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The development of Zanzibar as an entrepot and capital of a vast commercial empire has previously been attributed entirely to the far-sighted policies of Seyyid Said. A re-examination of the economic history of East Africa reveals that economic expansion from the eighteenth century resulted from economic forces which were independent of Omani policies; that these forces were already in motion before Seyyid Said first visited Zanzibar; and that the Omanis manipulated these forces to centralise economic activities at Zanzibar to a greater degree than would otherwise have been achieved, thus forming a commercial empire. The Omani demand for slaves for their expanding date plantations and the increasing French demand in the Mascarenes initiated a rapid expansion of Kilwa's hinterland and the growth of Zanzibar's entrepot role to supply the imports. When the French slave trade suffered a mortal blow from the Napoleonic wars and the eventual prohibition in 1822, the redundant slaves were diverted to the clove plantations of Zanzibar. The second major development was initiated by Portuguese taxation of the ivory trade of Mozambique. By 1801 ivory exports had been halved. To supply the unsatisfied Indian demand, to which was soon to be added European and American demand, the northern ivory hinterland was rapidly expanded during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. The development of the Indian mercantile community facilitated this expansion. The supply of this commodity of the hunt called for a constant expansion of the hinterland and sophistication of the commercial organization which, however, was dependent entirely on a caravan of human shoulders. The demand thus regularly outstripped supply, and ivory prices consequently rose. The price of manufactured imports, on the other hand, tended to remain steady or even decline as a result of mechanisation. The diverging price curves thus constituted a dynamic force for economic expansion. On such a vibrant economic base the Omanis structured their commercial empire. The empire, however, was not built on a stable administrative or political structure, but on a system of influence and common economic interests. In the age of the "Scramble" it merely crumbled.

The extent to which the Middle East in general and the Gulf states in particular are willing and able to embrace more inclusive means of popular political participation has dominated the politics of the region for nearly two decades. Faced with contending pressures of urbanisation, demographic shifts and increasingly finite reserves of oil and gas, that social contract peculiar to the region - the rentier state - is no longer regarded as the panacea for ensuring regime stability and legitimacy. The emergence of powerful and in some cases violent Islamist opposition groups, not least in Saudi Arabia, is seen as testament to such growing socio-political anomie. The Sultanate of Oman is not immune from such pressures. How to ensure the continued legitimacy of the political system in a post-oil era is the focus of this thesis. A traditionally tribal society noted for its adherence to the Ibadi school of Islam, Oman has increasingly been buffeted by the forces of globalisation, population growth, an emerging middle class, accelerating rates of urbanisation and the concomitant demands for greater political participation. Across much of the Middle East, such demands have either been bloodily repressed or, if imposed by outside intervention, have led to the emergence of fragile regimes whose legitimacy is often beholden to an uneasy alliance of otherwise competing sectarian factions. By contrast, Oman provides a unique case study in how attempts to open up the political space in Oman have emerged from three separate but inter-connected constituencies: a top-down approach associated with the state elite; the traditional view of Shura linked to religious and tribal hegemony, and the bottom-up approach to democratisation, associated with an increasingly educated and urbanised middle class. All three constituencies draw upon indigenous symbols such as religion, tradition and norms to promote their view of democratisation. The thesis examines the extent to which these contending approaches to political reform employ existing forms of legitimacy and identity drawn from Ibadi Islam and in particular, the concept of Shura. The thesis explores the extent to which Shura is, in an Omani context, compatible with national emancipation and in so doing, challenges the extent to which this process is less a function of broader public demand, and more a response to the demands of Omani elites wishing to entrench the longevity and legitimacy of the political system in the post-oil era. The thesis argues that all three constituencies believe that Shura in Oman, despite its often contested nature, forms the cornerstone for ensuring the legitimacy of any political regime. Incorporating a sense of shared identity that recognises the continued importance of tribalism in determining political allegiance, the process of Shura has nonetheless reached a level of maturity that now embraces the concept of popular participation. The absence of sectarian factions and other social problems in the evolution of this process serves to highlight how indigenous approaches to popular participation can determine new approaches to political reform across the Middle East.

