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The development of Zanzibar as an entrepot and capital of a vast commercial empire has previously been attributed entirely to the far-sighted policies of Seyyid Said. A re-examination of the economic history of East Africa reveals that economic expansion from the eighteenth century resulted from economic forces which were independent of Omani policies; that these forces were already in motion before Seyyid Said first visited Zanzibar; and that the Omanis manipulated these forces to centralise economic activities at Zanzibar to a greater degree than would otherwise have been achieved, thus forming a commercial empire. The Omani demand for slaves for their expanding date plantations and the increasing French demand in the Mascarenes initiated a rapid expansion of Kilwa's hinterland and the growth of Zanzibar's entrepot role to supply the imports. When the French slave trade suffered a mortal blow from the Napoleonic wars and the eventual prohibition in 1822, the redundant slaves were diverted to the clove plantations of Zanzibar. The second major development was initiated by Portuguese taxation of the ivory trade of Mozambique. By 1801 ivory exports had been halved. To supply the unsatisfied Indian demand, to which was soon to be added European and American demand, the northern ivory hinterland was rapidly expanded during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. The development of the Indian mercantile community facilitated this expansion. The supply of this commodity of the hunt called for a constant expansion of the hinterland and sophistication of the commercial organization which, however, was dependent entirely on a caravan of human shoulders. The demand thus regularly outstripped supply, and ivory prices consequently rose. The price of manufactured imports, on the other hand, tended to remain steady or even decline as a result of mechanisation. The diverging price curves thus constituted a dynamic force for economic expansion. On such a vibrant economic base the Omanis structured their commercial empire. The empire, however, was not built on a stable administrative or political structure, but on a system of influence and common economic interests. In the age of the "Scramble" it merely crumbled.

The principal aim of this thesis is to assess the performance of Imam Salim b.Rashid and the Imamate revival in Oman during the second decade of the 20th century. It presents biographical information about Imam Salim, with special reference to the military and political policies by which he established and consolided his Imamate in the Interior Province, and his relations with the Sultan and the latter's British supporters. An attempt is also made to explore the relationship between the Imam and the Omani tribes and to evaluate his administrative success. This thesis comprises eight chapters, and the introduction and conclusion. The introduction reviews the relevant literature on the topic. The first chapter describes the geographical setting and provides a historical background, relating to three principal matters: the rise of the Iba<;liyyah and the development of the Imamate in Oman; the events in Oman after Sd. Sa'id's death up to 1913; and the effects of the First World War. The second chapter seeks to give an account of the career of Imam Salim's life and the Imamate revival. The third chapter discusses the manner in which the Imam was elected, private and public allegiance (bay'ah) and the Imam's aims and policy programme. Chapter Four deals with the Imam's military operations and the spread of his authority over Oman. Chapter Five examines the attempts at negotiation between the Imam and the Sultan, and the role of the British Government and the local figures in this regard. Chapter Six is devoted to a discussion of the role of the tribes in support of Imam Salim, and the extent of the Imam's influence over these tribes. Chapter Seven assesses the Imam's administrative machinery, including the political system, the bureaucracy, education policy, and financial apparatus. Chapter Eight examines the causes behind the assassination of Imam Salim and the signing of the Treaty of al-Sib. In the conclusion, we present the findings of the research as they have emerged from the assessment of the course of events in Oman. We have said that the Omanis succeeded in reviving the Imamate and elected Imam Salim al-KharU~i who devoted his efforts to establish the foundations of the state, and peace prevailed in the country after the treaty of al-Sib in 1920.

