ISLAM

ZIAKA, A. (ed.) — On Ibadism. (Studies on Ibadism and Oman, 3). Georg Olms Verlag AG, Hildesheim, 2014. (24,5 cm, 232). ISBN 978-3-487-14882-3. € 54,-.

This is the third volume in the series *Studies on Ibadism and Oman*. It contains a selection (10 out of 16) of the lectures given during an international conference organized by Aristotle University in Thessaloniki, 9-10 November 2009, and three additional new articles (al-Salimi, Gaiser, Al Ismaili). Volumes 1, 2 and 5 in this series have been reviewed earlier in this journal (*BiOr* LXXI, nrs. 3-4, May-August, 2014, 615-623). We are now waiting for volume 4, which is in preparation and will bring the lectures given at the conference *Ibadi Theology. Rereading Sources and Scholarly Works* held at the University of Naples "l'Orientale", 28-30 May 2012; it promises to be interesting (see the abstracts on www.unior.it/doc_db/doc_obj_7004_05-05-2012_4fa57b3fe0030.pdf (Jan. 2014)).

The present volume, prepared by Angeliki Ziaka, is divided into two sections: *On Ibadi History, Theology and Jurisprudence* and *On Ibadi Religion and Society*. After an introduction with excellent summaries of the articles that follow by the editor Angeliki Ziaka (pp. 11-20), the first section opens with a paper of Abdulrahman al-Salimi, entitled *Ibadi Studies and Orientalism* (pp. 23-29), in which he presents a quick, very broad outline of the study of Ibadism by European orientalists, which started by translating (the few) Ibadi texts they could lay their hands on (Badger, Ross, Masqueray, Motylinski), and was followed by compiling bibliographic lists of Ibadi works (Motylinski, Smogorzewski; later on Schacht and the Libyan Ibadi ʿAmr al-Nāmī, and then van Ess). It seems doubtful if Hans Schlüter, who did bibliographical work on Libya, fits in this list of Ibadi bibliographies. Within the framework of more in-depth studies, (of course) the Polish orientalist Tadeusz Lewicki is mentioned and the Italian Roberto Rubinacci. Pulling the line further up in time, other names pass by, among whom Pierre Cuperly, who wrote an excellent book on Ibadi theology. Talking about the relationship between orientalism and colonialism, strangely enough, "the Italian orientalist" [Enrico] Insabato is mentioned. In reality, Insabato was a philo-Arab medical doctor with strong anarchist sympathies, living in Cairo, where he worked to forge a bond between the Arabian Muslim world and Italy, *i.a.* through a journal: *al-Nādī/Il Convito*. He was a somewhat mysterious person, having close contacts both in the highest Italian government circles and in circles of the Sanūsiyya (apart from a number of other publications on him, see Daniel-Jacques Grange: *L'Italie et la Méditerranée (1886-1911): les fondements d'une politique étrangère*. 2 vols. Rome: L'école française de Rome, 1994, pp. 1469-1487, 1495-1510, —available on www.persee.fr (Dec. 2014)— for a detailed account of his activities in Cairo).

Then Josef van Ess: *Introduction: The Beginning of Ibadi Studies* (pp. 35-41) gives a quick, well-considered and well-structured overview of Ibadi studies, that would have been an excellent introduction to a comprehensive course on Ibadism for undergraduate students.

The contribution of John C. Wilkinson, *Ibadism: Some Reconsiderations on the Origins and Early Development* (pp. 43-51), basically is an outline of his book that was later published in 2010 by Oxford University Press. Wilkinson presents an acute and in-depth analysis of early, partly pre-islamic, history and tribal relationships of Iraq and Oman that influenced the coming into being of al-Ibāḍiyya. He offers new insights, using contemporary Mashriqi sources to deconstruct the standard model of Ibadi origins (Ibadism was the true ʿ*ilm*, which was like a bird; "the egg was laid in Medina, hatched in Basra and flew to Oman"), which largely stems from Maghribi sources. The strength of Ibadism, Wilkinson argues, has been the ability to adjust to the peculiarities of the regions where it became implanted. He discusses the process of Madhhabization of al-Ibāḍiyya: in the Maghrib, material originally emanating from the Mashriq and specifically written for them, consequently became tailored to provide a rational explanation of Ibadi origins in Basra.

The third paper is by Wilferd Madelung: ʿ*Abd Allāh ibn Yazīd al-Fazārī on the abode of Islam* (pp. 53-58). Al-Fazārī is known as the most prominent Ibadi *kalām* theologian of the 2nd/8th century. Originally from Kūfa, he moved to Baghdad, and from there he found refuge among the local Ibadi community in Yemen, fleeing from persecution by Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd in 179/795. His rationalist *kalām* theology had particularly strong influence -already in his own lifetime- in the Maghrib, where he was counted among the Nukkār, though he never visited the Maghrib. In his contribution, Madelung treats a very early treatise of which the manuscript was discovered recently in Mīzāb, and of which only the first folio has been preserved, entitled *Kitāb al-Futyā*, in which al-Fazārī answers to questions from an interlocutor. The text has recently been published in: Abdulrahman al-Salimi and Wilferd Madelung: *Early Ibadi theology. Six Kalām texts by ʿAbd Allāh b. Yazīd al-Fazārī* (Leiden: Brill, 2014). It deals with the legal status of the abode of Islam (*Dār al-Islām*) and with the obligation of *walāya* (association) and *barāʾa* (dissociation). True Muslims, *i.e.* the Ibadis, were allowed to reside and move freely in *Dār Tawḥīd wa-Nifāq*, as al-Fazārī characterizes *Dār al-Islām*, and they are allowed to practise precautionary dissimulation (*taqiyya*). They must however practise *walāya* only with other true Muslims in belief and in action. In regard to most of the residents of the abode, they must either declare *barāʾa* or abstain from judgment.

Adam Gaiser examines in his *Tracing the ascetic life and very special death of Abū Bilāl: Martyrdom and Early Ibadi Identity* (pp. 59-72) early Ibadi writing about the life and martyrdom of Abū Bilāl Mirdās b. Udayya. His paper is based on Abū Sufyān's presentation of Abū Bilāl's narrative as preserved in al-Darjīnī (*Ṭabaqāt al-Mashāyikh*) and al-Shammākhī (*K. al-Siyar*), as well as in al-Izkawī's version of the story in his 12th/18th century *Kashf al-Ghumma*. Gaiser argues that the early Ibāḍiyya employed the genre of martyrdom and the process of connecting their community to the martyrs as a means of first, appropriating existing Khārijite martyrdom stories, and second, creating and

bolstering an identity for their community through pious genealogy. In doing this they acted parallel to other late antique/early Islamic confessional groups in Iraq.