The British government's announcement of its intention to withdraw 'East of Suez' by the end of 1971 was the catalyst for renewed efforts to resolve many disputes in the Gulf region. Accordingly, the threat posed by the growing Marxist inspired rebellion in Dhofar to Britain's remaining interests in the area could not be left unchallenged. But the means by which this challenge was to be met (including the extent of both overt and covert support for the Sultan) in the post-Suez era, posed a number of challenges for decision-makers in Whitehall. It soon became apparent that with aid flowing to the rebels from South Arabia, the situation was rapidly deteriorating. The failure of the counter-insurgency campaign thus far was increasingly seen to be the fault of Sultan Sa'id bin Taimur whose stubborn refusal to engage in anything but repression in Dhofar and whose denial of modernity to his people in spite of increasing oil revenues meant that Sa'id came to be seen as part of the problem and not the solution. This thesis examines how officials in London defined British interests in Oman and the debates in Whitehall, under successive governments, about how best to tackle the growing insurgency. This complex balancing act between protecting British interests and influence, creating an effective indigenous administration and security bodies while maintaining the image of strategic retreat and the sovereign independence of Oman forms the focus of this thesis. Through an exploration of British government decision making regarding Oman this thesis provides a systematic re-examination of the Anglo-Omani relationship during the critical years of transformation from isolated, undeveloped state into a modern outward looking nation. Since there have been no impartial, in-depth studies of this period which have had access to a wide range of primary source documents, the thesis is able to fill a gap in the literature by demonstrating how British interests were decided upon, how foreign policy was made and how it was implemented. Through the examination of this process this thesis aims to develop a better understanding of how and why Britain decided to commit herself to the protection of the Omani regime, while, at the same time, withdrawing from the Gulf and seeking membership of the European Economic Community. Using historical methodology and drawing extensively upon newly released archival records and interviews with former officials and high ranking officers, the thesis challenges established narratives regarding Britain's role in Oman. By examining the three key pillars of British support for the Sultanate of Oman - the political, military and diplomatic - this thesis argues that the evolution of a careful, considered and sometimes parsimonious policy marked British policy towards Oman, a policy far removed from the deterministic, callous and rapacious account presented by writers such as Halliday, Newsinger and Owtram.

The aim of this thesis is to study the political changes in Oman from 1970 with the focus on the transition towards democracy. The core issue is the change from the policy of the previous sultan, who banned the participation of the nation and oppressed it. This led the country to civil war, isolation and the end of the regime. The current sultan, who launched a coup against his father in 1970, adopted various changes in areas such as the economy, politics and infrastructure, and allowed the people to run the country. The important changes were the process of democratisation in Oman, which is discussed in the context both of democratic theory, and change in the South. The thesis will offer an overview of democratic political theory, an account of political change in the South in general, and in the Middle East region in particular. The focus on Oman will seek to answer three questions: when did the process of democratisation begin; why was it begun, and how has it been managed? The core of the argument will look at the creation of formal institutions of democracy, such as the Majlis Ash-Shura (Consultative Council), and the State Council, and informal institutions, such as the media, the Chamber of Commerce, the Businessmen's Council, Sablat Alarab (the Arab Council Web Site), and the role of leading individuals in the democratic debate. These changes led the current sultan to receive internal and extemallegitimacy. Omani citizens are now aware of the development in other parts of the world and they will force the current sultan to add further changes. He should respond positively in order to remain in power.

The principal aim of this thesis is to assess the performance of Imam Salim b.Rashid and the Imamate revival in Oman during the second decade of the 20th century. It presents biographical information about Imam Salim, with special reference to the military and political policies by which he established and consolided his Imamate in the Interior Province, and his relations with the Sultan and the latter's British supporters. An attempt is also made to explore the relationship between the Imam and the Omani tribes and to evaluate his administrative success. This thesis comprises eight chapters, and the introduction and conclusion. The introduction reviews the relevant literature on the topic. The first chapter describes the geographical setting and provides a historical background, relating to three principal matters: the rise of the Iba<;liyyah and the development of the Imamate in Oman; the events in Oman after Sd. Sa'id's death up to 1913; and the effects of the First World War. The second chapter seeks to give an account of the career of Imam Salim's life and the Imamate revival. The third chapter discusses the manner in which the Imam was elected, private and public allegiance (bay'ah) and the Imam's aims and policy programme. Chapter Four deals with the Imam's military operations and the spread of his authority over Oman. Chapter Five examines the attempts at negotiation between the Imam and the Sultan, and the role of the British Government and the local figures in this regard. Chapter Six is devoted to a discussion of the role of the tribes in support of Imam Salim, and the extent of the Imam's influence over these tribes. Chapter Seven assesses the Imam's administrative machinery, including the political system, the bureaucracy, education policy, and financial apparatus. Chapter Eight examines the causes behind the assassination of Imam Salim and the signing of the Treaty of al-Sib. In the conclusion, we present the findings of the research as they have emerged from the assessment of the course of events in Oman. We have said that the Omanis succeeded in reviving the Imamate and elected Imam Salim al-KharU~i who devoted his efforts to establish the foundations of the state, and peace prevailed in the country after the treaty of al-Sib in 1920.

