخارجية منطلقاً نحو سياسة حصيفة جعل من علاقتها مع إيران محط وساطة إقليمية ودولية عبرت عنها منذ مجئ الثورة الإسلامية في إيران عام 1979 . أن موقع سلطنة عُمان في الخليج العربي جعل منها ما بين قطبي الصراع الكبيرين في الخليج والمنطقة ايران والسعودية ورغم ذلك فإنها استطاعت من ان تحافظ على سياسة متوازنة تجاه إيران حيث أستطاعت سلطنة عُمان من تبني موقف متوازن في سياستها الخارجية عكس بقية دول المنطقة في وقت شهدت منطقة الشرق الأوسط العديد من الأحداث والتجارب جعلت من بعض الدول تسعى الى إيجاد مساحة من التحالفات والانضمام إليها وتُعد سلطنة عُمان من بين جميع دول مجلس التعاون الخليجي هي الدولة الأكثر أرتياحاً تجاه ايران ، وهذا نتيجة السلوك التوازني الذي تتبعه سلطنة عُمان في سياستها الخارجية تجاه ايران كسبيل للحفاظ على آمنها . لأنها لا ترى في ضوء ما تمتلكه من قدرات على ردع التهديدات العسكرية ، وانما من خلال إدارة خيوط التوازن عبر تهدئة التهديدات الخارجية في الخليج العربي . فهي تسعى قدر الأمكان لكي تكون موضع ثقة إقليمية ودولية ، لأجل الحفاظ على التوازن بين المصالح المتضاربة لجيرانها وبين مصلحتها القومية العُليا المتمثلة بأمنها في ضمن سياسة خارجية تضع المصالح الوطنية والبُعد عن الصراعات كهدف أساسي في توجهاتها حتى بعد غزو العراق من قبل الولايات المتحدة الامريكية عام 2003 . الى تحرير الرهائن البحارة البريطانيين عام 2007 ودور سلطنة عُمان الفعال في حل هذه الأزمات.

Discover this 2025 paper in Al Malweah for Archaeological & Historical Studies by ريا مجيد عطية; and, ماجد عجيمي سليم Abstract: In 2017, the Gulf crisis erupted between Qatar on one side, and Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain on the other, following the severing of diplomatic and economic ties with Qatar and accusations of its support for terrorism. However, the Sultanate of Oman took a different stance from its Gulf neighbors. Moreover, Oman adopted a policy of positive neutrality in the crisis, avoiding alignment with any of the conflicting parties. It also sought to play a mediating role between the rivals, calling for dialogue and de- escalation.

The seventh in the CAIW series, this title draws on the 50 years of experience of Cambridge based World of Information. During most of the period covered, Oman was ruled by Sultan Qaboos bin Said, overcoming several handicaps, including modest hydrocarbon revenues, and during the first years of Qaboos’ reign, a rebellion in the southern province of Dhofar. The latter was often described as a full-blown war with the neighbouring People’s Democratic Republic of the Yemen (PDRY) and its Soviet supporters. Nevertheless, this strategically located, mostly Ibadhi sect Sultanate, has developed from a medieval, into a modern state.

This thesis explains the prevailing paradigm of the role of small states in regional security systems, and fundamentally examines the case of Oman as a small country that has managed to play a significant role in the Middle Eastern regional security system, contrary to conventional political science expectations of such states’ behavior as per the neoclassical realism theory (NRT) paradigm. This thesis explains Oman’s different and independent regional positions, notably: (1) supporting the Camp David Peace Accords (1978) and not joining the Arab League and Gulf boycott of Egypt after Sadat’s rapprochement with Israel; (2) developing and maintaining diplomatic ties with Iran after the 1979 Revolution, when it was seen as an imminent threat to Gulf regimes, and during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988); (3) meditating between Iran and the US in the P5+1’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (2015) (i.e., the “Iran Nuclear Deal”); and (4) preserving regional security in the context of the ongoing Yemen conflict. This thesis examines these cases in light of hitherto unutilized sources (such as newspapers, official documents, gray literature, archives, memoirs, local books, reports, memos) and interviews with key experts involved in Oman’s foreign policy and related events. This thesis thus demonstrates that Oman as a small state was able to tangibly and effectively influence the regional security system through a balanced foreign policy and establishing spaces that support dialogue and diplomacy to address regional tension and conflicts and maintain relative neutrality in most regional and international conflicts.