Ahmed Al Ismaili: *The Characteristics of God in the Ibādi, Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite Schools* (pp. 73-108). This paper starts with an explanation of how certain theological terms were conceived in the three theological schools concerned (*Tawḥīd*, *Tashbīh*, *Taʿṭīl*, *Tanzīh*, *Dhāt*, *Shayʾ*, *Ism*, *Musammā*, *Tasmiya*, *Ṣifa*, *Waṣf*, *Mawṣūf*, etc.), and gives us the evolution of the schools on these topics from the 3rd/9th to the 7th/13th centuries. On pp. 89-95 attributes of essence and attributes of the act are treated: the position of the Ibadi school, 3rd/9th to the 7th/13th centuries (90-93), of the Ashʿarite school (93-94), and of the Muʿtazilite school (94-95). Then (pp. 96 ff.), the relationship between the divine essence and the divine attributes in the Ibadite school (97-99), the Muʿtazilite school (100), and the Ashʿarite school (101) are treated, and the proofs for their respective standpoints. Unfortunately, the English formulations are not always hundred percent clear throughout the paper.

Ersilia Francesca: *Constructing an identity. The development of Ibādi law* (pp. 109-133), starts with an outline of theories concerning the origins of the Ibadi law, commencing with the conclusion that French and German Ibadi legal studies during the European colonial period were principally concerned with making Ibadi legal texts available to the colonial rulers of the territories in question. Schacht, in his *The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence* (1950), was the first to attempt an academic reconstruction of Ibadi law; he was convinced of the inexistence of an ancient Ibadi legal system independent from the Sunnis. This was challenged by the Italian scholar Rubinacci, who demonstrated that the Ibadis took a detached line from the beginning, which was more or less supported by Coulson (*A History of Islamic Law*, 1964). Ennami, in his Ph.D. thesis of 1971, concluded that the Ibadi legal system was derived from material reported by Ibadi authorities only. Finally John C. Wilkinson took the middle ground between Schacht and Ennami, arguing that in the process of rationalizing the development of their school the Ibadis went through a process of normalization attempting to attain the level of development of the orthodox schools. Then follows a discussion of the primary sources for the early Ibadi jurisprudence, which until now are still all in manuscript. Although affirming that the risk of the ancient Ibadi sources having been manipulated is undeniable, Mrs Francesca is convinced of the authenticity of the content of the manuscripts she has studied. In the final pages of her article, Francesca elaborates on the different stages in the development of Ibadi law during the first and second centuries A.H., and on the process of "rationalization" during which the treatises of Ibadi scholars were being brought in line with those of the orthodox schools. Finally the *Musnad al-Rabīʿ b. Ḥabīb*, the most important Ibadi collection of *ḥadīth* is discussed, which shows inconsistency in the texts and in the *isnāds* and most probably must be seen as a product of rationalization to bring the Ibadi school at the same level as its opponents, the orthodox schools. Nevertheless, Francesca argues, Schacht's theory that the Ibadis derived their law from the orthodox schools, introducing only superficial modifications as were required by their own political and dogmatic tenets, remains not convincing: recent studies have demonstrated that they took from the start an independent line from the Sunni schools. Pp. 110-118 are (almost) the same as chapter 1 of Francesca's book *Teoria e pratica del commercio nell'Islam medievale. I contratti di vendita e di commenda nel diritto ibāḍita* (Rome: Istituto per l'Oriente C.A. Nallino, 2002, pp. 24-38). The content of the remaining part of the article is more or less equivalent to that of chapter 2.

Valerie J. Hoffman, in her paper *Historical memories and imagined communities. Modern Ibadi writings on Khārijism* (pp. 137-150), —in 2009 published elsewhere (note 1)— ponders on the fact that the Ibadis often are identified with the extremist Khawārij by other Muslims. Through examples from modern Ibadi writings, she comes to the conclusion that the Ibadis "since the end of the nineteenth century increasingly moved to dissociate themselves from any identification as Khawārij [while], on the other hand, they vigorously defend the correctness of their differences with other Muslims, and continue to identify with the people of Nahrawān", who "are the best of the Ibadi 'imagined community', despite the Ibadis' eagerness to deny any link to the Khawārij in a context of increasing contacts with Sunni Muslims and the growth of European imperialism".

Dale F. Eickelman: *The Modern face of Ibadism in Oman* (pp. 151-163), depicts the rapid changes in Omani society and thinking of the people since the late 1970s, when, despite the material changes that had already taken place in the country since Sultan Qaboos' accession to the throne in 1970, Islamic rituals still were so thoroughly woven into the daily life of the community that everyone took them for granted. Ten years later, towards the end of the 1980s, "an increasingly literate Omani youth, familiar with the practices of Muslims and non-Muslims elsewhere in the world, were taking charge of their religion". Later again, today, "one sign of this shift in consciousness has been the reemergence of sectarian discourse", Eickelman remarks, "although contemporary sectarian discourse differs significantly from the sectarian divisions of earlier generations and has been overwhelmingly tolerant". To illustrate this, Eickelman recalls the way the Mufti of Oman Aḥmad b. Ḥamad al-Khalīlī, in a two-hour live television broadcast on 2 February 1987, reacted in a conflict with the Saudi Mufti ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Bāz that took place in 1986 (already more extensively treated in an earlier article in 1990 -note 10, and in 1989). The Saudi Mufti had condemned the Ibadi view on the vision of Allah, and the Omani Mufti reacted to the Saudi fatwa with words like "He wishes to separate Muslims from one another. God says that the community of Muslims is one ...". "Our obligation is to follow the Qur'an, and Ibn Baz refers only to scholars who agree with him, not to Qur'anic precedents ..." Having remarked that by the 1990s Oman's newly educated had become increasingly disenchanted with the lack of open discussion of religious values, and having referred to incidents in 1994, 1997, 2002 and 2005, when arrests were made for alleged religiously inspired conspirations, the author finally concludes saying that talking about religious identity in itself does not challenge state authority nor leads to religious conflict.

Marc Valeri: *Ibāḍism and the Omani nation-building since 1970* (pp. 165-176) examines the relationship between modern nation building and Ibadism in Oman, *i.e.* the role Ibadism, as an historical heritage but also as a political reference, has been attributed by the new regime of Sultan Qaboos after 1970. The government soon began to promote a consensual and generic Islam peculiar to Oman; in the 1996

Basic Law no explicit mention is made of the Ibadi legacy. Ibadism is only referred to as an Omani-based variation of Islam. There is a disavowal of the country's pre-1970 history. However, establishment of an official religious discourse completely divorced from the former period, when there have been Imamates in Oman, was not conceivable. Ibadism still has a more than symbolic pre-eminence. *Nahḍa* and *shūrā*, much heard words in the political discourse, are used for the process of nation building, but are in fact references to the Ibadi tradition. Then Valeri depicts the sensitive social climate Oman finds itself in: the arrival on the labour market of young educated people, coinciding with a decline in oil production, which is causing a revival of frustration and mutual prejudice in the society. There seems to be an emergence of debates about the relationship between Ibadi religious authorities and the state and the role Ibadism should play in contemporary national identity. It could very well be that a historical cycle is over.

Mandana E. Limbert: *On learning Ibadism and being Ibadi. Study-groups, reason and history* (pp. 177-187) is an analysis of a young women's study group in Bahla, in the summer of 1997; in what ways did the study group and the women themselves either embody Ibadism or understand themselves as Ibadi? How were ideas about what it meant to be Ibadi continuing to change at that time? Limbert takes up the same subject -the study group in Bahla- as in earlier articles like *Gender, religious knowledge and education in Oman* (2005) and *Study groups, gender and the tradition of knowledge in Bahla* (2006), in a different form, focusing here on history (how the young women understood their practice of meeting to learn as a continuation of an Ibadi tradition) and theology (were there particular precepts and notions that have become commonly associated with Ibadism that these young women aspired to emulate and reproduce beyond the very act of forming the study group itself). Limbert concludes with deducing from these summer classes what it meant to be a young, female, Ibadi in the late 1990s.