This dissertdtion examines British Foreign Policy toward the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, 1954-1959. The theoretical framework is clientelism. The patron-client relationship develops over a lengthy period. The Anglo-Omani relationship was uninterrupted from the 1600s through the subject period. and British efforts to later in Kuwait achieve included their the interests in establishment India and maintenance of the Al Bu Said family as Oman's hereditary monarchs. Britain signed anti-slave trade treaties with Oman in the nineteenth century to eliminate it as a regional economic threat; and separated the wealthy Zanzibar dominions from the control of Muscat's leadership. This "divide-and-rule" policy resulted in both Oman and Zanzibar becoming dependent on Britain. The 1913-1920 disturbance between the Sultan and shaikhs from the country's interior led to the British mediated Agreement of ai-Sib. The record shows that the events were different than what had been portrayed in various memoirs. Said ibn Taimur. the British educated Sultan, wanted political reunification of the interior with the coastal plains under his leadership. This was accomplished by the Sultan's forces with minimal opposition when the Imam died in 1954. The rebel leadership returned in 1956 with Saudi Arabian trained and armed troops. The rebels were defeated but the Sultan needed British military support. Britain's disproportionate response to the limited and localized opposition necessitated the rapid cover-up of damage to the interior's vii lages. The patron-client relationship strained almost to the breaking point. The British wanted to "cover-up" the damage they had wrought; the Sultan wanted to enhance his military capacity and to withdraw from the protective but overbearing relationship with Great Britain. The official records for the period are used extensively. For the first time, an academic work that discusses the events of the last half of the 1950's does not rely on personal interviews.

This thesis has concentrated on one period of the historical relations which began over three centuries ago. Great Britain, or rather Englan~ during the 1620s when the Portuguese were still the lords of Muscat, was trying to explore the eastern coast of Oman. They made friends in the Masseera Island, but their relationship with the Portuguese was not a friendly one. They were welcome, indeed, by the local powers as rivals to the Portuguese in India and in Persia as well as in Oman. But despite the generosity of their help, they tried to strike a balance between the ambitions of the local powers and those of the Europeans. The English, for example, were reluctant to assist the Persian projects in Muscat against the Portuguese. In fact, if the Portuguese were expelled from there by the Persians, then it would be too difficult for the Omanis to occupy it. At the same time they offered evacuation for the wounded and the surrendered Portuguese garrison with their women and children. The English observed that, after all the people of South Persia and of Hunnuz, Arabs or Persians alike, revolted. against Shah Abbas and wanted. the Portuguese back, having discovered. them to be the lesser evil. English interest in Oman and the Persian Gulf during the seventeenth century seems to have been purely commercial. For example, during the sixteen thirties and forties stable relations with the Portuguese were maintained, partly no doubt a reflection of the marriage between their two royal families, but also because the English saw commercial value in establishing good relations with both the Omanis and the Portuguese. After the expulsion of the Portuguese, the English witnessed the establishment of the first known Omani sovereign in the modem world, and the establishment of an Omani Afro-Asian Empire. They established good relations with the Ya,aarribeh family; but for some reason they were reluctant to establish themselves in Muscat. Probably the Dutch were seen to be in a better position while the English were ~stracted. by civil war. But during the first half of the eighteenth century English policy seems to have changed, probably due to the struggle between various local and European powers which took the form of piratical activities on the seas, in which the Omani Yaaribeh took part. By the second half of the eighteenth century the English had witnessed the downfall of the Ya,aaribeh and Greater Oman, and the establishment of another dynasty in the interior of Oman under Albu Sa,eed with the Omani Coast in the Gulf ruled by EI-Qawaasem, highlighting the division of Oman. The English found it in their interest to support Ahmed bin Sa,eed in East Africa, against El-Mazaree,a, and to keep East Africa under the Yal-bu-Sa,eed rule. They found a mutual interest in challenging the Qawaasem of Rasel-khaymeh in the Gulf, and their allies the EI-Wahabyeen in Arabia., during the first half of the nineteenth century.

This study has the principal aim of emphasising the success of Sultan Turki b. Sa'id's attempts to take power in Oman after the death of his father in 1856. It describes in detail his attempts, and his period of government, with reference to the British presence and attitude towards the Sultan, which had for some time given him considerable assistance in settling his problems with his opponents inside the country. This study also gives details of the British policy towards Oman from the early sixteenth century and the regional situation with reference to the appearance of the Ottoman Empire in Central Arabia and the Wahhabi dispute with the Government of Muscat.

