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This research concerning the cooking pottery production in late roman time in the Island of Pantelleria, located in the Sicily Channel.This coarse ware consisted in pans, pots, casseroles and lids and large jars, useful to cook food and other raw materials as bitumen and pitch. This high refractoriness is given to the ceramic mixture by the vulcanic minerals peculiars form the clay of the island. The archaeological excavations conducted until now, discovered a large settlement in the Scauri Bay placed in the S-W coast of the island, datable from the second half of the IV to the end of the V century. The village based its economical activity on the cooking pottery production and its export, as evidenced by the shipwreck in the harbor of Scauri. The pottery materials found in the site and in the shipwreck, come from reliable contexts and it has been helpful to a thorough tipological and chronological study of this local ware production. The analysis of the attestations in the Central and Western Mediterranean, through the bibliography and some unpublished datas from Sicily, led to create some circulation maps across the centuries. This has allowed me to make some considerations and conclusions. It has been possible to realize a diachronic study, to distinguish forms and types from the III cent. B.C. to the V cent. A.D.. The pottery had a wide circulation in the Mediterranean, mostly from the second half of the IV to the beginning of the VI century.

The development of Zanzibar as an entrepot and capital of a vast commercial empire has previously been attributed entirely to the far-sighted policies of Seyyid Said. A re-examination of the economic history of East Africa reveals that economic expansion from the eighteenth century resulted from economic forces which were independent of Omani policies; that these forces were already in motion before Seyyid Said first visited Zanzibar; and that the Omanis manipulated these forces to centralise economic activities at Zanzibar to a greater degree than would otherwise have been achieved, thus forming a commercial empire. The Omani demand for slaves for their expanding date plantations and the increasing French demand in the Mascarenes initiated a rapid expansion of Kilwa's hinterland and the growth of Zanzibar's entrepot role to supply the imports. When the French slave trade suffered a mortal blow from the Napoleonic wars and the eventual prohibition in 1822, the redundant slaves were diverted to the clove plantations of Zanzibar. The second major development was initiated by Portuguese taxation of the ivory trade of Mozambique. By 1801 ivory exports had been halved. To supply the unsatisfied Indian demand, to which was soon to be added European and American demand, the northern ivory hinterland was rapidly expanded during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. The development of the Indian mercantile community facilitated this expansion. The supply of this commodity of the hunt called for a constant expansion of the hinterland and sophistication of the commercial organization which, however, was dependent entirely on a caravan of human shoulders. The demand thus regularly outstripped supply, and ivory prices consequently rose. The price of manufactured imports, on the other hand, tended to remain steady or even decline as a result of mechanisation. The diverging price curves thus constituted a dynamic force for economic expansion. On such a vibrant economic base the Omanis structured their commercial empire. The empire, however, was not built on a stable administrative or political structure, but on a system of influence and common economic interests. In the age of the "Scramble" it merely crumbled.

The British government's announcement of its intention to withdraw 'East of Suez' by the end of 1971 was the catalyst for renewed efforts to resolve many disputes in the Gulf region. Accordingly, the threat posed by the growing Marxist inspired rebellion in Dhofar to Britain's remaining interests in the area could not be left unchallenged. But the means by which this challenge was to be met (including the extent of both overt and covert support for the Sultan) in the post-Suez era, posed a number of challenges for decision-makers in Whitehall. It soon became apparent that with aid flowing to the rebels from South Arabia, the situation was rapidly deteriorating. The failure of the counter-insurgency campaign thus far was increasingly seen to be the fault of Sultan Sa'id bin Taimur whose stubborn refusal to engage in anything but repression in Dhofar and whose denial of modernity to his people in spite of increasing oil revenues meant that Sa'id came to be seen as part of the problem and not the solution. This thesis examines how officials in London defined British interests in Oman and the debates in Whitehall, under successive governments, about how best to tackle the growing insurgency. This complex balancing act between protecting British interests and influence, creating an effective indigenous administration and security bodies while maintaining the image of strategic retreat and the sovereign independence of Oman forms the focus of this thesis. Through an exploration of British government decision making regarding Oman this thesis provides a systematic re-examination of the Anglo-Omani relationship during the critical years of transformation from isolated, undeveloped state into a modern outward looking nation. Since there have been no impartial, in-depth studies of this period which have had access to a wide range of primary source documents, the thesis is able to fill a gap in the literature by demonstrating how British interests were decided upon, how foreign policy was made and how it was implemented. Through the examination of this process this thesis aims to develop a better understanding of how and why Britain decided to commit herself to the protection of the Omani regime, while, at the same time, withdrawing from the Gulf and seeking membership of the European Economic Community. Using historical methodology and drawing extensively upon newly released archival records and interviews with former officials and high ranking officers, the thesis challenges established narratives regarding Britain's role in Oman. By examining the three key pillars of British support for the Sultanate of Oman - the political, military and diplomatic - this thesis argues that the evolution of a careful, considered and sometimes parsimonious policy marked British policy towards Oman, a policy far removed from the deterministic, callous and rapacious account presented by writers such as Halliday, Newsinger and Owtram.