Fontini Tsibiridou: *State Culture and the Ibadi Tradition in the Sultanate of Oman* (pp. 189-209). A highly abstracted account of impressions acquired during fieldwork between 2004 and 2009 and from publications, especially on developments in modern Oman. Many reflexions echo the gist of other articles in this volume, especially those of Eickelman and Valeri. Mrs Tsibiridou ponders on issues like how a state culture in the Sultanate of Oman under the heritage of Ibadi tradition could be constructed and function. "The Ibadi tradition has to be considered of paramount importance ... appears to act as glue; this can be surmised from examining policies followed by the Sultan and his government, which makes use of elements of the Ibadi tradition, and this may motivate its people to make clear their difference from the other inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula." Under the heading of *Old and new orientalisms*, Mrs Tsibiridou gives an analysis of a book that is widely extolled because of the abilities of its author to work as a western scholar from within, making a selective use of historical facts and adding fieldwork remarks regarding moral values and continuing Ibadi tradition. It concerns Hussein Ghubash's book *Oman — The Islamic democratic tradition* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006). She does this through a full reproduction of the review of Jeremy Jones (Oman: a thousand years of democratic tradition by Hussein Ghubash, *Journal of Islamic Studies* (Oxford), vol. 18 nr. 2 (2007), 274-276), then adding her own critical reflexions on the book as a social anthropologist, and giving the views of a few other reviewers. As she says: "It would be of critical importance to follow the metamorphosis of the elected Imam's prestige into the Sultan's hereditary authority without the issue of legitimization arising from the community." On one of the last pages of her paper Mrs Tsibiridou observes: "I am more and more convinced of the fact that Ibadism has been interiorized in people's habitus as well as in its Sultan's visions."

Nikolaos Efstratiou, in his paper *Practicing Ethnoarchaeology in the Sultanate of Oman* (pp. 211-223), presents the ethnoarchaeological research that has been carried out since 2004 in Jaʿlān, among *bedu* tribe groups in the region of Ra's al-Ḥadd. He describes the working methods the research team used to capture the archaeological-material 'imprints' of the tribal way of life in the region, how to use the ethnographic presence in order to facilitate an understanding of the archaeological past.

The book offers a variety of papers, ranging from theology to social anthropology. Some offer new ideas, others take up old ones dressed in a new coat, some overlap partly. Some papers are well structured, others less well. Beginning students of Ibadism (in Oman) will find the book interesting reading, less so researchers who are more familiar with Ibadism and Oman, who, however, will find some papers certainly worth reading.

Throughout the book, in nearly all the texts, a certain sloppiness can be noticed, and a lack of conformity in the spelling of names within the same article, which is a pity. To give a few examples: Dumām/Ḍumām (p. 44); Ibn Rushd in stead of Abū 'l-ʿUthmān al-Aṣamm (p. 74 note 4); Ibadi in stead of Ibadis (Hoffman's article); television broadcast on 2 February 1987 (p. 157)/his 1988 live televised lesson (p. 159); Muwahab in stead of Mawāhib (p. 162); p. 174 note 2: Anderson 1983/not in the bibliography; might have came (p. 180); useless, ghayr nafaʿa (p. 183); Sahid in stead of Sayyid (pp. 193, 197).

Maastricht, December 2014 Martin CUSTERS

*
* *

DE SMET, D., M. SEBTI and G. DE CALLATÄY (éds.) — Miroir et savoir. La transmission d'un thème platonicien, des Alexandrins à la philosophie arabo-musulmane. Actes du colloque international tenu à Leuven et Louvain-la-Neuve, les 17 et 18 novembre 2005. (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, De Wulf-Mansion-Centre series I, vol. XXXVIII). Leuven University Press, Leuven, 2008. (24,5 cm, X, 304). ISBN 978-90-5867-670-2. € 69,50.

This book is the result of the international colloquium *Miroir et Savoir* about a very extensive theme of the Platonic and Neo-Platonic philosophy in many aspects from the late-Roman time of Plotinus, the beginning of christianism until the arabo-muslim culture even until Suhrawardī and Mullā Ṣadrā. Seeing the sensible world as a reflection of the intelligible ideas, the mirror became a metaphor of the emanation for the Neoplatonists to obtain knowledge about the

intellegible world of which the light is reflected in the mirror of the soul so that man is able to get knowledge from that world, but each in his own way.

Cristina D'Ancona opens this volume with a treatise, entitled *Le rapport modèle-image dans la pensée de Plotin*, in which she deals with the most important part of the Enneads, V I 4-5 (22-33). In this passage Plotinus speaks about the statement of Aristotle in Metaphysica 991a20-22 that Plato's doctrine of the Ideas is empty talk and Plotinus gives his answer. Plotinus thinks, according to her, indeed that only the realia intellegibilia can be object of real knowledge, but it is impossible to acquire knowledge of these realia by a simple and superficial reasoning. For the Forms do not have any location in space or time. Thus the intellegibilia can only be understood by direct knowledge without any form of εἴδωλον. It is possible to get to know the nature of the intellegible world, namely through the principle νοῦν νῷ θεωρετέον to find πῶς τούτων ἕκαστον καὶ τί ὄν.

The διάνοια knows things from the outside, knows that it judges things which it judges and furthermore it knows that it judges those things because of criteria it possesses by virtue of the Intellect and according to the knowledge ἄνευ ... τῶν εἰκόνων.

Plotinus states that the sensibilia imitate the intellegibilia, a model-image relation, and followed Plato's Timaeus that the visible cosmos is the μίμημα of intellegible cosmos. But the image is similar and at the same time dissimilar; the image not being pure and perfect as the original one.

Anca Vasiliu: *Habet speculum philosophus ! Du miroir sophistique à l'image intérieure.*

This part is about the *Apologia pro se sive de magia liber*, written by Apuleius from Madaurus. First the story of Apuleius himself, how he returned from Athens and how he got married with the widow Pudentilla, but got accused by the brother of Pudentilla's deceased husband of seducing Pudentilla by sorcery to marry her because of her wealth, by means of a mirror. In addition Vasiliu speaks about the functions of the mirror during Apuleius' time, such as for the use of sorcery. This brother accused Apuleius, but with this accusation he is also accusing the philosophers, as Apuleius explains. Thus it is Apuleius' task *purgandae apud imperitos philosophiae et probandi mei* through many antitheses like knowledge and ignorance *an ideo magus, quia poeta.*

It is in this manner that the accuser becomes the accused, whereas the mirror becomes the most important object. On the other hand Apuleius' true mirror is the language, while he is attacking the authority of the judge and the accusers. In the end there is an accurate analysis of the story.