How and why does Oman maintain an independent foreign policy that is neither allied, neutral, nor dependent? Previous arguments have emphasized the importance of Oman’s location and culture or the personality of Sultan Qaboos (reigned 1970‐2020). However, relying on geographical factors overlooks the Sultanate’s dependence on the United Kingdom under Sultan Sa‘id (r. 1932‐70), while focusing on the personality of the late Qaboos underassesses continuities in policy under his successor, Haitham (r. 2020‐). In this article I argue that Qaboos’s promotion and preservation of international partnerships in suppressing the Dhofar Rebellion in the 1970s shaped – and have sustained – Oman’s statecraft.

بسبب دبلوماسيتها الناعمة و المحايدة، تم الاعتراف بعمان كوسيط رئيسي في الخليج والشرق الأوسط على نطاق أوسع، وعلى وجه الخصوص دورها في تقريب وجهات النظر بين ايران و الولايات المتحدة الامريكية، مما عزز سمعتها بقوة كصانع للسلام. لفهم ممارسات الوساطة العمانية في المنطقة بشكل كامل، يجب وضع وساطتها في سياق السياسة الخارجية الأوسع للسلطنة، ويجب تجميع جميع الوساطات المعروفة في مكان واحد من أجل تطوير تصنيف لفهم الأشكال والأنماط بشكل أفضل. وفي نهاية المطاف، فإن الوساطة تخدم وتمكن من خلال السياسة الخارجية للسلطنة. ولم تكن هذه نتيجة حتمية. على مدار عهد قابوس، تطورت عمان لتصبح "دولة محاورة"، حيث أصبحت ممارسة الوساطة أداة مهمة في تعزيز الأهداف المركزية المتمثلة في الحفاظ على سياسة عمان الخارجية المستقلة، وبالتالي في نهاية المطاف سيادة السلطنة وتقوية وأمنها .

Oman has developed under the rule of former Sultan Qaboos (1970-2020) a particular foreign strategy with its own basic lines, without neglecting the need to achieve a regional understanding with its neighbours and international superpowers, United States in the first place. Over the course of the last three years, his cousin and successor, Haitham bin Tariq Al Said, has aimed to undergo the “smooth” positive neutrality pursued by Qaboos albeit his efforts to introduce a number of innovations have been constrained under the pressure of an unexpected economic crisis. We try to analyse whether these budget grievances can oblige Muscat to establish a closer relationship with Saudi Arabia at the expense of its positive neutrality policies regarding a number of regional issues, e.g., Iran Nuclear Deal, Yemen´s war or the Peace process between Arab countries and Israel. We think that material conditions have already had a clear impact on Oman´s neutral diplomacy, mainly because Oman has relied on Saudis to help it overcome its dire financial straits. This does not mean, however, that the current Sultan is not making great efforts to maintain its traditional commitment to a type of strategy that could be termed specifically Omani; but the fact is that the decrease in oil and gas prices has had a remarkable effect on its government´s domestic and foreign policies. And as we intend to argue, the principles of positive neutral foreign policy of a small country like Oman cannot be disassociated from its economic situation and its increasing dependence on regional organizations like the Gulf Cooperation Council (which is highly influenced by Saudi´s priorities). This direction, we believe, leads to a renewed alignment with Riyadh which, after providing generous financial aid, is well placed to impose a “new regional view” on its south eastern neighbour. This new reality might change definitely the main trend line of Muscat´s traditional foreign policy as we knew it in the Gulf region.

This thesis aims to provide a nuanced explanation of the birth, evolution and consistency of Oman’s foreign policy of neutrality. Over the last five decades, neutrality has been a core feature of Omani foreign policy. Departing from its Arab Gulf Neighbours, Oman decided to adopt neutrality in various conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq War in 1980–88, the Syrian Civil War and the recent War in Yemen, 2015–2022. Even in conflicts where it could not be neutral, Omani leaders would express their preference to maintain a neutral stance. To guide my analysis, I developed a conceptual framework, which I denominate as the processual model of neutrality (PMN), that conceives neutrality as a process of three phases: ‘strategic’, where the country decides to adopt neutrality for strategic reasons; ‘passive’, when the country adopts neutrality but lacks the recognition of external powers; and ‘active’, when the country adopts neutrality and has wide recognition for this policy, enabling it to play active neutral roles such as hosting peace negotiations and supporting humanitarian efforts. On this basis, this dissertation explores Omani foreign policy towards two major conflicts, the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) and the War in Yemen (2015–2022), demonstrating that these cases are crucial to understanding the emergence of Omani neutrality and its consolidation and recognition. Furthermore, this thesis explores the period between 1988–2015 in order to scrutinise how the Omani position varied during other major conflicts, such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Syrian Civil War in 2011. Using data drawn from interviewing key Omani decision-makers and visiting several archives in the UK, US and Oman, this thesis concludes that Oman’s neutrality started as a strategic decision resulting from a complex interaction of different domestic and external factors during the Iran-Iraq War. This thesis also argues that Oman was not able to adopt neutrality in cases such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 due to various reasons, including the influence of its security guarantors and serious threats perceptions. Finally, factors such as the wide recognition of Omani neutrality and diplomatic reach enabled Oman to exercise active neutrality during the War in Yemen.