The aim of this thesis is to study the political changes in Oman from 1970 with the focus on the transition towards democracy. The core issue is the change from the policy of the previous sultan, who banned the participation of the nation and oppressed it. This led the country to civil war, isolation and the end of the regime. The current sultan, who launched a coup against his father in 1970, adopted various changes in areas such as the economy, politics and infrastructure, and allowed the people to run the country. The important changes were the process of democratisation in Oman, which is discussed in the context both of democratic theory, and change in the South. The thesis will offer an overview of democratic political theory, an account of political change in the South in general, and in the Middle East region in particular. The focus on Oman will seek to answer three questions: when did the process of democratisation begin; why was it begun, and how has it been managed? The core of the argument will look at the creation of formal institutions of democracy, such as the Majlis Ash-Shura (Consultative Council), and the State Council, and informal institutions, such as the media, the Chamber of Commerce, the Businessmen's Council, Sablat Alarab (the Arab Council Web Site), and the role of leading individuals in the democratic debate. These changes led the current sultan to receive internal and extemallegitimacy. Omani citizens are now aware of the development in other parts of the world and they will force the current sultan to add further changes. He should respond positively in order to remain in power.

This dissertdtion examines British Foreign Policy toward the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, 1954-1959. The theoretical framework is clientelism. The patron-client relationship develops over a lengthy period. The Anglo-Omani relationship was uninterrupted from the 1600s through the subject period. and British efforts to later in Kuwait achieve included their the interests in establishment India and maintenance of the Al Bu Said family as Oman's hereditary monarchs. Britain signed anti-slave trade treaties with Oman in the nineteenth century to eliminate it as a regional economic threat; and separated the wealthy Zanzibar dominions from the control of Muscat's leadership. This "divide-and-rule" policy resulted in both Oman and Zanzibar becoming dependent on Britain. The 1913-1920 disturbance between the Sultan and shaikhs from the country's interior led to the British mediated Agreement of ai-Sib. The record shows that the events were different than what had been portrayed in various memoirs. Said ibn Taimur. the British educated Sultan, wanted political reunification of the interior with the coastal plains under his leadership. This was accomplished by the Sultan's forces with minimal opposition when the Imam died in 1954. The rebel leadership returned in 1956 with Saudi Arabian trained and armed troops. The rebels were defeated but the Sultan needed British military support. Britain's disproportionate response to the limited and localized opposition necessitated the rapid cover-up of damage to the interior's vii lages. The patron-client relationship strained almost to the breaking point. The British wanted to "cover-up" the damage they had wrought; the Sultan wanted to enhance his military capacity and to withdraw from the protective but overbearing relationship with Great Britain. The official records for the period are used extensively. For the first time, an academic work that discusses the events of the last half of the 1950's does not rely on personal interviews.