Carlos Steel: *Proclus on the mirror as a metaphor of participation.*

Proclus, Commentary on the Parmenides, bk. IV, starts with 3 metaphors to elucidate how sensible objects participate in intelligible forms: reflections in mirrors, impressions of a seal in wax and images made by craftsmen.

Plato himself called the sensible world εἰκών of the intelligible world, the demiurg is a craftsman who painted (διεζωγράφει, Timaeus 55c5-6).

Proclus: difference between the just mentioned 3 and 1-2 is that 3 has a producer of the image. In case of a mirror the craftsman is producer and model, similar as it is with wax. Therefore the third metaphor is not appropriate to indicate the manner of participation in the divine Forms. The first and the second differ from each another: wax is not in the same state as before, just like the mirror. The mirror only receives the reflections of the Forms, without being affected by them. The material substrate is not impassive in the reception of participation. The Good itself makes the Forms creative and things subject to them. How can the seal make an imprint in the matter? The sculptor, the demiurg, brings together the matter and the model so that the result resembles the Form. Thus the soul has the opportunity to see what is invisible.

Bernard Coulie: *Le miroir dans la littérature grecque chrétienne.*

The famous phrase of the Epistle to the Corinthians: *For now we see as through a mirror, in darkness, but then we shall see face to face; now I know in part, but then I shall know even as I also am known.* The Epistle presents the mirror as a metaphor of incomplete knowledge. Thus the Greek Fathers, like Gregorius of Nazianza: Human being cannot see the truth and human intelligence cannot understand God in his truth; you can see it only by means of a mirror. From the Byzantine writers Gregorius Palamas is the most remarkable: The divine being is unknowable, but the contemplatif prayer allows man *to see* the light of God. Also it is said that man is a mirror of God and an intermediary of the divine light and human knowledge. In the Byzantine mysticism the mirror guides to knowledge.

Jan M.F. Van Reeth: *Image et symbole. Le miroir dans la tradition syriaque.*

The Book of Wisdom (1e century B.C.) was the basis of the christian Syriac tradition, in which the creative divinity is like subtle πνεῦμα penetrating all, as we find in Stoic thinking, cf. φῶς ἐκ φωτός from the Confession of Nicaea. On the other hand, the πνεῦμα θεοῦ is like εἰκῶν of God, the mirror showing the epiphany of God, the Λόγος. In the Odes of Salomon (2e century) it became: ܡܪܝܐ (mirror) is the Lord. Thus Ephrem: Adam is the mirror of Christ.

Philippe Vallat: *Vrai philosophe et faux prophète selon Fārābī. Aspects historiques et théoriques de l'art du symbole.*

Fārābī thought that philosophy entered a new phase, returning to the old countries where it started. From Egypt and Iraq it went to Greece and it returned to Syria and Arab countries. He was the founder of philosophy, a restoration of the period of Plato and Aristoteles and then came religion, because each religion denies human liberty. Fārābī thought about the real philosopher who has to create religion, cf. *Kitāb taḥṣīl as-saʿāda* and *Kitāb al-milla*. In his time all governments were living in *ǧāhilīya*, but when Fārābī speaks about philosophy, he means the first philosophy or metaphysics or neoplatonic theology: the State founded after the return of the philosophe from the Cavern in Plato. The legislator has to be firstly metaphysicist, because he has to understand what makes the citizens happy by actualising the intellegibilia in the soul of his fellow citizens. For Fārābī religion was the condition of the human harmony. The final goal of politics is the conformation of human life to the hierarchic order which governs human life, which leads to human happiness, even to *baqāʾ fī l-wuǧūd.*

Meryem Sebti: *Réceptivité et spéculation dans la noétique d'Avicenne*.

Avicenna used the analogy of the mirror to describe the highest destination of the human soul and to show the receptivity of the human soul for the intellectus agens. The mirror is therefore perfect, because it only reflects what is given to reflect, but can not change what it receives. The soul obtains the Forms better and its knowledge becomes more receptive by use, like a mirror better reflects by cleaning, but matter remains the same. But sometimes the human intellect is not able to receive more forms, because the soul is directed towards the sensibilia. This ambiguity Avicenna has been resolved by *ḥāḍā* (not *ḥāḍā*, p. 150) "to imitate" or *tašabbaha*, "to seek to be probable". Avicenna follows Aristoteles in this respect that the νοῦς receives the form of the object without their matter, conceived by the sensus communis, that makes it into a sensible form. Human intellect does not possess the intelligible form, it only reflects. Thinking is reflecting with the greatest clearness the intellegibilia in the intellectus agens. After many reflections of the universal forms, man will be able to release himself from the sensibilia and to imitate the divine thinking. Ascesis has to be preceded by the reception. Each understanding of the intellegibilia supposes a conversion to the world of the intellegibilia, see further Sebti's *Avicenne, L'âme humaine*, Paris 2000.

Daniel De Smet: *Miroir, savoir et émanation dans l'ismaélisme fatimide*.

This section is about the oldest text of the Ismailism, *Kitāb Rāḥat al-ʿAql*, by Ḥamīd ad-Dīn al-Kirmānī (XI century). De Smet speaks about the chapter *Fī kayfīyat al-inbiʿāṯ*, in which it is about the image of the mirror as an image of the emanation of the second Intelligence or Universal Soul.

In the first part of this book al-Kirmānī followed Proclus denying being and not being of the Principium and all attributes in positive and negative sense to prevent any causal relation between the Principium and its first creature, the Intellect, a product of emanation (*inbiʿāṯ*). The intellect is the perfection itself without matter, pure intellect, each activity directed to itself, its origin in the *Theology of Aristoteles* and the *Liber de causis*.

The intellect of the prophets and the imams is different from common people, because they possess a pure intellect (*ʿuqūl maḥḍa*) through their knowledge of the light of the world of the holiness (*ʿālam al-quds*). They are able to receive the influx from the world of the Intellect, inspired directly by Allah.

Godefroid de Callataÿ: *Miroirs et jeux de lumière dans l'encyclopédie des Frères de la Pureté*.

They called themselves Brethren of Purity, *Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ*. No names of the authors are known, only their epistles are known, now being edited by the Institute of Ismaili Studies, Oxford University Press, with Nader el-Bizri as general editor.

The mainpoints are:

a. Man consists of body and soul. The soul is like a mirror, which should not be dirty. But to enter the Paradise you need two qualities: *Ṣafāʾ an-nafs*, purity of the soul, and *Istiqāmat aṭ-ṭarīqa*, rightness of the straight way.

b. The scale of vices and virtues: 4 virtues: to know the realities of all that exists, believe in the right opinions; praiseworthy character and a good behaviour.

c. Man is the mirror of the world.

d. Know yourself, then you know the universe.

e. The mirror of the numbers: They had a special neoplatonic and pythagoric theory of emanation. The *Iḫwān* added to the 6 hierarchic stages still another 3 Plotinic hypostases, totally 9 *ḥudūd*. The ninth *ḥadd* comprises the minerals, the vegetation and the animals, of which man belongs to the highest realm, because he is the *ḫalīfa* of God on earth.

Jules Janssens: *L'âme – miroir : Al-Ġazālī entre philosophie et mysticisme*.