The main hypothesis of this study is that in the period from the 1860s to the 1960s the politics and decision-making of the Omani state were influenced by four forces, namely the British, the merchants, the tribal leaders and the ulama. The arguments relate only to the Sultanate of Oman, since no reliable data are available for the Imamate of Oman. During the second half of the seventeenth century the Omani state entered its imperial age, which lasted until the middle of the nineteenth century. The Ya'ariba dynasty, which was the first ruling family in that age, was similar to the states described by Ibn Khaldun. This was followed by the rise of the Al Bu Said dynasty. The imperial age lasted until the collapse of the Omani empire in 1861. The main finding of this study are first that the British role was the most prominent in the formation of the post-imperial Omani state, while these of the merchants, the tribal leaders and the ulama were mostly indirect or minimal. Secondly, the study found that, in addition to the tribal conflict, the period between 1861 and the 1950s was dominated by two other forms of social struggle, namely conflict between the merchants and the peasants, and tensions in the fragile alliance between the tribal and religious leaders. Thirdly, the several types of external subsidy, which Oman started to receive after 1861, laid the foundation of the rentier state in Oman, much earlier than the oil era. Fourthly, the political division of Oman, which resulted from the Treaty of Sib of 1920, never led to the emergence of two independent states. The situation, which prevailed between 1920 and 1955, was to a large extent one of one state with two systems. It is hoped that, in addition to its contribution to the study of the history and international relations of Oman, this study will provide students of political economy with a better understanding of the nature of the Omani state as one of the oldest states in the Arab World.

This thesis focuses on the images of Oman in British travel writing from 1800 to 1970. In texts that vary from travel accounts to sailors’ memoirs, complete travelogues, autobiographies, and letters, it looks at British representations of Oman as a place, people, and culture. It argues that these writings are heterogeneous and discontinuous throughout the periods under consideration. Offering diverse voices from British travellers, this thesis challenges Edward Said’s project in Orientalism (1978) which looks to Western discourse on the Middle East homogenisingly as Eurocentric and hostile. Chapter one explores and discusses the current Orientalist debate suggesting alternatives to the dilemma of Orientalism and providing a framework for the arguments in the ensuing chapters. Chapter two outlines the historical Omani-British relations, and examines the travel accounts and memoirs written by several British merchants and sailors who stopped in Muscat and other Omani coastal cities during their route from Britain to India and vice versa in the nineteenth century. Chapter three is concerned with the works of travellers who penetrated the Interior of Oman. James Wellsted’s Travels in Arabia (1838), Samuel Miles’ The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf (1919) and other uncollected travel accounts, and Bertram Thomas’s Alarms and Excursions (1932) are investigated in this chapter. Chapter four considers the travellers who explored Dhofar in the southern Oman and the Ruba Al-Khali or the Empty Quarter. Precisely, it is devoted to Bertram Thomas’s Arabia Felix (1932) and Wilfred Thesiger’s Arabian Sands (1959). Chapter five looks at the last generation of British travellers who were in Oman from 1950 to 1970 employed either by oil companies or the Sultan Said bin Taimur. It explores Edward Henderson’s Arabian Destiny (1988), David Gwynne-James’s Letters from Oman (2001), and Ian Skeet’s Muscat and Oman (1974). This thesis concludes with final remarks on British travel writing on Oman and recommendations for future studies related to the subject. The gap of knowledge that this thesis undertakes to fill is that most of the texts under discussion have not been studied in any context.

The economic and security significance of maritime and political interests around the world has altered with the changing international security environment, as has the importance of secure sea routes to meet global demand. Oman increasingly relies on the sea for maritime trade and exploitation of marine resources, but without a common maritime policy and strategy to align its commercial and maritime interests, its offshore resources will remain under-developed. Oman’s primary interest is to ensure national maritime security by maintaining an effective navy and other agencies to guard its sea areas, and protect its maritime trade. However, it still lacks a formal maritime doctrine to underpin its policies This study argues that a maritime doctrine will assist Oman to utilise its maritime power and protect its national interests. In the absence of archive material, this study has drawn upon personal interviews with maritime experts and practitioners, and reviewed and analyzed a wide range of official publications and secondary sources on maritime policy and doctrine. It highlights the relationship between economic growth and maritime trade in Oman, examines the role of Oman’s shipping industry and related activities, and compares the experiences and expertise of several nations that have established maritime doctrine. Oman’s need for a maritime doctrine in order to protect its national interests and sovereignty is pressing. It should connect and coordinate its maritime power, military strategy, policies, and standing operating procedures through a single maritime doctrine that will provide the basis for mutual understanding between units of the Sultan’s Armed Forces, related government agencies, and national policy-makers, ensuring operational familiarity and efficiency. In proposing a discrete administrative body to oversee the codification of principles and procedures, the study fills a significant gap in Oman’s national maritime policy and strategy, since the expression of maritime doctrine will help protect the integrity and interests of the state and its people.