This dissertdtion examines British Foreign Policy toward the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, 1954-1959. The theoretical framework is clientelism. The patron-client relationship develops over a lengthy period. The Anglo-Omani relationship was uninterrupted from the 1600s through the subject period. and British efforts to later in Kuwait achieve included their the interests in establishment India and maintenance of the Al Bu Said family as Oman's hereditary monarchs. Britain signed anti-slave trade treaties with Oman in the nineteenth century to eliminate it as a regional economic threat; and separated the wealthy Zanzibar dominions from the control of Muscat's leadership. This "divide-and-rule" policy resulted in both Oman and Zanzibar becoming dependent on Britain. The 1913-1920 disturbance between the Sultan and shaikhs from the country's interior led to the British mediated Agreement of ai-Sib. The record shows that the events were different than what had been portrayed in various memoirs. Said ibn Taimur. the British educated Sultan, wanted political reunification of the interior with the coastal plains under his leadership. This was accomplished by the Sultan's forces with minimal opposition when the Imam died in 1954. The rebel leadership returned in 1956 with Saudi Arabian trained and armed troops. The rebels were defeated but the Sultan needed British military support. Britain's disproportionate response to the limited and localized opposition necessitated the rapid cover-up of damage to the interior's vii lages. The patron-client relationship strained almost to the breaking point. The British wanted to "cover-up" the damage they had wrought; the Sultan wanted to enhance his military capacity and to withdraw from the protective but overbearing relationship with Great Britain. The official records for the period are used extensively. For the first time, an academic work that discusses the events of the last half of the 1950's does not rely on personal interviews.

This thesis has concentrated on one period of the historical relations which began over three centuries ago. Great Britain, or rather Englan~ during the 1620s when the Portuguese were still the lords of Muscat, was trying to explore the eastern coast of Oman. They made friends in the Masseera Island, but their relationship with the Portuguese was not a friendly one. They were welcome, indeed, by the local powers as rivals to the Portuguese in India and in Persia as well as in Oman. But despite the generosity of their help, they tried to strike a balance between the ambitions of the local powers and those of the Europeans. The English, for example, were reluctant to assist the Persian projects in Muscat against the Portuguese. In fact, if the Portuguese were expelled from there by the Persians, then it would be too difficult for the Omanis to occupy it. At the same time they offered evacuation for the wounded and the surrendered Portuguese garrison with their women and children. The English observed that, after all the people of South Persia and of Hunnuz, Arabs or Persians alike, revolted. against Shah Abbas and wanted. the Portuguese back, having discovered. them to be the lesser evil. English interest in Oman and the Persian Gulf during the seventeenth century seems to have been purely commercial. For example, during the sixteen thirties and forties stable relations with the Portuguese were maintained, partly no doubt a reflection of the marriage between their two royal families, but also because the English saw commercial value in establishing good relations with both the Omanis and the Portuguese. After the expulsion of the Portuguese, the English witnessed the establishment of the first known Omani sovereign in the modem world, and the establishment of an Omani Afro-Asian Empire. They established good relations with the Ya,aarribeh family; but for some reason they were reluctant to establish themselves in Muscat. Probably the Dutch were seen to be in a better position while the English were ~stracted. by civil war. But during the first half of the eighteenth century English policy seems to have changed, probably due to the struggle between various local and European powers which took the form of piratical activities on the seas, in which the Omani Yaaribeh took part. By the second half of the eighteenth century the English had witnessed the downfall of the Ya,aaribeh and Greater Oman, and the establishment of another dynasty in the interior of Oman under Albu Sa,eed with the Omani Coast in the Gulf ruled by EI-Qawaasem, highlighting the division of Oman. The English found it in their interest to support Ahmed bin Sa,eed in East Africa, against El-Mazaree,a, and to keep East Africa under the Yal-bu-Sa,eed rule. They found a mutual interest in challenging the Qawaasem of Rasel-khaymeh in the Gulf, and their allies the EI-Wahabyeen in Arabia., during the first half of the nineteenth century.

This study has the principal aim of emphasising the success of Sultan Turki b. Sa'id's attempts to take power in Oman after the death of his father in 1856. It describes in detail his attempts, and his period of government, with reference to the British presence and attitude towards the Sultan, which had for some time given him considerable assistance in settling his problems with his opponents inside the country. This study also gives details of the British policy towards Oman from the early sixteenth century and the regional situation with reference to the appearance of the Ottoman Empire in Central Arabia and the Wahhabi dispute with the Government of Muscat.