Janssens discusses this theme on the basis of three books, the *Maʿāriğ al-quds*, the *Mīzān* and the *Iḥyāʾ*, bk. XXI, with the central question, how is it possible to maintain the fundamental unity of the soul, whereas it is able to seize a multiplicity of intellegibilia. The human soul seizes each thing in actu for a fixed time like the mirror that does not possess in itself the reflected images. The intellegibilia are presenting themselves as separated images.

The soul receives the images as in a mirror in their true form (*ḥaqīqa*) through the light, a sort of the emanation in the soul or as revelation. What is known, is not realised in the soul, but it is only the image of it, like in a mirror. Still there are obstacles for the soul to obtain knowledge, but each can reach the truth through the mercy of God. Ġazālī distinguishes two types of knowledge, the knowledge acquired by one's own efforts, for the *ḥukamāʾ* and *ʿulamāʾ*, and the other type of knowledge, coming from above, for the *awliyāʾ*, the friends of God, who got any illumination (*išrāq*) from God. But Ġazālī rejected pure mysticism, because we can only know an image of God.

Joseph van Haeperen: *Dans le testament spirituel d'ibn ʿArabi : L'homme, miroir de dieu, miroir de l'homme*.

The most important books of Ibn ʿArabī are *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīya* and *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*. Both books devote a chapter to the Wisdom of God on the basis of statements of prophets with two aspects of the mirror: man as mirror of God and God as mirror of man.

God manifests himself in the sphere of being and wants to become acquainted with himself by means of an object. The nature of the object is so that it reflects God like a mirror. This object is endowed with existence (*al-wuǧūd*), that means that it does not belong to the Eternal Beings. The being is created by his word كن. In this manner he can see his own mystery. But the spirit is missing, it is only a rough mirror in which the divine presence is absent, but the spirit of God has to finish its work. Therefore "When I have fashioned him and breathed of My spirit into him" (S. XV 29), the mirror is polished and Adam is the perfect man, according to Ibn ʿArabī, a notion that occurs also in the Jewish, Greek and Gnostic world. Ibn ʿArabī's theory is to find back in the Twelvers, where the 12th Imām is the perfect man, who will be the accomplishment of the world and the saviour of mankind.

But God is also the mirror of mankind. God is absolutely active, whereas the mirror is passive. The mirror receives his images from elsewhere. But the mystic comes to knowledge through intuition, so that man gets divine illumination, through which he is able to look into the mirror of God. God himself is hidden, but visible in the mirror. God covers man with light. This mystic has two mystic states, the *fanāʾ*, to get into the influence of God so that the descent of God is possible and he can ascend to God, and the other, the *baqāʾ*, that causes him coming in a mystic state.

Herman Landolt: *Les idées Platoniciennes et le monde de l'image dans la pensée du Šayḫ al-Išrāq Yaḥyā al-Suhrawardī (ca. 1155-1191).*

The most famous book of Suhrawardī is *Kitāb ḥikmat al-išrāq* (The book of the wisdom of the Illumination), because of which he is called *Šayḫ al-Išrāq*. The book starts with much criticism on Averroes (*Tahāfut at-tahāfut*) and on Ġazālī (*Tahāfut al-falāsifa*). Suhrawardī wanted to restore the authority of a Neoplatonic Plato and the wisdom of old Persian Zoroastrian sages, as Henri Corbin stated, who showed his obscure theory of Illumination, *Išrāq*.

Suhrawardī returned to the Ideas of Plato (*al-muṯul al-aflāṭūnīya*) which in reality exist as universalia in two types: two types of *kullī*, i.e. *mā qabla 'l-kaṯra* and *mā baʿda 'l-kaṯra*, because he assumed the Platonic Ideas as quidditates (*ḏawāt*), which became for him *arbāb al-aṣnām an-nawʿīya* (the lords of the specific images). From the universalia (*kullī*) appear the different emanations. The separated pure lights (*al-anwār al-muǧarrada*) are not incarnated, but are being manifested in the material world, perhaps in any form of some divine imām or sufi *šayḫ*. He thought that the world of Ideas (*ʿālam al-miṯāl*) is a real world with light and dark in contrast with the Platonic Ideas. It is the world to which the pure soul rises.

Many terms he used, are also found at the *Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ*, but also at some ancient Greeks as Empedocles and Agathodemon, cf. Daniel De Smet's book *Empedocles Arabus*, Bruxelles 1998.

Sajjad H. Rizvi: *"Au-delà du miroir" or beyond discourse and intuition: pedagogy and epistemology in the philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā Šīrāzī (ca. 1571-1635).*

After an extensive biography of Mullā Ṣadrā and a description of his books, esp. *Al-Ḥikma al-Mutaʿāliya fī-l-Asfār al-ʿAqlīya al-Arbaʿa*, a large compendium of philosophy and theology with the different philosophical journeys from this world to God, Rizvi concludes that it is based on the soteriology and eschatology of the Twelfer Shiʿism and an important Neoplatonic substrate.

Mullā Ṣadrā started his work with *aḥkām al-wuǧūd* (properties of existence) about his definition and vision of metaphysics. Knowledge is grasping universalia and constructing chain of syllogistic deductions. Therefore pedagogy is very important in taking the student in a certain way in teaching him the art of argumentation and reasoning. With this theory he is near to the Socratic method you will find in the Platonic dialogues: deriving knowledge of the nature of things by deciphering their definitions. Suhrawardī's epistemological theory of *ilm ḥuḍūrī* is an intuition of the mirror of the soul. He describes subsequently this *ilm ḥuḍūrī* and how to get it: through self-knowledge. The path to self-knowledge is through *al-ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya*, the transcendent philosophy described as a method of stepping beyond the mirrors of the intellect and the soul, which is only possible through mystical disclosure.

In short, this article is a good introduction to the difficult philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā.

Christine van Ruymbeke: *L'histoire du concours des peintres Rūmīs and Chīnīs chez Niẓāmī et chez Rūmī. Deux aspects du miroir.*

Van Ruymbeke speaks about the parable used by two famous Persian poets, *Niẓāmī* and *ar-Rūmī* to illustrate two epistemological theories in philosophical and mystical point of view, showing how many elements have been derived from Greek thinkers. The story is accepted of being borrowed from the Ġazālī's *Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm ad-dīn*.

In the *Iskandar Nāma* Alexander the Great was surrounded by all Greek philosophers. He gets all the wisdom and becomes a prophet. He starts his journeys around the world to bring the real religion to all peoples, a sort of pre-Islam, a type king-philosopher-prophet we know from Fārābī. In the first part of it, the *Šaraf Nāma*, Iskandar and the Hāqān of Chīnī organise a competition of painters of both countries (the Rūmī and the Chīnī). The painters could not see the pictures of each other, separated through a curtain. But after the curtain was removed, the king saw two identical paintings. But it appeared to be a mirror, in which the painting of the Rūmī (Greeks) was reflected. This story belongs to a longer history that Iskandar, approaching China, came in contact with the Hāqān. The Hāqān made peace, but the next day the Hāqān approached with a big army. First thought of Iskandar was that he violated the treaty, but the Hāqān came to show him his army. The King did not see the reality, but the sage was the active Intellect and saw the truth.

