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The article examines radical changes both in the procedure of Shura Council formation and in its field of competence. The structure of the Council comes under review and the place and role of its main authorities in supporting the government on different running the state issues is determined. Considering and examining the many years' experience of the Council the author has come to the conclusion that the role of the Shura Council is limited only by the government in addressing certain issues. The Council studies these issues and provides recommendations to the Sultan for approval. These recommendations have no legal force, and the Council cannot impose its views on the Government. Despite this fact, the Council in its current form can become the basis for the future Parliament of Oman. To make this happen, in our opinion, it is necessary that the Council be directly involved in the discussion and approval of the state budget. It is also important to make the government accountable to the Council and to report to him about the results of its work.

The article examines the evolution and peculiarities of the Imamate institute in Oman. Special attention is paid to the Ibadi movement of Islamic law as well as to the tribal common law both of which form the basis for the analysis of the role of Shura Council and influential circles for the purpose of gaining certain balance in relations between the authorities of the country and its inhabitants. Our analysis shows that until the middle of the XX century Oman was a union of tribes supporting Ibadi Islam. Within Ibadi doctrine for the first time in the history of Muslim societies the principles of people's participation in public administration were developed, which resulted in the outward expression in imamate moderate state system. Imam ruled the country with the help of the Council of theologians, the Shura Council, as well as governors and heads of tribes. For centuries Imamate and its institutions ensured the safety of society and order in social relations. Oman Imamate guaranteed gradual strengthening of the tradition of social relations and its steadiness. The effectiveness of such a form was confirmed by the fact that such statehood existed for twelve centuries.

This article examines the role of Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said in the development of Oman’s foreign and defense policy from 1970 to 1977. Historians have assumed that following the British-orchestrated overthrow of Qaboos’s father in 1970, British soldiers and diplomats exerted a decisive influence over the inexperienced young sultan’s policy decisions. While Qaboos certainly depended on British military assistance to defeat an insurgency in Oman’s Dhofar province, he proved much more assertive than existing accounts have suggested. Drawing on British archival documents as well as correspondence of American advisors to the sultan, this article shows that Qaboos played an active role in the development of Omani foreign and defense policy. From the beginning of his reign, the sultan enlisted a diverse group of independent advisors in order to limit British influence over his government. His assertiveness intensified as Oman enjoyed a windfall of oil wealth beginning in 1973. In demonstrating the sultan’s attempts to consolidate power from the outset of his reign, this article offers a case study of the limits of Western influence over leaders in the Gulf region.

With increasing rights for women, legal reform, and a flexible interpretation of Islam, Oman is opening up, declares Sultan Qabus bin Said in an interview.

The British government's announcement of its intention to withdraw 'East of Suez' by the end of 1971 was the catalyst for renewed efforts to resolve many disputes in the Gulf region. Accordingly, the threat posed by the growing Marxist inspired rebellion in Dhofar to Britain's remaining interests in the area could not be left unchallenged. But the means by which this challenge was to be met (including the extent of both overt and covert support for the Sultan) in the post-Suez era, posed a number of challenges for decision-makers in Whitehall. It soon became apparent that with aid flowing to the rebels from South Arabia, the situation was rapidly deteriorating. The failure of the counter-insurgency campaign thus far was increasingly seen to be the fault of Sultan Sa'id bin Taimur whose stubborn refusal to engage in anything but repression in Dhofar and whose denial of modernity to his people in spite of increasing oil revenues meant that Sa'id came to be seen as part of the problem and not the solution. This thesis examines how officials in London defined British interests in Oman and the debates in Whitehall, under successive governments, about how best to tackle the growing insurgency. This complex balancing act between protecting British interests and influence, creating an effective indigenous administration and security bodies while maintaining the image of strategic retreat and the sovereign independence of Oman forms the focus of this thesis. Through an exploration of British government decision making regarding Oman this thesis provides a systematic re-examination of the Anglo-Omani relationship during the critical years of transformation from isolated, undeveloped state into a modern outward looking nation. Since there have been no impartial, in-depth studies of this period which have had access to a wide range of primary source documents, the thesis is able to fill a gap in the literature by demonstrating how British interests were decided upon, how foreign policy was made and how it was implemented. Through the examination of this process this thesis aims to develop a better understanding of how and why Britain decided to commit herself to the protection of the Omani regime, while, at the same time, withdrawing from the Gulf and seeking membership of the European Economic Community. Using historical methodology and drawing extensively upon newly released archival records and interviews with former officials and high ranking officers, the thesis challenges established narratives regarding Britain's role in Oman. By examining the three key pillars of British support for the Sultanate of Oman - the political, military and diplomatic - this thesis argues that the evolution of a careful, considered and sometimes parsimonious policy marked British policy towards Oman, a policy far removed from the deterministic, callous and rapacious account presented by writers such as Halliday, Newsinger and Owtram.

The aim of this thesis is to study the political changes in Oman from 1970 with the focus on the transition towards democracy. The core issue is the change from the policy of the previous sultan, who banned the participation of the nation and oppressed it. This led the country to civil war, isolation and the end of the regime. The current sultan, who launched a coup against his father in 1970, adopted various changes in areas such as the economy, politics and infrastructure, and allowed the people to run the country. The important changes were the process of democratisation in Oman, which is discussed in the context both of democratic theory, and change in the South. The thesis will offer an overview of democratic political theory, an account of political change in the South in general, and in the Middle East region in particular. The focus on Oman will seek to answer three questions: when did the process of democratisation begin; why was it begun, and how has it been managed? The core of the argument will look at the creation of formal institutions of democracy, such as the Majlis Ash-Shura (Consultative Council), and the State Council, and informal institutions, such as the media, the Chamber of Commerce, the Businessmen's Council, Sablat Alarab (the Arab Council Web Site), and the role of leading individuals in the democratic debate. These changes led the current sultan to receive internal and extemallegitimacy. Omani citizens are now aware of the development in other parts of the world and they will force the current sultan to add further changes. He should respond positively in order to remain in power.

Oman’s need to reduce its oil dependence illuminates the difficulty of reforming Gulf rentier states writ large.