This thesis has concentrated on one period of the historical relations which began over three centuries ago. Great Britain, or rather Englan~ during the 1620s when the Portuguese were still the lords of Muscat, was trying to explore the eastern coast of Oman. They made friends in the Masseera Island, but their relationship with the Portuguese was not a friendly one. They were welcome, indeed, by the local powers as rivals to the Portuguese in India and in Persia as well as in Oman. But despite the generosity of their help, they tried to strike a balance between the ambitions of the local powers and those of the Europeans. The English, for example, were reluctant to assist the Persian projects in Muscat against the Portuguese. In fact, if the Portuguese were expelled from there by the Persians, then it would be too difficult for the Omanis to occupy it. At the same time they offered evacuation for the wounded and the surrendered Portuguese garrison with their women and children. The English observed that, after all the people of South Persia and of Hunnuz, Arabs or Persians alike, revolted. against Shah Abbas and wanted. the Portuguese back, having discovered. them to be the lesser evil. English interest in Oman and the Persian Gulf during the seventeenth century seems to have been purely commercial. For example, during the sixteen thirties and forties stable relations with the Portuguese were maintained, partly no doubt a reflection of the marriage between their two royal families, but also because the English saw commercial value in establishing good relations with both the Omanis and the Portuguese. After the expulsion of the Portuguese, the English witnessed the establishment of the first known Omani sovereign in the modem world, and the establishment of an Omani Afro-Asian Empire. They established good relations with the Ya,aarribeh family; but for some reason they were reluctant to establish themselves in Muscat. Probably the Dutch were seen to be in a better position while the English were ~stracted. by civil war. But during the first half of the eighteenth century English policy seems to have changed, probably due to the struggle between various local and European powers which took the form of piratical activities on the seas, in which the Omani Yaaribeh took part. By the second half of the eighteenth century the English had witnessed the downfall of the Ya,aaribeh and Greater Oman, and the establishment of another dynasty in the interior of Oman under Albu Sa,eed with the Omani Coast in the Gulf ruled by EI-Qawaasem, highlighting the division of Oman. The English found it in their interest to support Ahmed bin Sa,eed in East Africa, against El-Mazaree,a, and to keep East Africa under the Yal-bu-Sa,eed rule. They found a mutual interest in challenging the Qawaasem of Rasel-khaymeh in the Gulf, and their allies the EI-Wahabyeen in Arabia., during the first half of the nineteenth century.

This study has the principal aim of emphasising the success of Sultan Turki b. Sa'id's attempts to take power in Oman after the death of his father in 1856. It describes in detail his attempts, and his period of government, with reference to the British presence and attitude towards the Sultan, which had for some time given him considerable assistance in settling his problems with his opponents inside the country. This study also gives details of the British policy towards Oman from the early sixteenth century and the regional situation with reference to the appearance of the Ottoman Empire in Central Arabia and the Wahhabi dispute with the Government of Muscat.

The main hypothesis of this study is that in the period from the 1860s to the 1960s the politics and decision-making of the Omani state were influenced by four forces, namely the British, the merchants, the tribal leaders and the ulama. The arguments relate only to the Sultanate of Oman, since no reliable data are available for the Imamate of Oman. During the second half of the seventeenth century the Omani state entered its imperial age, which lasted until the middle of the nineteenth century. The Ya'ariba dynasty, which was the first ruling family in that age, was similar to the states described by Ibn Khaldun. This was followed by the rise of the Al Bu Said dynasty. The imperial age lasted until the collapse of the Omani empire in 1861. The main finding of this study are first that the British role was the most prominent in the formation of the post-imperial Omani state, while these of the merchants, the tribal leaders and the ulama were mostly indirect or minimal. Secondly, the study found that, in addition to the tribal conflict, the period between 1861 and the 1950s was dominated by two other forms of social struggle, namely conflict between the merchants and the peasants, and tensions in the fragile alliance between the tribal and religious leaders. Thirdly, the several types of external subsidy, which Oman started to receive after 1861, laid the foundation of the rentier state in Oman, much earlier than the oil era. Fourthly, the political division of Oman, which resulted from the Treaty of Sib of 1920, never led to the emergence of two independent states. The situation, which prevailed between 1920 and 1955, was to a large extent one of one state with two systems. It is hoped that, in addition to its contribution to the study of the history and international relations of Oman, this study will provide students of political economy with a better understanding of the nature of the Omani state as one of the oldest states in the Arab World.