Because of its overall picture it is easy to gain an overview of the Neo-Platonic influence on the islamic philosophy, especially due to its starting point from Plotinus and Proclus. Sometimes you ought to have some patience, when the argument is somewhat long and the quotations are very complete.

Culemborg, 20-10-2014 Lou FILIUS

*
* *

PITSCHKE, C. — Skrupulöse Frömmigkeit im frühen Islam. Das »Buch der Gewissensfrömmigkeit« von Ahmad b. Hanbal. Annotierte Übersetzung und thematische Analyse. (Arabische Studien, 5). Verlag Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 2010. (24 cm, IX, 290). ISBN 978-3-447-06136-0. ISSN 1860-5117. € 64,-.

The *Kitāb al-Waraʿ* is a collection of traditions attributed to the famous Sunnite scholar Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (780–855 AD), eponym of the Hanbalite school of law (*madhhab*). Ibn Ḥanbal was known for his stress on correct religious conduct in accordance with traditions handed down from whom he considered to be the pious forefathers. The work under review is an annotated German translation of the *Kitāb al-Waraʿ* with a thematic analysis of its contents for which the author was granted a PhD by the Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena in 2006, published here in a slightly different version.

The author very clearly explains what *waraʿ* ("conscious pious deliberation") means, discussing it side-by-side with the closely related term *zuhd* (renunciation). While *zuhd* entails a striving toward asceticism, *waraʿ* is a conscious and intentional deliberation about what one may and may not do in practicing one's belief. In other words, the *Kitāb al-Waraʿ* provides the reader with Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal's views as to what is permissible and what is not permissible for the piously-minded.

The book consists of three main parts. Part A is introductory; Part B deals directly with the *Kitāb al-Waraʿ* while

Part C contains an appendix, bibliography and indices. Pages 1–7 preface the book and provide us with an explanation of the concept of *waraʿ* by contrasting it with its semantic cousin *zuhd* which conveys a different meaning as just noted. Next, the author offers us a snapshot of Ibn Ḥanbal's prominence and reputation, both in the classical Islamic tradition as well as in our present day and age. An overview (p. 8–12) summarizes Ibn Ḥanbal's life and work, including information on his family, his journeys undertaken in search of *ʿilm* (religious knowledge *par excellence*) and his teachers. Subsequently, Ibn Ḥanbal's role in the *miḥna* is narrated. The *miḥna* refers to the seventh Abbasid caliph al-Ma'mūn's attempt (r. 813–833 AD) to enforce his religious viewpoints on the Islamic Community, the ulama in particular. Ibn Ḥanbal's opposition to the caliphal order to acquiesce in the caliph's doctrine of the createdness of the Qur'an (*khalq al-qurʾān*), transformed him into a hero especially in the eyes of the chroniclers who coined the term "*miḥna*," which literally means a test or tribulation, to describe Ibn Ḥanbal's ordeal during this tumultuous period of Islamic history. The last section (p. 13–19) discusses other authors who have written about *waraʿ* together with their works, alongside a short description of wrong attributions of the work. The published editions of the *Kitāb al-Waraʿ* are the subject matter of the next section (p. 21–33) which also elaborates on the various transmitters and/or transmission lines of the *Kitāb al-Waraʿ*. Afterwards (p. 31–33), short biographical notices of a number of pious men who "fit" into the framework of the *Kitāb al-Waraʿ* are narrated.

In the section containing the thematic overview (p. 34–66), the author identifies and lists seventeen different main topics discussed in the *Kitāb al-Waraʿ*, after which the core of the book follows, the annotated translation itself (p. 67–167 the first part and p. 168–249 the second and final part of the *Kitāb al-Waraʿ*). An appendix which collates the existing published editions of the *Kitāb al-Waraʿ* (unfortunately the author missed one published edition, see below), the bibliography, an index of names and, finally, an index of subjects close the book (p. 251–290).

The author of the work under review used one edition as basis and collated it with other existing editions, summarizing similarities and variants in a separate appendix to aid the reader (p. 251–271). The basic edition used was the collection by al-Marrūdhī, *Kitāb al-Waraʿ*, edited by Samīr ibn Amīn al-Zubayrī, Riyad 1997 AD/1418 AH (208 pages). This edition was collated with three other printed collections: (1) *Kitāb al-Waraʿ*, edited by Muḥammad Zaghlūl, Beirut 1988 AD/1409 AH (166 pages); (2) *Ḳitāb al-Waraʿ*, no editor listed, Cairo 1921 AD/1340 AH (126 pages), and (3) *Kitāb al-Waraʿ*, edited by Zaynab Ibrāhīm al-Qārūṭ, Beirut 1983 AD/1403 AH (208 pages). Much to my surprise, I must confess, when I went to my study to get the edition I own, I discovered that it was yet another edition, not listed by the author: *Kitāb al-Waraʿ*, edited by Muṣṭafā Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Dhahabī, Mecca and Riyad: Maktabat Nizār Muṣṭafā al-Bāz, 1997/1418 (164 pages). This edition is a collection of sayings attributed to Ibn Ḥanbal compiled by one of his adepts, Abū Bakr al-Marwazī (d. 888 AD/275 AH) — one of the transmission lines of the work discussed by the author. All in all, then, there are five separate editions of this work; four of which were used and collated by the author and a fifth one that was missed — something that could happen to any researcher given the nature of how books are published in the Arab world.

In referring to the secondary literature, it seems that the author chose to stick as closely as possible to the subject at hand — Ibn Ḥanbal and *waraʿ*. However, a number of works by Christopher Melchert are germane to the discussion and should have been at least mentioned in the book under review. For the benefit of the reader, I will include these works here, to be added to the book's Bibliography: "The Piety of the Hadith Folk", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 34 (2002): 425-39; "Early Renunciants as Hadith Transmitters". *The Muslim World*, 92, no. 3: 407. (2002); "Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal's Book of Renunciation", *Der Islam* 85 (2008): 345-59 (to be sure, the last articles deal with another work attributed to Ibn Ḥanbal, the *Kitāb al-Zuhd*, but are important to understand Ibn Ḥanbal's position more thoroughly).

The translation is accurate as is the annotation. However, it does require some close reading at times since the author includes variegated details to help make the text as accessible as possible for his readers. Much to the author's credit, he explicitly states that some of the traditions included in the *Kitāb al-Waraʿ* cannot be straightforwardly translated. Indeed, in the translation and the annotation the author helps us by indicating where he experienced problems with the translation.

To acquaint the reader somewhat with the contents and substance of this work, I will take silk as an example as it is discussed in the *Kitāb al-Waraʿ*. A tradition is presented in which the prophet Muḥammad forbids the use of silk or of any material even partially made from silk (p. 234). Elsewhere (p. 131), Ibn Ḥanbal states that the use of silk for decoration is just as improper as the wearing of silk is. In between these two passages (p. 230), however, emphasizing the importance of gender segregation, Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal asserts that silk is forbidden for men but there is nothing wrong if women wear silk. At once, it is thus obvious what kind of work the *Kitāb al-Waraʿ* is: Statements are made throughout the entire book about topics with little analysis; the tradition is narrated and that's usually it. What makes the *Kitāb al-Waraʿ* so interesting are passages like this because one can discern how the ulama were still struggling with the question about the permissibility of wearing silk, something that ultimately would be condemned in the six Sunnite canonical hadith collections. Works like this one are therefore essential for anyone who seeks to understand the evolution of the Islamic religion. We are grateful to the author that he has made such a text also accessible for non-Arabists.