The foreign policy of Oman, since Sultan Qaboos bin Said’s accession to the throne in 1970 until his death in 2020, has been characterized by vigorous activities and broad outreach during a period marked by significant global challenges and shifts across political, economic, and security dimensions. This was especially pronounced in the Arabian Gulf region, which endured a destructive conflict that jeopardized its security and economic stability, resulting in substantial costs. This conflict, the Iran-Iraq War, also known as the First Gulf War (1980–1988), posed a considerable threat. This study examines Sultan Qaboos bin Said’s position on this war and Oman’s foreign policy approach to managing its implications.

بسبب دبلوماسيتها الناعمة و المحايدة، تم الاعتراف بعمان كوسيط رئيسي في الخليج والشرق الأوسط على نطاق أوسع، وعلى وجه الخصوص دورها في تقريب وجهات النظر بين ايران و الولايات المتحدة الامريكية، مما عزز سمعتها بقوة كصانع للسلام. لفهم ممارسات الوساطة العمانية في المنطقة بشكل كامل، يجب وضع وساطتها في سياق السياسة الخارجية الأوسع للسلطنة، ويجب تجميع جميع الوساطات المعروفة في مكان واحد من أجل تطوير تصنيف لفهم الأشكال والأنماط بشكل أفضل. وفي نهاية المطاف، فإن الوساطة تخدم وتمكن من خلال السياسة الخارجية للسلطنة. ولم تكن هذه نتيجة حتمية. على مدار عهد قابوس، تطورت عمان لتصبح "دولة محاورة"، حيث أصبحت ممارسة الوساطة أداة مهمة في تعزيز الأهداف المركزية المتمثلة في الحفاظ على سياسة عمان الخارجية المستقلة، وبالتالي في نهاية المطاف سيادة السلطنة وتقوية وأمنها .

The gradual armed takeover of Yemen, beginning with the capture of Sanaa, in September 2014 by Houthi rebels and supporters of ex-President Ali Abdullah Saleh overthrew the internationally recognized government of President Hadi. On March 26, 2015 a Saudi-led coalition, including several regional countries, intervened militarily in “Operation Decisive Storm” to thwart the Iranian-backed Houthi expansion and restore Hadi to power. The coalition included all GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) states except Oman, which stayed out of the conflict for both domestic and foreign policy reasons, calling for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Qatar took part in the coalition until it was excluded following the eruption of a diplomatic dispute with its immediate neighbors on June 5, 2017. Qatar joined Oman in seeking a peaceful settlement of the Yemeni dispute while extending diplomatic and humanitarian assistance, which was perceived by the Saudi-led coalition as interference in the conflict.

This article aims to explain the reason for Oman’s neutrality policy amid Saudi-Iran growing tension in the region. The neutral stance from Oman raised some questions about their position as a part of the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that, if following the logic of consequences, should take sides with Saudi, and put pressure on Iran due to Saudi presence in the group. Oman always promotes peace and tends to avoid confrontation when facing Saudi-Iran rivalry. By implementing explanative methods and a constructivism paradigm based on norms as a tool of analysis, and supported with secondary data, this article found out that Oman’s neutrality decision in the Saudi-Iran rivalry is largely being influenced by their domestic norms, that is Ibadism, that made them capable to avoid conflict in the region, in this case, the Saudi-Iran rivalry. Ibadism also drives them to always promote peace in the region, because this teaching is based on four main ideas, namely tolerance, just rule, acceptance of the other, and peaceful compromises. In the end, this domestic norm influenced Oman’s decision-maker’s conception of the importance of preserving stability in the region. This then becomes an important explanation about why Oman breaks with their fellow GCC members that tend to support Saudi in the rivalry with Iran and decided to follow neutrality as their main policy.