University of Leuven/ John A. Nawas
Institute for Advanced Arabic
and Islamic Studies, Antwerp November 2014

*
* *

GÜNEŞ, M. — Al-Ġazālī und der Sufismus. (Arabisch-Islamische Welt in Tradition und Moderne, 8). Verlag Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 2011. (24 cm, 306). ISBN 978-3-447-06498-9. ISSN 1864 -8002. € 56.-.

The book under review served the Turkish Muslim author Merdan Güneş (from now on referred to as G.) as thesis in

Heidelberg in 2009. His *Doktorvater* was professor R.G. Khoury. The reader is not told whether the author is a practicing sufi himself. This is not an irrelevant question to start this review with. Al-Ghazāli (AD 1058-1111. In the review this current spelling is used. Cf. W. Montgomery Watt, *Muslim Intellectual. A study of al-Ghazali* (Edinburgh: University Press 1963/1971), Excursus [:] Ghazālī or Ghazzālī, pp. 181-183.) distinguished between knowledge about Sufism and experience with it, as essential prerequisites to understand what Sufism is all about. A Muslim author may possess both qualities.

I want to stress from the beginning —the critical comments I am about to make notwithstanding— that I consider G.'s book to be an important contribution to the study of the thought of Islam's greatest scholar al-Ghazāli. I allow myself a personal initial observation. Al-Ghazāli has kept me intrigued ever since my professor of Arabic at the Free University in Amsterdam, D.S. Attema, himself a pupil of the great al-Ghazāli scholar, the Leiden professor Arend Jan Wensinck (1882-1939), guided me and other students in 1959 in our efforts to understand al-Ghazāli. We were reading book 6 in part 4, *kitāb al-maḥabba* (*amor Dei*) of al-Ghazāli's magnum opus *Iḥyā' ʿulūm ad-dīn* ("The Revival of the Religious Sciences"). An additional reason to mention this is that G. underlines again and again that for al-Ghazāli love of God is the central concept of his sufi knowledge (*ʿilm*) and experience (*maʿrifa*). Only at a later stage we found out that H.H. Dingemans had translated al-Ghazāli's *Boek der Liefde* ("Book of Love") as part of his thesis in 1938. Attema had kept this a secret from his students, lest they should be tempted not to make their own translations. Dingemans' book sold well, may be because its title had a special appeal for buyers, who expected to find information about sexual behaviour in the Muslim world. They might have turned instead to the German translation by H. Bauer of al-Ghazāli's book on marriage (*Von der Ehe*, 1917). Already in 1938 Dingemans was pleading for a complete translation of all forty books of the *Iḥyā'* into modern European languages. As far as I can judge the work on translations of the *Iḥyā'* should now be almost complete or in its final stages. Because of the availability of many translations, also of many of his other works, I have stopped reading al-Ghazāli in Arabic. It was too time consuming. During the period we lived in Pakistan (1964-1977) Urdu became my tool to get to know Muslim thought in that region. Even there Muslim scholars preferred to read al-Ghazāli in English translations. I know of no Urdu translations of al-Ghazāli.

I return to Merdan Güneş' dissertation. After an introduction with a brief survey of recent research on al-Ghazāli (pp. 16-24) the book consists of three main sections. The first section describes Sufism from its earliest beginnings until the time of al-Ghazāli (pp. 25-90). Almost every paragraph of this first chapter ends with a quotation of al-Ghazāli to indicate continuity between the latter and his predecessors. The second section deals with al-Ghazāli's understanding of Sufism. In the final section G. outlines the assumed impact of al-Ghazāli on later developments of Sufism and even on mysticism and theological thought beyond Islam. The book contains a broad but not complete bibliography. Some important titles are not listed, as I will indicate below.

Rather than dealing with one aspect of al-Ghazāli's mystical thought, a method followed by several dissertations about this giant among Muslim authors, G. tries to give a comprehensive view of his main subject by placing it in a broader context. For a thesis this approach is a risky undertaking. A.J. Wensinck, well known for his concordance of Islamic traditions, after many years of intermittent studies of al-Ghazāli postponed his summary until the very end of his career. His beautiful *La Pensée de Ghazzāli* (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve 1940) was posthumously published.

In my review I follow the table of contents. In his introduction G. apologizes for not being complete while describing the state of research on al-Ghazāli not even as far as German scholarship is concerned. Al-Ghazāli studies put together are an ocean in which his own contribution, he modestly admits, is just a drop in that ocean. But his summary is still impressive. References to Turkish studies show how in that country al-Ghazāli enjoys scholarly attention. But with little effort G. might have added more Dutch, French, English and Italian titles of recent studies. The lemmas on al-Ghazāli in the first and second edition of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* by Duncan B. Macdonald and W. Montgomery Watt remain helpful introductions to older studies. Paolo Nicelli, "Al-Ghazāli Theologian and Spiritual Master", *Encounter. Documents for Muslim Christian Understanding*, volume 283, Rome, March/April 2002, mentions 19 titles of English translations of works of al-Ghazāli. For French translations of parts of the *Iḥyā'* Maurice Borrmans is helpful: "Paraboles, apologues et allegories au service du dialogue religieux chez Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali (à l'occasion du 900e anniversaire de sa mort)", *Se Comprendre* (Lyon), No 86/2 de 24 février 1986, 31ème année. Marie-Thérèse Hirsch translated book XXII of the *Iḥyā'* into French (Paris: Du Cerf 2007). Wensinck is mentioned a few times. But G., though he mentions Bar Hebraeus, obviously did not read Wensinck's translation of Bar Hebraeus' *Book of the Dove*, which shows in detail how much this Christian author is dependent upon al-Ghazāli. I happen to possess Wensinck's own printed copy of this book with many marginal remarks in his own beautiful handwriting in view of a reprint (which did not materialize). These notes show that the printed text does not contain all references to places where Bar Hebraeus follows al-Ghazāli's original. Wensinck also wrote in 1932 about Ghazāli's conversion ("bekeering") and Ghazāli's *Mishkāt al-Anwār* ("Niche of Lights") (probably in 1925). The latter study does not confirm G.'s assumption, based on the Turkish translation, that Wensinck had criticized the *Mishkāt* for its emanation theory (G., p. 111). Why should he? He is not a Muslim. As a scholar he just describes al-Ghazāli, he does not argue with him. As a Christian scholar, well acquainted with theology, he often makes comparisons with Christian medieval theology and philosophy, again without passing judgment. Referring to Wensinck himself rather than to a Turkish study about him would have been well in line with G.'s book. See: H. Kraemer, P.A.H. de Boer and W.C. van Unnik (eds.), *Semietische studiën uit de nalatenschap van Prof. Dr A.J. Wensinck* (Leiden 1941), pp. 154-177; 192-212. A.Th. van Leeuwen's thesis *Ghazālī als apologeet van de islam* (Leiden 1947) applies a Barthian critique of religion on al-Ghazāli's total oeuvre. He tries to show that al-Ghazāli failed as a reformer of Islam. In his view he is mainly an apologist of Islam. But his title "apologist of Islam" loses conviction when one realizes that it is partly based on the assumption that *ar-Radd al-djamīl* (see Franz-Elmar Wilms *Al-Ghazālīs Schrift wider die Gottheit Jesu* (Leiden 1966) and Chidiacs French translation of 1939)

belongs to the authentic works of the master. Hava Lazarus-Yafeh (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) has convincingly shown that this is not the case. See her study "Is there a concept of redemption in Islam?", in *Some Religious Aspects of Islam* (Leiden 1981), pp. 48-57 (in here: pp. 54-55). G. accepts *ar-Radd* as a genuine text of al-Ghazāli (p. 260, note 135).

In the first section, from paragraph 1.1 until 1.2.14, totalling 32 subdivisions, a survey of Sufism is presented. I mention the following items: its ascetic origins, the models of Muhammad and Jesus and Muhammad's contemporaries, the validity of the distinction between mysticism in general and Sufism as its Muslim expression, terminology and the origin of the term, branches and historical developments of Sufism. G. warns against the practice of some non-Muslim scholars to apply mystical terminology from elsewhere on Sufism. By doing so they might blur characteristics of mysticism which are unique for Islam. In four paragraphs he writes about the notion of love in Sufism -being the core of al-Ghazāli's mystical thought- and the place of Sufism among Islamic sciences. In this context I mention that Watt wrote that even after al-Ghazāli's *Iḥyā'* Sufistic teaching was not included in the curriculum of standard "Islamic sciences" (Watt, p. 178). G. rightly refers to studies on mysticism by Louis Gardet and the Egyptian George Anawati. Both authors also described in *Introduction à la Théologie Musulmane* (1948, pp. 113-120), how al-Ghazāli organized Islamic sciences and how he included Sufism. G. draws attention to the use of language by Sufi authors and the role of poetry in the spread of Sufism in Arabic, Persian and other languages. I like to add that the development of Urdu as a language owes much to Sufi poetry. The role of dreams and symbolism is not ignored. All important earlier works are briefly dealt with. The discussion about the origins of Sufism seems to be definitely settled in favour of genuine Islamic beginnings. G. returns to this point in section 3, p. 239: "Qur'ān and sunna as source of Sufism". Nevertheless G. does not exclude Iranian, Indian, Christian and neo-platonic influences on its beginnings. Readers would welcome a comparison, although brief, of Christian mysticism and Sufism.

The second section forms the central part of the book. G. follows most authors who discover in al-Ghazāli's autobiography, *al-Munqidh* ("Rescuer from Error"), a midlife crisis or even a conversion as the result of revelation. In this autobiography al-Ghazāli describes that in his search for religious certainty and peace with God and men, he had in vain studied theology, philosophy and law. In his *Munqidh* he wrote: "In the course of those periods of solitude things impossible to enumerate or detail in depth were disclosed to me. This much I shall mention, that profit may be derived from it: I know with certainty that the Sufis are those who uniquely follow the way to God Most High, their mode of life is the best of all, their way the most direct of ways, and their ethic the purest." I quote the translation of R.J. McCarthy, p. 94 (*Freedom and fulfillment. An annotated translation of Al-Ghazālī's* al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl *and other relevant works of al-Ghazālī* (Boston: Twayne 1980 = *Deliverance from error. An annotated translation of* al-Munqidh min al Ḍalāl *and other relevant works of Al-Ghazālī* (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae [around 1999], p. 81), which is not found in the book under review. The esoteric terms in this quotation will not remain unnoticed. G. maintains that al-Ghazāli did not experience a conversion in the sense that he broke radically with the past, and that there was almost a rupture as some claim. G. sees certainly a major change in emphasis in the way and goal of his life. Sufism was not a matter unknown to him before, since al-Ghazāli came from a pious family and had studied it. The newness implies that it became centre stage. At the same time he remained an Ashʿari theologian and kept emphasizing the importance of strict observation of legal prescriptions especially for the illiterate Muslim masses. G. describes al-Ghazāli's major mystical writings. That his shift to Sufism implied a change in emphasis in his theology proper became obvious by his paying more attention to the divine quality of love: God loves his creature who was created in His image and this creature is therefore capable of love (p. 180). Love is not found among the seven *sifāt maʿnawiyya* of *kalām*. (cf. C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Selected Works* (Leiden 1957), p. 82). The Sufi should go beyond knowledge about God, as derived from the holy texts and seek inner experience, light, illumination, unity. These states of mind lead the Sufi to the proximity of God. His *Mishkāt al-anwār* shows how. For the perception of the light of revelation rational analysis and observation fall short; the inner eye, the eye of faith is essential. Reflection on the divine names became an important aspect of Sufism. See Marston Speight, "Al-Ghazāli on the divine name, al-Muqsit (The just one): An opening for Muslim-Christian Dialogue" in *Recueil d'articles offert à Maurice Borrmans* (Rome 1996, pp. 223-229). G. shows on the basis of this theologically inspired anthropology how Sufi authors after Ghazāli developed their theories about the ideal human being, *al-insān al-kāmil* (p. 193). Al-Ghazāli may not have succeeded in changing the theological curricula, he certainly created space in the Muslim world for the acceptance of many forms of Sufism in mystical orders, in handbooks about the mystical paths, the importance of the system of *murshid* (leader) and *murīd* (disciple). Giving a summary goes beyond the purpose of a review. In section 3 G. first discusses the debate about Sufism among Muslim scholars. Because of the rather extreme views of some, al-Halladj for example, and the antinomian views of others strong opposition against Sufism has maintained itself until the present day. But al-Ghazāli had also followers who defended a consensus and, very much in line with the spirit of Islam, a midway. G. presents an overview of al-Ghazāli's impact on Muslims but also on Jewish and Christian thinkers. See above for Bar Hebraeus. G. mentions the great medieval scholar Thomas Aquinas. He could also have referred to Terry Hanley, "St. Thomas' Use of al-Ghazāli's *Maqāsid al-Falāsifa*" in *Medieval Studies*, Volume XLIII, 1982. Parallels with Christian thought are also dealt with, for example with St Augustine (AD 354-430) as shown by Frick. G. also mentions Pascal, whose word: "Le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît pas", comes very close to al-Ghazāli's critique of rational philosophy as ultimate source of knowledge. On the other hand there were critics too. The philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes) showed inconsistencies in the writings of al-Ghazāli. The Christian scholar Arend van Leeuwen argued that he failed as a reformer of Islam (see above).

G. does not present arguments for his suggestion that The Holy War and The Pilgrim's Progress by John Bunyan (1628-1688) were influenced by Islamic thought (p. 246). The idea seems rather farfetched. In conclusion this is not the definitive book about al-Ghazāli, but it certainly deserves

diligent attention of those who, like the present reviewer, are fascinated by al-Ghazāli. It presents a beautiful and coherent overview. In a reprint, which this book deserves, shortcomings can be amended. Personally I would have appreciated it if this thesis would have contained less opinions about the master and more texts of him.

Leusden, December 2014 Jan SLOMP